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ABSTRACT
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has often been hailed as
an engine of European integration. Entrusted with the task of securing the uniform interpretation of the law of the European Union—
among other functions—the ECJ makes use of comparative law for
a variety of purposes. The very composition of the Court and its peculiar linguistic regime make the Court a major comparative law
laboratory. Under the Treaties, the Court is explicitly authorised to
∗ Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Turin (Italy). A shorter version
of this article was presented as the 42nd John H. Tucker, jr. Lecture in Civil Law,
held at LSU on Sept. 5, 2019. I am grateful to Prof. Olivier Moréteau for his wonderful hospitality, and for his comments on a previous version of this text. I wish
to thank Christabelle Lefebvre for her great editorial assistance.
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resort to comparative law as a method of judicial interpretation with
regard to certain aspects of European law. But comparative law is
an essential tool for the Court in several other contexts as well. This
article is the occasion to take a closer look at the role that comparative law plays in the development of the jurisprudence of the Court,
and to showcase some salient applications of it. Quite often, the
Court limits references to comparative law arguments to a few lines
in its judgments. Nonetheless, comparisons that go far beyond the
merely technical aspects of the law are part and parcel of the everyday business of the Court. Even when the language of comparative
law is not overtly spoken, those comparisons define the ethos of the
European Union, and show how the Union sets out to challenge, and
change, the laws of the Member States.
Keywords: comparative law, European law, legal harmonization, legal translation, general principles of law, autonomous concepts,
constitutional traditions, constitutional identity, European Court of
Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
The European Court of Justice, known as the ECJ, is entrusted
with the task of securing the uniform interpretation and application
of the law of the European Union (EU). 1 To achieve its mandate, the
ECJ often draws on the methodologies of comparative law to interpret the law of the EU. I intend to showcase aspects of this practice
and highlight how it has been fundamental to the growth of European law. The ECJ is now part of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is comprised of the ECJ and the General Court.
The General Court is a specialised Court of more limited jurisdiction. The ECJ remains the dominant forum for the most important
part of the judicial business of the Union. In this paper, I will therefore mostly focus on the ECJ as a consumer of comparative law.

1. Article 19 Treaty on European Union [hereinafter TEU].
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There is an abundance of literature on the various uses of comparative law by constitutional and supreme courts around the
world. 2 This literature analyses citation patterns and practices and
mutual influences, but also poses a good number of critical questions concerning the use of comparative law by courts. A basic question is whether comparative law references are relevant at all in deciding a case pending before a national court. What are these
2. To mention works published in the last twenty years only, see, e.g., THE
USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS, XIVTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, ATHENS 1997 (U. Drobnig & S. van Erp eds., Kluwer 1999);
B. Markesinis & J. Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11 (2005);
G. F. FERRARI & A. GAMBARO, CORTI NAZIONALI E COMPARAZIONE GIURIDICA
(E.S.I. 2006); B. S. MARKESINIS, J. FEDTKE & L. ACKERMANN, JUDICIAL
RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: A NEW SOURCE OF INSPIRATION? (UCL Press
2006); B. S. MARKESINIS & J. FEDTKE, ENGAGING WITH FOREIGN LAW (Hart
Publ’g 2009); T. H. BINGHAM, WIDENING HORIZONS: THE INFLUENCE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ON DOMESTIC LAW (Cambridge
U. Press 2010); G. Smorto, L’uso giurisprudenziale della comparazione, EUROPA
E DIRITTO PRIVATO 223 (2010); V. BARSOTTI & V. VARANO, 1 IL NUOVO RUOLO
DELLE CORTI SUPREME NELL’ORDINE POLITICO E ISTITUZIONALEDIALOGO DI
DIRITTO COMPARATO (Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2012); M. BOBEK,
COMPARATIVE REASONING IN EUROPEAN SUPREME COURTS (Oxford U. Press
2013); M. Gelter & M. M. Siems, Language, Legal Origins, and Culture Before
the Courts: Cross-Citations Between Supreme Courts in Europe, 21 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 215 (2013); 1 THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES (T. Groppi & M-C. Ponthoreau eds., Hart Publ’g 2013);
E. MAK, JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN A GLOBALISED WORLD: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGING PRACTICES OF WESTERN HIGHEST
COURTS (Hart Publ’g 2013); M. Gelter & M.M. Siems, Citations to Foreign
Courts—Illegitimate and Superfluous, or Unavoidable? Evidence from Europe,
62 AM. J. COMP. LAW 35, 35–86 (2014); R. HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS:
THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Oxford U. Press
2014); COURTS AND COMPARATIVE LAW (M. Andenas & D. Fairgrieve eds., Oxford U. Press 2015); A. von Bogdandy, Comparative Constitutional Law as a Social Science? A Hegelian Reaction to Ran Hirschl’s Comparative Matters, 55 DER
STAAT 103–115 (2016), available at https://perma.cc/3CX3-NMTB; D. S. Law,
Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy, 168 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA L.
REV. 927 (2015); R. Hirschl, Judicial Review and the Politics of Comparative
Citations: Theory, Evidence & Methodological Challenges, in COMPARATIVE
JUDICIAL REVIEW (E.F. Delaney & R. Dixon eds., Edward Elgar 2018); JUDICIAL
COSMOPOLITANISM: THE USE OF FOREIGN LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS (G. F. Ferrari ed., Brill Nijhoff 2019); C. Lienen, Judicial Constitutional Comparativism at the UK Supreme Court, 39 LEG. STUD.
166 (2018). The literature on judicial dialogue, judicial globalization, community
of courts, or transnational organizational field of courts, provides further insights
on the trends mapped by this literature. For the historical perspective, see G.
Gorla, Il ricorso alla legge di un “luogo vicino” nell’ambito del diritto comune
europeo, 89 FORO IT. (1973).
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references? A mere puffery by learned jurists, an embellishment of
national laws, the mark of a desperate litigator? What else could they
be? Another question often posed is to what degree are comparative
law arguments made by the courts legitimate? Do they simply fall
outside the purview of the judge because they go beyond the local,
applicable law? Are they legitimate, if examined under the broad
rule of law criteria? In some judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court
these questions emerge and are also addressed by some members of
that Court in their extrajudicial writings. 3 Personally, I had the
pleasure of listening to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on these very
issues. The occasion was the World Congress of Comparative Law
held in Washington, D.C. by the International Academy of Comparative law in 2010. 4 It was a fascinating lecture, which defended the
use of comparative law in constitutional adjudication. Closer to
home, the Italian Constitutional Court has increasingly paid attention to comparative law as a subject that is relevant in various ways
to the decision of constitutional law cases. 5 A former Italian Constitutional Court Judge, Prof. Sabino Cassese, pointed to the fact that
in the late twentieth century the increased relevance of comparative
law in this context has been favoured by the demise of the ideology
3. S. A. Simon, The Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional
Rights Cases: an Empirical Study, 1 J. L. CTS. 279 (2013); R.C. Black, R. J. Owens & J. L. Brookhart, We Are the World: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Sources of Law, 46 BRITISH J. POLITICAL SCI. 891 (2014); G. F. Ferrari, Legal
Comparison Within the Case Law of the Supreme Court of the United States of
America, in JUDICIAL COSMOPOLITANISM 94 (Brill Nijhoff 2019).
4. The speech was delivered on July 30, 2010. It is now reported on the web
site of the Supreme Court of the United States, available at https://perma.cc/68QJXJVV. An extended version of the speech was delivered on previous occasions;
see., e.g., R. Bader Ginsburg, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Humankind:
The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 64
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 575 (2005).
5. For a recent assessment, see P. Passaglia, Corte costituzionale e comparazione giuridica: una analisi (molto) sineddotica, una conclusione (quasi) sinestesia, in 12 I RAPPORTI CIVILISTICI NELL’INTERPRETAZIONE DELLA CORTE
COSTITUZIONALE NEL DECENNIO 2006–2016, 12° CONVEGNO NAZIONALE DELLA
SOCIETÀ ITALIANA DEGLI STUDIOSI DEL DIRITTO CIVILE (E.S.I 2018). The offices
of the Court have produced a document that reflects on this use as well; see R.
Nevola, Corte Costituzionale: Servizio Studi, L’assistenza alla decisione giurisdizionale (Oct. 2018), available at https://perma.cc/H5S6-EHN9.
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of nationalism, and by the spreading of the awareness that common
problems may yield common solutions, elaborated beyond the nation state, at the international level. 6
The literature that I have just mentioned is hardly relevant to approach the use of comparative law by the European Court of Justice,
however. The use of comparative law reasoning by the ECJ must be
understood holistically, in the light of the institutional position of
the Court and the nature of EU law. Far from being contested, recourse to the use of comparative law by the ECJ is widely accepted.
The legitimacy of recourse to comparative law in the interpretation
or application of European law derives, in specific instances, from
the texts of the Treaties that are the bulwark of the EU’s very existence, as it will be seen. But, beyond those specific cases, comparative law is widely accepted (and practiced) by all the players in the
game: members of the Court, litigants, and academic commentators
on EU law by and large share the same support for the legitimacy of
comparative law in the judicial practice of the ECJ. Eminent members of the Court—including its current President, Koen Lenaerts—
writing in their extrajudicial capacity signal the substantial role that
comparative law plays in the jurisprudence of the Court. 7 I will
6. S. Cassese, Sulla diffusione nel mondo della giustizia costituzionaleNuovi paradigmi per la comparazione giuridica, 4 RIV. TRIM. DIR. PUB. 993
(2016).
7. F.G. Jacobs, Comparative Law and European Union Law, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 525 (2d. ed., M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann
eds, Oxford U. Press 2019) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
LAW]; K. Lenaerts, The European Court of Justice and the Comparative Law
Method, 25 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 297 (2017); K. Lenaerts, The Comparative Law
Method and the European Court of Justice: Echoes Across the Atlantic, 64 AM.
J. COMP. L. 841 (2016); K. Lenaerts, La Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne
et la méthode comparative, in LE DROIT COMPARÉ AU XXIE SIÈCLE—ENJEUX ET
DÉFIS 35 (B. Fauvarque-Cosson ed. 2015). For previous extra judicial writings by
members of the Court on its use of comparative law methods, see P. Mengozzi,
Les principes fondamentaux du droit communautaire et les droits des États
membres, 3 RDUE 435 (2002); W. Van Gerven, Comparative Law in a Texture
of Communitarization of National Laws and Europeanization of Community Law,
in JUDICIAL REVIEW IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVELIBER AMICORUM IN
HONOUR OF LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY 433 (Kluwer 2000); C. N. Kakouris, Use of
the Comparative Method by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 6
PACE INT’L L. REV. 267 (1994); J. Mertens de Wilmars, Le droit comparé dans la
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therefore discuss the overall practice of comparative law by the
Court, while highlighting some of its specific features. I will then
formulate a few observations concerning this practice, to better understand what the Court is comparing when it goes about the business of rendering its rulings.
II. MULTILINGUALISM, TRANSLATION, AND INTERPRETATION AT THE
ECJ
A preliminary point to consider is the specific linguistic regime
governing litigation at the ECJ in Luxembourg. This regime mirrors
the institutional position of a supranational court that belongs to an
integrated multilingual European legal order. The twenty-eight
judges of the Court, one for each Member State, and the eleven Advocates General of the Court, are called upon to work as well in a
multilingual environment. The European Union’s linguistic regime
requires the publication of EU law in all the twenty-four official languages of the Member States, bar one, Irish, that, for resource-related reasons, is not as well served. 8 The specific linguistic arrangements governing the procedure of the ECJ need not be presented in
detail here, 9 but they surely involve a huge translation and interpretation effort. In the preliminary ruling procedure, used by the
jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, JOURNAL DES
TRIBUNAUX 37 (1991); Y. Galmot, Réflexions sur le recours au droit comparé
par la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, 6 RFDA 255 (1990); P.
Pescatore, Le recours, dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, à des normes déduites de la comparaison des droits des États
membres, 32 R.I.D.C. 337 (1980) (with citations to prior contributions on the
same topic); for the opinion of a former member of the Commission’s legal services, see M. Hilf, The Role of Comparative Law in the Jurisprudence of the Court
of Justice of the European Communities, in THE LIMITATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 558 (Yvon Blais 1986).
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 920/2005 of June 13, 2005, amending Regulation No 1 of April 15, 1958 determining the language to be used by the European Economic Community and Regulation No 1 of April 15, 1958 determining
the language to be used by the European Atomic Energy Community and introducing temporary derogation measures from those Regulations.
9. For a short explanation of the applicable rules, see Court of Justice of the
European Union, Language arrangements at the Court of Justice of the European
Union, https://perma.cc/X9H6-FVMD.
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national courts to refer questions relating to the interpretation of the
EU to the ECJ, the language of the questions posed to the ECJ determines the language of the case. The preliminary questions formulated by the local court must then be immediately translated in all
the other official languages of the Union for their publication in the
Official Journal of the European Union. The deliberations and the
internal communications of the Court are all in French, which was
the language of choice when the Court was established in 1958.
French is also the language of the draft judgments deliberated by the
Court and of the final judgment. Once more, however, the judgment
has to be translated in the language of the original procedure—the
language considered authentic—and then in all the official languages of the Union. By itself, this demanding linguistic regime involves considerable comparative law skills. To provide reliable, accurate renderings of meaning across all these languages is a formidable task. One commentator who closely observed the workings of
the institution noticed that: “the role of translation at the CJEU goes
deeper than ‘simply’ converting judgments from the working language of that Court into the other twenty-three EU official languages. Translation is, in fact, embedded in the process of drafting,
reasoning and deciding a case before the CJEU.” 10 Consider, for example, the case of Webb v. Webb. 11 This litigation raised a question
of jurisdiction over an immovable property located in France that
was subject to an English resulting trust. The question referred to
the Court required the European judge to be familiar with notions
such as legal ownership, beneficial interest, presumption of advancement, and the nature of a resulting trust. To translate these
terms into languages other than English, where the trust may be a
10. K. McAuliffe, Translating Ambiguity, 9 J. COMP. L. 65, 66 (2015). For
an insider’s view of the process that is involved in the drafting of a judgment, see
K. McAuliffe, Behind the Scenes at the Court of Justice, in EU LAW STORIES:
CONTEXTUAL AND CRITICAL HISTORIES OF EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 35 (B. Davies & F. Nicola eds., Cambridge U. Press 2017) [hereinafter EU LAW STORIES].
11. C-294/92 George Lawrence Webb v Lawrence Desmond Webb [1994]
ECR, I-01717.
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relatively new or even non-existent concept, surely requires comparative law skills. A similar difficulty may arise with purely civilian notions, of course. For instance, can a usufruct over immovable
property be compared to the concept of “leasing or letting of immovable property” for tax purposes? In giving a positive answer to
this question, Advocate General Francis Jacobs provided an extensive comparative examination of the legal regimes of Europe in relation to time limited rights over immovable property. 12 This is a
wonderful example of functional comparative law. It must have also
been a formidable challenge for the lawyer-linguists who translated
this opinion into all the other official languages of the Union. 13 To
facilitate the tasks of the 606 lawyer-linguists employed at the
Court, 14 there is a terminology coordination unit that handles the
management of (comparative) multilingual legal terminology. This
unit defines and coordinates the terminological projects that contribute to the overall quality of the texts; among its tasks there is the
terminological and legal pre-processing of the documents to be
translated. 15
III. COMPARATIVE LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR SHARED MEANING IN
EUROPEAN LAW
As discussed in the next pages, recourse to comparative law in
the interpretation and application of EU law is expressly warranted
12. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on Feb. 22, 2001, Case C326/99 Stichting “Goed Wonen” v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [2001] ECR I06831.
13. On the role of Court’s lawyer-linguists, see K. McAuliffe, Hidden Translators: The Invisibility of Translators and the Influence of Lawyer-Linguists on
the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 3 LANGUAGE AND
LAW/LINGUAGEM E DIREITO 3, 5 (2016). McAuliffe notes that the grounding of
jurisprudence in the historical French, as dictated by the Court, secures the stable
meaning of the terms of art. However, this at times leaves even native French
speakers struggling with the interpretation of their own language.
14. COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Annual report−The Year in
Review 19 (2018).
15. For more information on this unit, see Court of Justice of the European
Union, Projects and Terminological Coordination Unit, https://perma.cc/867XZ7DV.
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by the Treaties in some cases. 16 Beyond those cases, the Court also
has recourse to comparative law even when it is not expressly sanctioned by the Treaties. The uniform interpretation and application of
EU law throughout the Union requires the establishment of a uniform meaning of the law across the Union’s languages. This meaning may be established in clear terms by the European texts, which
often provide the relevant definitions and notions. But this is not
always the case, and therefore the Court must decide whether, absent
a clear indication by those texts, a certain term or expression shall
nonetheless have a uniform meaning across the Union, or not. Sometimes the laws of many jurisdictions may converge on a single answer to this question, by providing a shared meaning for a certain
term or expression, but this is seldom the case. When the laws of the
Member States go in different directions, comparative law helps the
Court establish the level of uniformity or divergence that is achieved
or should be achieved by EU law on a certain point. To cater to the
relevant research and documentation needs, the Court has in place
tailored support resources. The Court may thus turn to the services
of its Research and Documentation Directorate to acquire a comparative law report on any question that merits an analysis. Sadly, these
reports are still not accessible to the public and to researchers. And,
in this respect at least, comparative law operates behind the scenes
in the workings of the European judiciary.
How does the Court proceed to resolve conflicting interpretations of EU law between the Member States? Here is a simple, illustrative example, provided by a famous package travel case. 17 A girl
went on holiday with her parents in Turkey. At the club where they
spent their vacation, she got food poisoning. After her return to Austria, she claimed damages for pain and suffering and, most importantly, for her spoiled holiday. The defendant was a German
travel agency. Vacation packages in Europe were then governed by
16. See infra Parts VII, VIII.
17. Case C-168/00 Simone Leitner v TUI Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG
[2002] ECR I-02631.
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Council Directive 90/314/EEC (Directive 90/314), implemented by
all the Member States. 18 But how does the concept of “damages”
play out in EU law under this directive was unclear. The Austrian
Court that had jurisdiction over the case rejected the claim for the
loss of enjoyment of the holiday. Under Austrian law, this type of
non-material loss was not a compensable loss. On appeal, the Court
formulated a request for a preliminary ruling by the ECJ. The question referred to the ECJ concerned the concept of “damages” under
the applicable package travel directive. Can damages include compensation for the non-material damage suffered by the unlucky
young tourist? Without a clear answer in the directive, was the Austrian Court right to simply apply its own law concerning what damage is recoverable in similar circumstances? Or does the Directive
require an autonomous notion of “damages” for the purpose of giving effect to its provisions?
In addressing this issue, the ECJ had before itself a variety of
solutions prevailing in the laws of Member States: some favouring
compensation for the non-material damages, others rejecting it. Advocate General Tizzano, presenting this picture to the Court, spotted
a trend prevailing across the Member State favouring the reparation
of the non-pecuniary damage for spoiled holidays. 19 Furthermore, to
rule out a uniform approach to those losses would have frustrated
one of the purposes of Directive 90/314, namely the securing of

18. Council Directive 90/314/EEC of June 13, 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours, OJ L 158, 23.6.1990, p. 59–64. The Directive has
been replaced by a new instrument, which is force since 2018; see Directive (EU)
2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Nov. 25, 2015 on
package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No
2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC, OJ L 325, 11.12.2015, p.
1–33. The recitals of the new Directive now make clear that damages for spoiled
holidays under the Directive shall: “cover non-material damage, such as compensation for loss of enjoyment of the trip or holiday because of substantial problems
in the performance of the relevant travel services.”
19. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano delivered on Sept. 20, 2001, Case
C-168/00 Simone Leitner v TUI Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG [2002] ECR I02631.
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undistorted competition in the functioning of the internal market. 20
Following the Advocate General’s opinion, the Court thus held that
compensation of the non-pecuniary damage asked by the claimant
for the non-performance of touristic services should have been allowed, if such damages were proven before the national court. 21
IV. THE KEYWORDS, THE CONCEPTS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
This brings me to highlight two points. First, the methodology
to research key sources, namely the case law corpus of the EJC,
which can give us a fuller picture of the use of comparative law by
the Court. A textual search in the European case law database EurLex to find documents containing the words “comparative law”
would have missed the package travel case I have just mentioned.
How can this be? The keyword “comparative” is absent from the
judgment; the search string “comparative law” is not found in the
Advocate General’s opinion too, because he uses the expression
“comparative analysis” instead. If my tentative count is correct, no
more than ten court judgments contain a textual reference to “comparative law.” Indeed, this is a rare textual occurrence. The Advocate Generals’ opinions present a more encouraging picture. A first
tentative count produces 108 opinions containing the search string
“comparative law.” But, as mentioned above, these numbers cannot
be considered reliable if we intend to go into the substance of the
matter. Let there be no doubt about this: a deeper investigation
would turn out different numbers. How different? This is difficult to
say. No study has systematically addressed this precise question so
far. In other words, this is a latent reservoir of comparative law exercises that has yet to be tapped for research purposes.
Let me now turn to the second point mentioned above, which
concerns the nature of the exercise in which the Court is involved
when deciding similar cases. By securing the uniform interpretation
20. Id. at ¶ 44.
21. Case C-168/00.
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and application of EU law across Europe, the Court reduces the discretion that is otherwise left to the Member States, as it did in the
package travel case discussed above. There can be no uniform interpretation of EU law if the Member States were to enjoy a high degree of discretion, as it happens when the Treaties allow for this diversity, because a certain matter is not attributed to the competence
of the Union, or because the Union has not legislated to introduce
such uniformity, even though it would have been competent to do
so. Nonetheless, when the Court elaborates the autonomous concepts that are needed to establish the uniformity that is required, the
Court often consults the laws of the Member States, and draws from
them, thus avoiding a top down approach to the interpretation of EU
law. Why does this happen?
It is true that the legal order established by the Treaties is autonomous from the laws of the Member States. 22 This is a constitutional
feature of EU law. Yet, despite this, the legal order established by
the Union is also incomplete in many respects, precisely because it
is a new legal order. To put it quite bluntly and in common sense
language: in many respects EU law has more holes than a well-aged
piece of Swiss cheese. As Luigi Moccia wrote, this reflects an underlying structure in which “being a European lawyer,” “means to
be able to be a bridge for communication and the opening of its national (domestic) legal system with other member states’ legal systems and with the Union’s legal system itself, through the development on a comparative basis of a new European ius commune.” 23
22. Case 26-62 NV Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend
& Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR, English special edition, 00001; Case 6–64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR, English
special edition, 00585.
23. L. Moccia, Dalla comparazione alla integrazione giuridica: la via della
cittadinanza europea, 2 LA CITTADINANZA EUROPEA 5 (2015). Moccia’s following works have explored in depth these dimensions of the European order, both
from the historical and the current prespective, see L. Moccia, Prospetto storico
delle origini e degli atteggiamenti del moderno diritto comparato. (Per una teoria
dell’ordinamento giuridico “aperto”), RIV. TRIM. DIR. PROC. CIV 181 (1996); L.
Moccia, Diritto europeo, ordinamento aperto e formazione giuridica, 1 LA
CITTADINANZA EUROPEA 31 (2012); L. Moccia, Cittadinanza dell’Unione e
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The European Treaties established that the Court must secure the
uniform interpretation and application of the law, thus establishing
the principle of legality as the Union’s cornerstone. 24 But the Treaty
itself does not provide a full account of the substantive principles
underlying EU law. It also does not provide for the applicable standard of review. 25 This is why in the last two decades or so, with respect to core areas of private law, a legion of European jurists strived
to provide a text that would eventually help to fill many of the gaps,
by providing an overall frame of reference for those areas. 26 The
search for a full set of principles, concepts, and rules covering certain private law matters was driven by the desire to overcome the
piece-meal approach of EU law to contract, torts, delictual liability,
obligations, and so on. Whether the EU had the competence to enact
such a wide-ranging text was a foundational constitutional question, 27 which was often postponed in the debates over this proposal.
In the end, the Union decided not to go forward, for disparate reasons, which need not be investigated here. But the challenge posed
by this state of affairs remains open 28 and the many lessons linked
formazione di un diritto e di un giurista europeo, European Rights (2013), at
https://perma.cc/3RPF-TNZY. In the field of constitutional law, this is the approach strongly advocated by A. Von Bogdandy, The Past and Promise of Doctrinal Constructivism: A Strategy for Responding to the Challenges Facing Constitutional Scholarship in Europe. 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 364 (2009), and by the
scholars who worked with him to the books published in the series Handbuch Ius
Publicum Europaeum.
24. Article 19.1 TEU: “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall . . .
ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.” See also articles 251 et seq. Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.
25. T. TRIDIMAS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 20 (Oxford U. Press
2006); T. Koopmans, The Birth of European Law at the Crossroad of Legal traditions, 39 AM. J. COMP. LAW 493, 493–495 (1991). With regard to private law,
see N. REICH, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU CIVIL LAW (Intersentia 2014).
26. C. TWIGG-FLESNER, THE EUROPEANISATION OF CONTRACT LAW:
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES IN LAW (2d., Routledge 2013).
27. See, e.g., S.R. Weatherill, European Private Law and the Constitutional
Dimension, in THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAWCOLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW (F. Cafaggi
ed., Oxford U. Press 2006).
28. See, e.g., COMMENTARIES ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAWS (N. Jansen &
R. Zimmermann eds., Oxford U. Press 2018). The books in the Common Core of
European Private Law series with General Editors Ugo Mattei and Mauro
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to this failure must still be fully digested. 29 To further outline the
challenge that the Court must address in interpreting EU law, one
has to consider that any comparative law input must anyhow still
lead to the application of the rule that fits the aims or purposes of
the Union, because the use of comparative law as a means of gap
filling and interpretation of EU law is useful only insofar as it advances the purposes of the European legal order and fits coherently
into the system of EU law. 30 However, reference to the laws of
Member States remains indispensable in the search for a solution
that is fully in line with the objectives and basic principles of EU
law. This has been recognised by the Court over and over again,
from the very inception of its activity. The Algera case 31 is an early,
much cited illustration of this approach. In the Algera case, the Court
remarked that the rules of the Treaty did not cover the problem
raised by the litigation, namely the possibility of withdrawing an
administrative decision, but also found that the same problem was:
familiar in the case-law and learned writing of all the countries of the Community. . . . Unless the Court is to deny justice it is therefore obliged to solve the problem by reference
to the rules acknowledged by the legislation, the learned
writing and the case-law of the member countries. 32
The Court is not forced to a lowest common denominator when
proceeding in this way. As Advocate General Slynn remarked in a
later case with respect to the comparative examination of the various
national solutions: “Such a course is followed not to import national
Bussani, and the Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe,
started by Walter van Gerven and now directed by Dimitri Droshout, tackle as
well the same challenge.
29. For critical reflections on this, see the different remarks of P. Legrand,
Antivonbar, 1 J. COMP. L. 13 (2006) and H.-W. MICKLITZ, THE POLITICS OF
JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Cambridge U. Press 2018).
30. There is common agreement on this point, which is brilliantly highlighted
by S. Rodin, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, 64 AM. J.
COMP. L. 815 (2016).
31. Joined Cases 7/56, 3/57 to 7/57 Dineke Algera et al. v Common Assembly
of the European Coal and Steel Community [1957–58] ECR, English special edition, 00039.
32. Id. at ¶ 55.
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laws as such into Community law, but to use it as a means of discovering an unwritten principle of Community law.” 33 While the International Court of Justice is required by article 38(1)(c) of its statute to apply: “the general principles of law recognised by civilised
nations,” there is no general provision like this in the European Treaties. 34 Nonetheless, this has not stopped the Court from elaborating
general principles of EU law that are of great importance for the
evolution of EU law, 35 putting flesh on the bones of the EU’s legal
order to use the metaphor advanced by Advocate General Mazak
nearly ten years ago. 36 The principles in question often derive from
a comparative examination the laws of the Member States on certain
issues. The case law of the Court on this point has recognised on this
basis a variety of principles, e.g. the prohibition of unjust enrichment on the part of the Community,37 the admissibility of “default
interests” for sums due under EU law, 38 the recognition of clientlawyer privilege in proceedings opened by the Commission.39
33. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn delivered on Jan. 26, 1982, C-155/79
AM & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European Communities. Legal privilege [1982] ECR 01575, p. 1649 (emphasis in original).
34. The point is made by F.G. Jacobs, supra note 7, at 537. See Opinion of
Advocate General Tesauro delivered on Nov. 28, 1995, C-46/93 Brasserie du
pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State
for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ECR I-01029.
35. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES OXFORD (S. Vogenauer & S. Weatherill eds., Hart Publ’g 2017);
T. Tridimas, The General Principles of Law: Who Needs Them?, 52 CAHIERS DE
DROIT EUROPÉEN 419 (2016); K. Lenaerts & J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law, 47 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1629 (2010).
36. Opinion of Advocate General Mazàk delivered on Feb. 15, 2007, C411/05 Félix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA [2007] ECR I-08531,
¶¶ 83–86. For the relevance of comparative law in this context, see G. Martinico,
Exploring the Platonic Heaven of Law: General Principles of EU Law from a
Comparative Perspective, 3 NORD. J. EUR. LAW 1 (2020).
37. C-47/07 Masdar (UK) Ltd v Commission of European Communities
[2008] ECR I-09761, ¶¶ 44–50.
38. For a summing up of the relevant law, see Opinion of Advocate General
Bot delivered on Sept. 4, 2014, Case C-336/13 P European Commission v IPK
International - World Tourism Marketing Consultants GmbH [2014]
EU:C:2014:2170, ¶¶ 62–67.
39. Case 155/79 AM & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European
Communities [1982] ECR 01575, ¶¶ 18–21. See C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v European Commission [2010] ECR I-08301,
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V. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF EU LAW AND THE
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT LAWS
So far, I have discussed how the comparative examination of
laws of the Member States play out in the interpretation and application of EU law by the Court. At the core of the European Union
lies the establishment of the internal market. This drives a multitude
of harmonizing efforts, targeting the laws of the Member States,
which stand in a dialectical relationship with the principle of mutual
recognition, first affirmed in the Cassis de Dijon case. 40 But comparisons among the laws of the Member States are not the only ones
that the Court develops within this framework. The Court draws
comparisons between EU law and U.S. law as well; they are important too, to understand what type of comparisons the ECJ develops in fulfilling its tasks.
The world we live in is a highly interconnected world. To cope
with previously unknown coordination problems, we need more, rather than less, comparative law expertise. 41 As far as EU law is concerned, this means an openness to comparisons involving the laws
of non-Member States as well, and first and foremost with the U.S.,
the other major trading block among capitalist economies. 42
A dispute now pending before the ECJ is a wonderful illustration
of the increasing demand for the coordination of regulatory regimes
at the international level and of how comparative law becomes relevant in this respect. The case concerns inter alia the validity of the
agreement between the EU and the U.S. known as “Privacy

¶¶ 40–51 (no common trend among Member States concerning the recognition of
legal privilege over correspondence for in-house lawyer).
40. Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein
[1979] ECR 00649.
41. See S. BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE
NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 4 (Knopf 2015): “judicial awareness can no longer stop
at the border.”
42. This was the intuition which led to the pioneering study of M.
CAPPELLETTI, M. SECCOMBE & J. H. WEILER, INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (De Gruyter 1986).
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Shield.” 43 The agreement governs the safeguards to be provided in
the transfer of EU citizens’ personal data from the EU to the U.S.
Companies conducting business in Europe and North America need
to transfer data across the Atlantic, but such transfers are regulated
by EU law as well. The story behind this litigation begins in 2010,
when Mr. Maximilian Schrems, a law student from Austria aged 23,
went for his semester abroad at Santa Clara University in the Silicon
Valley. During his stay at that law school, Mr. Schrems participated
in a seminar where the guest speaker was Ed Palmieri, Facebook’s
privacy lawyer. Schrems related that he was shocked by the
speaker’s limited grasp of the severity of data protection laws in Europe. Once back at home in Austria, he launched a first lawsuit to
challenge the status quo. The litigation ended up at the ECJ. In 2015,
a first judgment was, thus, handed down by the ECJ in this matter.44
The judgment proclaimed that the so-called Safe Harbour agreement—the predecessor of the Privacy Shield agreement—was based
on an invalid decision of the Commission.45 The ECJ found that the
decision of the Commission on Safe Harbour agreement was invalid
because it failed to state, as required by EU law, that the U.S. ensures
an “adequate level of protection” of the fundamental rights and freedoms of EU citizens after their data was transferred to the U.S., as
required by the applicable EU legislation and fundamental rights
law. 46 The Court explained that governments may interfere with personal data “only in so far as is strictly necessary.” 47 Along the lines
43. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of July 12, 2016
pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, OJ 2016,
L 207, p. 1–112.
44. Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner
[2015] EU:C:2015:650.
45. The decision that was thus declared invalid was the following: Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of July 26, 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection
provided by the safe harbor privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, OJ L 215, 25.8.2000, p. 7–47.
46. Id. at ¶¶ 96–97.
47. Case C-362/14, ¶ 92.
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already announced in Digital Rights Ireland, 48 it further held that:
“legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a
generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must
be regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right
to respect for private life. . . .” 49
This means that surveillance operations conducted through bulk
access to data are not compatible with the European fundamental
rights regime. 50 Furthermore, EU law requires “effective judicial
protection” and access to legal remedies for privacy violations. The
ECJ found that the European Commission had failed to assess
whether the U.S. approach to data protection was satisfactory in this
respect too. 51 Both in Brussels and in Washington, the judgment was
a bombshell. 52 The EU Commission and the U.S. government were
sent back to the drawing board. They, thus, rushed to strike a new
agreement. However, the new agreement, known as Privacy Shield,
has already been hit by a fresh request for a preliminary ruling by
the ECJ. 53 Again, the question is whether the fundamental rights and
freedoms relating to personal data, guaranteed in Europe, are being
respected when personal data are transferred to the U.S. The Court
will also have to decide whether alternative approaches based on
“standard contractual clauses”—that is, contract templates that are
pre-approved by the European Commission for data transfers, 54 are
48. Joined Cases C‑293/12 and C‑594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources et al. [2014]
EU:C:2014:238.
49. Case C-362/14, ¶ 94.
50. Id. at ¶¶ 92–93.
51. Id. at ¶ 95.
52. The U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Communications
and Technology (Committee on Energy and Commerce) hearing on “Examining
the EU Safe Harbor Decision and Impacts for Transatlantic Data Flows” held on
Nov. 3, 2015 gives an idea of the U.S. reactions to the ECJ ruling,
https://perma.cc/44CH-6G2P.
53. Case C-311/18 Facebook Ireland Limited and Schrems, case in progress.
54. Commission Decision 2010/87 of Feb. 5, 2010 on standard contractual
clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries
under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L
39/6, 12.2.2010, p. 5–18, as amended by Commission Implementing Decision
(EU) 2016/2297 of Dec. 16, 2016, OJ L 344, 17.12.2016, p. 100–101.
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adequate or not, a vital point for the firms that are currently using
this technique in day-to-day operations.
Advocate General Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe’s opinion in this
case holds that the Commission’s decision on standard contractual
clauses is valid, provided that there are sufficiently sound mechanisms to ensure that transfers based on the standard contractual
clauses are suspended or prohibited where those clauses are
breached or impossible to honour. In his view, that is the case in so
far as there is an obligation—placed on the data controllers and,
where the latter fails to act, on the supervisory authorities—to suspend or prohibit a transfer when those clauses cannot be complied
with. With respect to the Privacy Shield decision, the Advocate General expressed criticism in the light of the right to respect for private
life and the right to an effective remedy, although he also held that
the dispute in the main proceedings does not require the Court to
rule on the validity of the privacy shield.
We will soon learn the outcome of the request for a preliminary
ruling in this case. What is already clear is that the litigation has
brought about an unprecedented wave of comparative law research
about privacy laws on the two sides of the Atlantic. If the ECJ finds
that the new agreement is inadequate, some form of harmonisation
between the EU and U.S. approach to privacy and data protection is
much more likely to occur in the future. 55
VI. THE TRANSATLANTIC DIMENSIONS OF THE COMPARATIVE
EXERCISE
In the Privacy Shield litigation, a comparison of laws is implicitly mandated by EU fundamental rights law and the relevant data
protection legislation. But the ECJ may go for outward looking comparisons concerning U.S. law, as opposed to inward looking comparisons concerning the laws of the Member States, for a variety of
55. C-311/18. On June 20, 2020, the Court handed down its decision, holding
that the privacy shield is indeed invalid.
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reasons. The Court may conduct these comparisons because of the
relative novelty of some issues coming up before the Court. However, the same issues may be not so new in a wider perspective.
Sometimes it is tempting to turn to the U.S. to elaborate solutions
for Europe, or at least to make informed decisions benefitting from
the experience and lessons learnt in the U.S., as it has happened in a
variety of fields, including, inter alia, antitrust, intellectual property
(and trademarks in particular), federal-state relations in connection
with the regulation of interstate commerce, and gender-based antidiscrimination law. 56 Once more, the precise numbers of the ECJ
cases that have carried out such a comparison for one of the reasons
mentioned above is difficult to establish. Here, I will only mention
two cases that have brought about important developments in EU
law and that are illustrative of this practice.
The first is Jenkins v. Kingsgate, 57 dating back to 1981. This ruling is the first to ban indirect discrimination based on sex in equal
pay cases under EU law. Jenkins was a woman employed as a parttime worker, to do the same work as her full-time colleagues, in a
small textile company based in England. Her hourly pay was 10 per
cent less than the pay of the full-time workforce. In her factory,
nearly all the part time workers were women, while nearly all the
full-time workers were men. The Advocate General’s opinion in
Jenkins relied explicitly on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Griggs v. Duke Power 58 to establish a parallel between the condition
of African Americans in the U.S. and women in Europe, with respect
to indirect discrimination. The Advocate General knew, of course,
56. Three important studies have explored this theme; see P. Herzog, United
States Supreme Court Cases in the Court of Justice of the European Communities,
21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 903 (1998); L. F. Peoples, The Use of Foreign Law by the Advocates General of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 35 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 219 (2007); L. F. Peoples, The Influence of Foreign Law Cited in the Opinions of Advocates General on Community
Law, 28 YEARBOOK OF EUR. L. 458 (2009).
57. Case C-96/80 J.P. Jenkins v Kingsgate Ltd. [1981] ECR 00911. See I.
Tourkochoriti, Jenkins v Kingsgate and the Migration of the US Disparate Impact
Doctrine in EU Law, in EU LAW STORIES, supra note 10, at 418.
58. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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that in the U.S. the disparate impact doctrine, first affirmed with respect to racial discrimination cases under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, was applied to fight sex discrimination in the workplace as
well:
As has been observed more than once, the Supreme Court of
the United States and this Court often find themselves confronted with similar problems. Although of course the provisions of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 that
were in question in the Griggs case were worded differently
from Article 119 of the Treaty, their essential purpose was
the same, except in so far as the provision in question in the
Griggs case was about racial discrimination, not sex discrimination. Indeed in Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977) 433 US 321
the Supreme Court applied similar reasoning to sex discrimination. I draw considerable comfort from finding that my
conclusion accords with the conclusions of that court in
those cases. 59
An English barrister with a Harvard LL.M., Anthony Lester,
who had contributed to the elaboration of U.K. Race Relations Act
by managing to persuade the Labour Government to insert a reference to indirect discrimination in it, pleaded the Jenkins’s case before the ECJ. The Advocate General’s opinion reveals that this English barrister argued that the U.S. disparate impact doctrine announced by Chief Justice Burger in Griggs should have guided the
ECJ’s decision on pay discrimination as well. The argument, thus,
first advanced in the defendant’s brief is reflected in a couple of lines
of the ECJ judgment, though without any reference to U.S. civil
rights law. A pay differential between full and part-time workers is
not in itself prohibited under the Treaty: “unless it is in reality an
indirect way of reducing the pay of part-time workers on the ground
that that group of workers is composed exclusively or predominantly of women.” 60

59. Opinion of Advocate General Warner delivered on Jan. 28, 1981, Case
96/80.
60. Case C-96/80, ¶ 15.
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The second case of an outward looking use of comparative law
between U.S. and EU Law is provided by the Ruiz Zambrano litigation. 61 Here, the ECJ concluded that denying a residence and work
permit in Belgium to a Colombian father would impermissibly interfere with the substance of the European citizenship of his Belgian-born children. There is no need to ponder the full details of the
case. Let us just note that it is also a landmark decision because the
right of the plaintiff is recognised with respect to a situation that is
purely internal to one of the Member States. And yet, despite this,
the case is brought under the umbrella of EU law. What deserves a
closer examination here is the opinion of Advocate’s General Sharpston. She explores the idea whether the question put to the Court
should be addressed purely on the basis of the protection of fundamental rights under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 62 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court, in Gitlow v. New
York, 63 Sharpston argues that a step in this direction would bring the
EU law approach in line with how the U.S doctrine of incorporation,
as first outlined:
[W]hen the US Supreme Court extended the reach of several
rights enshrined in the Constitution’s First Amendment to
individual states. The ‘incorporation’ case-law, based since
then on the ‘due process’ clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require an inter-state movement nor legislative acts from Congress. According to the Supreme Court,
certain fundamental rights are so significant that they are
‘among the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause . . . from impairment by the
states. 64

61. C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi [2011]
ECR I-01177. On this case, see the instructive contribution by F. Strumia, Ruiz
Zambrano’s Quiet Revolution, in EU LAW STORIES, supra note 10, at 224.
62. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on Sept. 10, 2010,
Case C-34/09, ¶¶ 172–173 [hereinafter Opinion AG Sharpston, Case C-34/09].
63. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). R. Schütze, European Fundamental Rights and the Member States: From ‘Selective’ to ‘Total’ Incorporation?,
14 CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF EUR. LEG. STUD. 337 (2012).
64. Opinion AG Sharpston, Case C-34/09, ¶ 172.
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The Advocate General thinks that when the relevant facts occurred in Zambrano no such doctrine was yet established. But Advocate Sharpston maintains that this change may come sooner rather
than later:
[T]he Court should not, in the present case, overtly anticipate
change. I do suggest, however, that (sooner rather than later)
the Court will have to choose between keeping pace with an
evolving situation or lagging behind legislative and political
developments that have already taken place. At some point,
the Court is likely to have to deal with a case – one suspects,
a reference from a national court – that requires it to confront
the question of whether the Union is not now on the cusp of
constitutional change (as the Court itself partially foresaw
when it delivered Opinion 2/94). Answering that question
can be put off for the moment, but probably not for all that
much longer. 65
The case that Advocate Sharpston foreshadowed has now come
to the Court, not just in one dispute, but in several ones, and in various proceedings, namely as a reference for a preliminary ruling, but
also in the context of infringement procedures.
For the first time in 2016, when dealing with the Portuguese
judges’ case, 66 the Court announced a common standard concerning
judicial independence. This standard is applicable to sanction violations of the right to an effective judicial remedy and to judicial independence by the Member States. The case concerned the salary
reduction measures applied to the judges in Portugal, as well as to
all other public employees in Portugal in response to the 2008 financial crisis. These measures were challenged under EU law, but the
Court upheld their validity. The Court held that the pay reduction
measures applied in Portugal did not undermine judicial independence, which is an essential component of the right to an effective
judicial protection, because these measures affected the entire public
sector.
65. Id. at ¶¶ 172–173, 177.
66. Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de
Contas [2018] EU:C:2018:117.
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Although this conclusion could be easily taken for granted in
that context, in its ruling the Court affirmed a general obligation for
Member States to guarantee and protect judicial independence,
which is an essential part of the principle of effective judicial protection of individual’s rights: “[A] court or tribunal’s independence
is essential, as confirmed by the second subparagraph of Article 47
of the Charter, which refers to the access to an ‘independent’ tribunal as one of the requirements linked to the fundamental right to an
effective remedy.” 67 According to the Court:
The principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law, referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, is a general principle of EU
law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to
the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6
and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, . . . and which is
now reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter. 68
This is why some commentators have considered this judgment
as a first step in the development of a European version of the incorporation doctrine announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gitlow
v. New York, as foreshadowed by Advocate General Sharpston. 69
The Portuguese judges’ ruling was followed by other decisions
handed down by the Grand Chamber of the ECJ in 2019. In Commission v. Poland, 70 at issue were the measures taken by the Polish
government to lower the retirement age of judges. The question
raised was whether these measures violated the obligations flowing
from primary EU law to secure judicial independence and the right
to an effective judicial remedy. The precedent set in the Portuguese
67. Id. at ¶ 41.
68. Id. at ¶ 35.
69. L. Pech & S. Platon, Judicial Independence Under Threat: The Court of
Justice to the Rescue in the ASJP Case, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1827 (2018).
According to the authors, the case “comes close to being the EU equivalent of the
US Supreme Court case of Gitlow as regards the principle of effective judicial
protection.”
70. Case C-619/18 European Commission v Republic of Poland [2019]
EU:C:2019:531.
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judges’ case already made clear that the traditional material criterion
that separated the respective spheres of EU and national law cannot
and do not govern questions of such fundamental importance for democracy and the rule of law as judicial independence. The claim of
the Polish (and Hungarian) government that the rules governing the
judiciary fall within the exclusive competence of the Member State
was flatly rejected by the ECJ. In Commission v. Poland, the ECJ
made the principle of effective judicial protection (including the
principle of judicial independence) subject to federal standards of
review—to use the language that would be used in the U.S. Therefore, to quote the words of the judgment in this case:
[A]lthough, as the Republic of Poland and Hungary point
out, the organisation of justice in the Member States falls
within the competence of those Member States, the fact remains that, when exercising that competence, the Member
States are required to comply with their obligations deriving
from EU law. 71
The ECJ ruling in this case, as in the previous case concerning
the Portuguese judges, held that effective judicial protection is a
general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 72 The same holding has also
been affirmed in Commission v. Republic of Poland 73 and underlies
the judgment of the Court in the Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18
and C-625/18, A. K. and Others v Sąd Najwyższy 74 The latter of
these decisions makes clear that the principle of the primacy of EU
law requires the referring court to disapply national law and reserves
jurisdiction to a court that does not meet the requirements of judicial
independence. As such, the case would need to be heard and decided
by a court that meets the articulated requirements.

71. Id. at ¶ 52.
72. Id. at ¶ 49.
73. C-192/18 European Commission v Republic of Poland [2019]
EU:C:2019:924.
74. Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A. K. and Others v Sąd
Najwyższy [2019] EU:C:2019:982.
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VII. EU LAW AND THE EXTRACONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF THE
EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS
The reference to the common constitutional traditions of the
member states in the Commission v. Poland judgment brings me to
consider what I have until now postponed. There are provisions of
the Treaties that call, in rather explicit terms, for a comparative law
foundation of the applicable law. A first well-known example of this
kind, going back to the origins of the law of the European institutions, is the law applicable to the extracontractual liability of the EU.
A second example of more recent, but ever growing, importance is
provided by the reference to the notion of “constitutional traditions
common to the Member States.” 75 Together with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, these traditions provide
a grounding of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law,
as now proclaimed by article 6.3 TEU and article 52.4 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Already in the first version of the Treaty, dating back to 1957,
the extracontractual liability of the European institutions was established on the basis of the general principles common to the laws of
the Member States. In its present version, article 340 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union provides that: “[T]he Union shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the
laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its
institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.”
According to the same article, a similar provision now governs
the liability of the European Central Bank, which does not, however,
involve the liability of the Union; this is treated as an autonomous
institution in this respect as well. With the entry into force of the
75. O. Pollicino, Transfiguration and Actual Relevance of the Common Constitutional Traditions: Past, Present and Future, 18 GLOBAL JURIST 1 (2018); O.
Pollicino, Common Constitutional Traditions in the Age of the European Bill (s)
of Rights: Chronicle of a (Somewhat Prematurely) Death Foretold, in THE
FRAGMENTED LANDSCAPE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION IN
EUROPETHE ROLE OF JUDICIAL AND NON-JUDICIAL ACTORS 42, 49, 51–52 (Edward Elgar 2018) [hereinafter Common Constitutional Traditions].
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Charter of Fundamental Rights, the duty of the Union to make good
any damage caused to third parties has acquired a further dimension.
The Charter now establishes as a binding fundamental right of every
person: “to have the Union make good any damage caused . . . , in
accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the
Member States.” 76
The reference to the general principles common to the laws of
the Member States in these articles require the Court to conduct a
comparative examination of those laws, to establish what is actually
common to them, as far as their principles are concerned. Essential
concepts such as damage, loss, injury, negligence, causality, fault,
and so, on are still given different meanings in the Member States
so that to determine to what extent one can find commonalities
across the Member States is not a simple task. 77 This explains why
the jurisprudence of the Court on this matter has been examined
more than a few times in works dedicated to European private law.
Authors seek to answer the following question: “How does the Court
do it?” 78 In turn, these works have been cited by the Courtas
usual, the citations are mostly in the Advocates General’s opinions. 79 In terms of effectiveness, the jurisprudence of the Court on
this matter attracts some critical remarks because claims brought
against European institutions on this basis have had a very low rate
of success. A recent study prepared for the European Parliament
highlights this outcome.80 From the time that the Community was
76. Article 41.3 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
77. See K. Gutman, The Evolution of the Action for Damages Against the
European Union and its Place in the System of Judicial Protection, 48 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 695, 700 (2011); Gutman notes that “the case law on the Union’s
non-contractual liability is littered with concepts – e.g. damage, loss, injury,
causal link, fault, negligence, etc. – that are interpreted differently in the Member
States.”
78. TORT LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (H. Koziol & R. Schulze eds.,
Springer 2008).
79. See Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on Jan. 11, 2007, C-282/05 P
Holcim (Deutschland) AG v Commission of the European Communities [2007]
ECR I-02941, ¶¶ 58, 115.
80. R. Mańko, European Parliamentary Research Service, Action for Damages Against the EU (Dec. 2018), available at https://perma.cc/M4YX-BKLG.
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founded up to the year 2000, only twenty actions for damages were
successful. The number is similar between 2000 and 2014: Nineteen
plaintiffs have won against European institutions. It is not quite
“mission impossible” but these are very low numbers indeed. The
average success rate is a mere 8%. More recent data do not change
this picture. The case law of the Court thus makes “only a modest
contribution to breaking down the immunities of public bodies.”81
This is somewhat ironic, considering the importance that the Court
attributes to the principle of effective judicial protection.
VIII. THE “CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS COMMON TO THE
MEMBER STATES” AS AN INVITATION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
As mentioned above, article 6.3 TEU establishes fundamental
rights as general principles of the Union’s law: “as guaranteed by
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States . . .” Article 52.4 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights further provides that: “In so far as
this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights
shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions.” 82 These are
once more norms that explicitly require a determination of what is
common among the Member States. Obviously, this is more than
invitation to adopt a comparative stance to ascertain the general
principles of European law in the area of fundamental rights.
Those who are familiar with the evolution of European law will
quickly draw attention to the absence of similar provisions from the
text of the original Treaties. They are right, of course. A first version
81. C. VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 533 (Oxford U. Press 2013).
82. There is a reference to the same notion in the Preamble of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union:
This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the
Union and for the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in
particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations
common to the Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. . . .
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of this provision was incorporated in the Treaties only after the European Court of Justice recognized the necessity of containing the
potentially disruptive dynamics originating in the inevitable collisions between the norms of national constitutions of Members States
and European law. 83 The way out of the problem was to proclaim
that the validity of EU law could not be challenged on the basis of
the constitutions of Member States. And yet, at the same time, to
elaborate a doctrine of EU fundamental rights that draws from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 84 As the
Court first held in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 85:
Respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the
general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice.
The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must be
ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives
of the Community.
The Court, thus, asserted the autonomy and the independence of
the Community legal order vis-à-vis the Member States, but it also
recognized that this order presents a constitutional dimension “inspired”this was the original expressionby the constitutional traditions common to the laws of the Member States. This formula has
been subsequently refined and now it is featured in over one hundred
decisions rendered by the ECJ according to research conducted by
Riccardo de Caria and myself in 2017. 86 The constitutional traditions of the Member States are not stand-alone sources of law in this
framework. Under article 4.2 TEU, the European Union has
83. S. Cassese, The “Constitutional Traditions Common to the Member
States” of the European Union, 4 RIV. TRIM. DIR. PUB. 939 (2017).
84. B. Davies, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and the Miscalculation at
the Inception of the ECJ’s Human Rights Jurisprudence, in EU LAW STORIES,
supra note 10, at 155.
85. Case 11-70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 01125, ¶ 14.
86. M. Graziadei & R. De Caria, The “Constitutional Traditions Common to
the Member States” in the Case-law of the European Court of Justice: Judicial
Dialogue at its Finest, 4 RIV. TRIM. DIR. PUB. 949 (2017). Meanwhile, the number
of decisions featuring a reference to the notion has grown. For a study on the raise
and the impact of this notion, see Cassese, supra note 83.

30

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

undertaken the obligation to respect the constitutional identity of the
Member States, 87 which is also a means to diffuse the tensions that
can and do arise in the adjudication of EU law. 88 At the national
level, a reference to the notion of “constitutional identity” should
also reflect “a palpable commitment to the European project” by the
national constituency. 89 Nonetheless, a tendency to take a confrontational approach to this is matter is emerging, not only in some eastern countries like Hungary, but also at the centre of Europe, as the
controversial judgment of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht on
the expanded asset purchase program of the European Central Bank
shows. 90
Clearly, an assessment of what is common among the Member
States, as far as the respective constitutional traditions are concerned, should involve a serious comparative effort by the Court, to
give substance to the bottom up approach represented by this reference to the laws of the Member States. The European Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights
show what has been achieved so far and what is already common to
the Member States in the field of fundamental freedoms and rights.
But we should not underestimate the power of unwritten law represented by the general principles of EU law, built upon the
87. Article 4.2 TEU:
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local
self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including
ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order
and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.
88. CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY IN A EUROPE OF MULTILEVEL
CONSTITUTIONALISM (C. Calliess & G. van der Schyff eds., Cambridge U. Press
2019).
89. T. Drinóczi, Constitutional Identity in Europe: The Identity of the Constitution. A Regional Approach, 21 German Law Journal 105, 129 (2020).
90. See BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, May 5, 2020. The original version of the
judgment goes as far as to charge Mario Draghi, former head of the Bank of Italy,
of partiality towards his country in launching the OTM programme. This ugly
remark is, however, omitted in the English version of the judgment provided by
the Court itself. As the insightful study by Drinóczi shows, the approach of constitutional courts on this matter is far from uniform in Europe.
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foundations provided by the constitutional traditions of the Member
States. They are an immense normative reservoir to be tapped, 91 especially when EU law falls short of providing a specific rule, or textual reference. Reference to those traditions is also a reminder of the
fact that EU law can seldom afford the luxury of starting from
scratch.

91. Pollicino, Common Constitutional Traditions, supra note 75, at 42, 71.
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ABSTRACT
This Article identifies nearly one hundred articles and provisions in Louisiana’s first civil code, the Digest of 1808, which were
copied verbatim or almost verbatim (that is, literally or almost literally) from three French legal encyclopedias popular during the
Ancien Régime: Lerasle’s Encyclopédie méthodique: Jurisprudence
(8 vols., 1782–89), Jean-Baptiste Denisart’s Collection de décisions
nouvelles (1st ed., 6 vols., 1754–56), and Joseph-Nicolas Guyot’s
Répertoire de jurisprudence (2d ed., 17 vols., 1784–85). As the Appendix indicates, verbatim and almost verbatim extracts from Lerasle, Denisart, and Guyot constitute approximately five per cent of
the Digest’s source material. This Article therefore serves as a supplement (and partial corrective) to Rodolfo Batiza’s 1971 and 1974
studies of the Digest’s “actual sources”.
The present study argues that the Digest’s primary redactor,
Louis Moreau Lislet, borrowed language from French legal encyclopedia entries largely for pedagogical purposes, including introducing into Louisiana’s new civil code civilian definitions and other
material that would be useful for lawyers and judges trained in the
common law. As a result, Louisiana’s first civil code possesses a
didactic quality that is absent from its Napoleonic prototype.
Equally important, this study suggests that earlier scholars’ assumptions that the Digest’s source material reflects Louisiana’s
mixed Spanish-French legal history should be revisited: while discovery of a significant presence of French legal encyclopedic
sources certainly reveals the drafter’s preference for, and familiarity with, ancien droit legal literature, it further undermines previous
assumptions about the widespread indirect influence of Roman and
Spanish-Castilian sources.
Keywords: codification, ancien droit, encyclopedias, legal lexicography, Louisiana.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a 1971 study, Professor Rodolfo Batiza of Tulane Law School
famously purported to identify the “actual sources” of Louisiana’s
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first civil code, the Digest of 1808. 1 According to Batiza, most of
these sources were French. 2 In particular, Batiza found that more
than 70% of the Digest’s provisions had been copied from just three
French-language texts: the Code Napoléon (1804), its draft Projet
of Year VIII (1800), and Domat’s Loix Civiles (1689). 3 In a 1974
revised study, Batiza found additional evidence of verbatim borrowing from several other French-language sources, including JosephNicolas Guyot’s popular ancien droit legal encyclopedia, the Répertoire de jurisprudence (1784–85). 4 Based on his 1971 and 1974
studies, Batiza later concluded that the Digest’s primary redactor,
the New Orleans lawyer Louis Moreau Lislet (1767–1832), 5 had
used “definitions and additional rules borrowed from the works of
Domat, Pothier, and [French] legal encyclopedias” to supplement
Digest provisions taken from the Code civil and projet. 6 In contrast,

1. See Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources
and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 11 (1971) [hereinafter Batiza 1971]
(claiming to identify almost 97% of the Digest’s “actual sources”).
2. See id. at 12 (concluding that French sources “account for about 85 percent” of the Digest’s sources).
3. See id. at 11 & nn. 42–43, 45 (attributing 1,495 provisions to “verbatim”
or “almost verbatim” equivalents in the Code Civil, Projet, and Domat, or approximately 72% of the 2,081 sources identified in the 1971 study).
4. See RODOLFO BATIZA, 3 SOURCES WHICH HAD A SUBSTANTIAL OR PARTIAL INFLUENCE ON PROVISIONS OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1808: THE
ORIGINAL TEXTS (1974) [hereinafter BATIZA 1974] (identifying “about 40 provisions” taken from Guyot’s Répertoire de jurisprudence, Ferrière’s French translation of Justinian’s Institutes, and Antoine Desgodets’ Les loix des bâtimens). As
in BATIZA 1974, all citations to Guyot in the present study are for the second
edition: JOSEPH-NICOLAS GUYOT, RÉPERTOIRE UNIVERSEL ET RAISONNÉ DE JURISPRUDENCE CIVILE, CRIMINELLE, CANONIQUE ET BÉNEFICIALE (1784–85) [hereinafter GUYOT].
5. According to Batiza, Moreau Lislet was the Digest’s “sole drafter,” notwithstanding the formal appointment of another lawyer, James Brown, as co-redactor. See Rodolfo Batiza, Justinian’s Institutes and the Louisiana Civil Code of
1808, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1639, 1644 (1995) [hereinafter Justinian’s Institutes] (discussing Brown’s joint appointment). This Article assumes Moreau Lislet’s primary agency, although the degree of Brown’s contribution remains a subject of
dispute. See John W. Cairns, Spanish Law, the Teatro de la legislación universal
de España e Indias, and the Background to the Drafting of the Digest of Orleans
of 1808, 31 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 79, 88–90 (2017) (providing evidence of an
uneven division of labor rather than a “sole drafter” hypothesis).
6. Batiza, Justinian’s Institutes, supra note 5, at 1641 (emphasis supplied).
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Batiza attributed less than 10% of the Digest’s provisions to Louisiana’s pre-Purchase Spanish law. 7
Although Batiza’s 1974 study identified only a handful of articles in the Digest taken from Guyot’s répertoire, the Louisiana
Code’s debt to French legal encyclopedic literature is far more substantial than Batiza initially realized. The present study identifies for
the first time nearly one hundred additional Digest provisions copied
“verbatim” or “almost verbatim” from Lerasle’s Encyclopédie
méthodique: Jurisprudence (8 vols., 1782–89) 8 and Jean-Baptiste
Denisart’s Collection de décisions nouvelles (1st ed., 6 vols., 1754–
56), 9 two French legal encyclopedias that Moreau Lislet owned during his lifetime and cited in court, as well as additional provisions
borrowed from Guyot’s répertoire that Batiza’s 1974 study omitted. 10
Of Moreau Lislet’s three principal French legal encyclopedic
sources, the Encyclopédie méthodique was undoubtedly the most influential. This now-forgotten multi-volume legal encyclopedia contained many of the law-related entries first published in Denis Diderot’s original Encyclopédie (28 vols., 1751–56), which Diderot’s
successor as publisher, Charles-Joseph Panckoucke, had entrusted
to a law professor, M. Lerasle, for revision, and then sold to French
lawyers as an eight-volume set. 11 Importantly, Moreau Lislet relied
on verbatim or almost verbatim extracts from the Encyclopédie
méthodique to draft over seventy Digest articles on topics as wideranging as things, usufruct, partition by licitation, pledge, hypothec,
7. Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 12–13.
8. M. LERASLE, ENCYCLOPÉDIE MÉTHODIQUE: JURISPRUDENCE (1782–89)
[hereinafter Encyc. Juris.].
9. Unless otherwise noted, citations in the present study are for the 9th edition: J[EAN] B[APTISTE] DENISART, COLLECTION DE DÉCISIONS NOUVELLES
(1775) [hereinafter ANCIEN DENISART].
10. For individual source attributions to Lerasle, Denisart, and Guyot, see
Appendix (table of sources).
11. For discussion of Panckoucke’s republication of Diderot’s Encyclopédie
in subject-specific encyclopedias, including the compilation of the Encyclopédie
de jurisprudence, see George B. Watts, The Encyclopédie Méthodique, 73 PAPERS
MOD. LANG. ASSOC. 348, 364–65 (1958).
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dowry, compromise, and possession. Many of these provisions were
later adopted in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 and some survive
practically unchanged in the current Civil Code. Via Lerasle’s volumes, the redactor introduced scores of rules and definitions from
Diderot’s Encyclopédie into Louisiana civil law. 12
This Article argues that Moreau Lislet’s verbatim reliance on
French legal encyclopedic literature was neither accidental nor
merely ornamental. Rather, the redactor copied entries from Lerasle,
Denisart, and Guyot for distinctly pedagogical purposes, including
introducing ordinary readers (many trained in the common law) to
basic civil law concepts using ready-made French-language definitions; augmenting Digest provisions taken from the French Civil
Code and Domat with additional rules; and providing useful advice
to litigants lacking formal legal training. 13 Strategic borrowing from
legal encyclopedia entries reveals Moreau Lislet’s ambition to draft
a civil code that would serve as both a coherent body of legislation
for Louisiana as well as an accessible introduction to the civil law
tradition. 14
The redactor’s extensive reliance on French legal encyclopedic
sources also has important implications for ongoing investigations
into the possible influence of Roman and Spanish law on the Digest’s redaction. During the years prior to Batiza’s 1971 study, Louisiana legal scholars had engaged in intensive speculation about the
mixed origins of the Digest and the nature of its substantive relationship to Louisiana’s pre-Purchase Spanish-Castilian law.
Batiza’s studies were intended to resolve this debate by identifying
the “actual” French-language sources for most of the Digest’s articles, as well as non-verbatim Roman, French, and Spanish explanations for the Digest’s remaining provisions. However, comparison
of the present study’s verbatim source attributions (to Lerasle, Denisart, and Guyot) with Batiza’s proposed non-verbatim Spanish
12. See Parts III & IV, infra.
13. See Part IV, infra.
14. See Part V, infra.
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source attributions from 1971 and 1974 indicates that many of
Batiza’s non-verbatim sources are wrong and that Spanish and Roman sources were probably less influential in the Digest’s redaction
than even Batiza initially conceded. More importantly, Moreau Lislet’s repeated preference for verbatim copying from French legal literature, especially ancien droit sources with which he was familiar
from practice, strongly suggests that the redactor’s choice in source
material was less cosmopolitan than Louisiana legal historians have
previously assumed. 15
II. MOREAU LISLET’S FRENCH LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIAS: THE
CODIFIER’S ANCIEN DROIT PRACTICE TOOLS
On December 19, 1832, the notary Louis T. Caire prepared an
inventory of Moreau Lislet’s personal library; the “Man Behind the
Digest” had died a few weeks earlier. 16 In his testament, the redactor
left over 1,000 volumes, mostly law books, to his executor, Jean
Baptiste Desdunes. 17 Among the numerous titles left by Moreau Lislet, Caire’s inventory listed the following four works and volume
numbers: “Collection de décisions (13)”, “Encyclopédie de Jurisprudence (8)”, “Collection de décisions (4)”, and “Répertoire de Jurisprudence (17)”. 18
Although Caire’s inventory provides little bibliographical detail,
the four titles are nevertheless identifiable from contemporary evidence. In Greffin’s Ex’r v. Lopez (La. 1817), Martin’s Reports records Moreau Lislet appearing before the Louisiana Supreme Court
and referring the judges to “4 Denisart’s Decisions de Jurisprudence,
15. See Parts V & VI, infra.
16. See Agustín Parise, A Translator’s Toolbox: The Law, Moreau-Lislet’s
Library, and the Presence of Multilingual Dictionaries in Nineteenth-Century
Louisiana, 76 LA. L. REV. 1163, 1172 (2016). For the honorific title Man Behind
the Digest, see Alain Levasseur’s excellent biography of Moreau Lislet: ALAIN
LEVASSEUR, MOREAU LISLET: THE MAN BEHIND THE DIGEST OF 1808 (rev. ed.
with Vicenç Feliú, Claitor’s 2008).
17. See Parise, supra note 16, at 1172 & nn. 69–70.
18. See Mitchell Franklin, Libraries of Edward Livingston and of Moreau
Lislet, 15 TUL. L. REV. 401, 405–06 (1941) (reproducing Caire’s inventory).
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570, verbo turpitude,” while shortly before his death, the drafter appeared in De Armas v. City of New Orleans (La. 1833), where he
made reference to “6 Nouveau Denisart, p. 593. Verbo domaine,
&c.” 19 The first citation’s volume and page numbers match the 9th
edition (4 vols., 1775) of Denisart’s Collection de décisions; the second refers to Calenge’s 13-volume continuation (1783–1807) of
Denisart’s original work, sometimes called Nouveau Denisart. 20
These are almost certainly the “Collection de décisions (4)” and
“Collection de décisions (13)” listed in the Caire inventory.
Similar evidence confirms Moreau Lislet’s ownership of Lerasle’s Encyclopédie méthodique: Jurisprudence. This multi-volume
work was part of the Paris publisher Charles-Joseph Panckoucke’s
larger project to republish Diderot’s Encyclopédie in subject-specific sets. To compile the “encyclopédie de jurisprudence” volumes,
Panckoucke appointed a special committee of French legal lexicographers, chaired by the law professor M. Lerasle, who together extracted, revised, and expanded the original law-related entries found
in the first Paris folio of the famous Encyclopédie. Primarily the
work of François-Vincent Toussaint (1715–1772) and Antoine-Gaspard Boucher d’Argis (1708–1791), two French-jurists-turned-Diderot collaborators, the original entries in the Encyclopédie had contained numerous references to French coutumes and Roman law and
proved popular with French lawyers. 21 There is no evidence that
Moreau Lislet ever owned the Paris folio, which was both rare and

19. See Greffin’s Ex’r, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 145, 148 (La. 1817) (citing ANCIEN DENfor turpitude); De Armas, 5 La. 132, 140 (1833) (citing NOUVEAU DENfor domaine).
20. Compare id. with 4 ANCIEN DENISART 570 (1775) (turpitude); JEAN-BAPTISTE DENISART, 6 COLLECTION DE DÉCISIONS NOUVELLES 593 (1787) (domaine)
[hereinafter NOUVEAU DENISART].
21. See Lerasle, Avertissement in 1 Encyc. Juris. v (1782) [hereinafter Avertissement] (discussing editorial process); Luigi Delia, Le droit dans l’Encyclopédie. Cartographies, enjeux, collaborateurs, 48 RECHERCHES SUR DIDEROT ET SUR
L’ENCYCLOPÉDIE 143 (2013) (discussing Toussaint’s and Boucher d’Argis’ contributions to Diderot’s encyclopedia and providing additional biographical details).
ISART
ISART
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expensive. 22 However, according to the early law reports, the redactor cited “3 Encyclopédie de Jurisprudence, 74, verbo Communes”
in Orleans Navigation Co. v. City of New Orleans (La. 1812) and “2
Encyc. Jurisp. 579, 580, verbo Chemin” in Renthorp v. Bourg (La.
1816). 23 Both citations match the eight-volume Panckoucke set,
confirming that the “Encyclopédie de Jurisprudence (8)” in the
Caire inventory is the same title.
Finally, the “Répertoire de Jurisprudence” listed in the Caire inventory is presumably the second edition of Guyot’s highly esteemed work of the same name. Moreau Lislet had relied on Guyot’s
répertoire in the famous dispute between Edward Livingston and
the citizens of New Orleans over ownership of the New Orleans batture; in his scholarly Mémoire au soutien des droits des Etats-unis
à la Batture du faubourg Ste Marie (1808), the redactor cited the
répertoire’s entry on alluvion in defense of the government’s property interests. 24 Interestingly, Guyot had earlier served on Lerasle’s
revision committee. 25 Moreau Lislet was apparently aware of
Guyot’s influence on the compilation of the Encyclopédie
méthodique: in Morgan v. Livingston (La. 1819), the Louisiana redactor referred to Lerasle’s volumes as “Guyot’s Encyclopedia.” 26

22. Cf. Franklin, supra note 18 (Caire inventory). For estimate of the number
of copies outside France in late 1700s, see Robert Darnton, The Encyclopédie
Wars of Prerevolutionary France, 78 AM. HIST. REV. 1331, 1332 (1973).
23. Compare Orleans Nav. Co., 2 Mart. (o.s.) 214, 216 (La. 1812) (Moreau
citing “verbo Communes”) and 3 Encyc. Juris. 74 (1783) (commune); Renthorp,
4 Mart. (o.s.) 97, 117 (La. 1816) (Moreau citing “verbo Chemin”) and 2 Encyc.
Juris. 579 (1783) (chemin).
24. See 3 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Retirement series, 12 August
1810 to 17 June 1811, at 174 (J. Jefferson Looney ed. 2006) (Moreau citing
Guyot’s répertoire, along with Denisart and Lerasle).
25. See Avertissement, supra note 21, at vi.
26. See Morgan, 6 Mart. (o.s.) 19, 27 (Moreau citing “1 Guyot’s Encyc. 288;
verbo Alluvion.”).
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III. LERASLE, DENISART, AND GUYOT: THREE “ACTUAL SOURCES”
OF THE DIGEST OF 1808
Moreau Lislet was familiar with Lerasle, Denisart, and Guyot
for another important reason: he had used these same sources decades earlier to draft many of the Digest’s rules and definitions. In
1806, Louisiana’s Creole-dominated legislature had appointed Moreau Lislet and fellow lawyer James Brown (1766–1835) to compile
a French-language “civil code” for use in the new Territory of Orleans. 27 In an effort to forestall the reception of the Anglo-American
common law, the legislature instructed the two redactors to make
the “civil law by which this territory is now governed, the ground
work of said code.” 28 A legacy of the new territory’s recent colonial
past, post-Purchase Louisiana “civil law” was still primarily Spanish-Castilian derecho indiano. 29 Its principal sources included the
Siete Partidas (1265), Nueva Recopilación (1567), and Recopilación de las Indias (1680), supplemented by treatises such as Juan
de Hevia Bolaños’ Curia Philipica (1603) and José Febrero’s Librería de escribanos (1783), as well as the Corpus Juris Civilis of Roman law. 30 However, despite the legislature’s instructions, Moreau
Lislet and Brown’s finished project mysteriously resembled a modern French code, not a traditional Spanish compilation. 31 In

27. See HENRY PLAUCHÉ DART, THE SOURCES OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUI44 (1911); John Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 6 TUL. L. REV.
280, 281 (1932) (quoting June 7, 1806 resolution appointing Moreau Lislet and
James Brown as redactors).
28. John T. Hood, Jr., The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil
Code, 19 LA. L. REV. 18, 24 (1958) (quoting resolution); see also Alain A. Levasseur, The Major Periods of Louisiana Legal History, 41 LOY. L. REV. 585,
610–28 (1996) (reviewing political developments leading up to Moreau Lislet and
Brown’s appointment).
29. Id. at 590–609.
30. See KATE WALLACH, RESEARCH IN LOUISIANA LAW 203–218 (1958)
(providing bibliographical overview of Spanish sources in pre-Purchase Louisiana); see also M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW
INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA, Part 1 (2004) (discussing sources of law in
Spanish Americas).
31. See John Randall Trahan, The Continuing Influence of le Droit Civil and
el Derecho Civil in the Private Law of Louisiana, 63 LA. L. REV. 1019, 1026
SIANA
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structure, the Digest had the “classic three-book arrangement” of the
Institutes of Gaius and the Code Napoléon, while in phraseology,
Batiza’s 1971 study confirmed the drafters’ near-complete reliance
on French-language models. 32 Indeed, Batiza attributed less than
10% of the Digest’s provisions to the “possible influence” of nonverbatim provisions in the Partidas, Curia Philipica, and Febrero.
Consistent with Batiza’s earlier findings of the redactors’ overwhelming reliance on French-language models, the Appendix to this
study identifies for the first time nearly one hundred additional Digest provisions that Moreau Lislet copied verbatim or almost verbatim (i.e., literally or almost literally) from French legal encyclopedias, specifically Lerasle’s Encyclopédie méthodique (74 Digest
provisions); Denisart’s Collection de décisions and/or Nouveau
Denisart (12 provisions); and Guyot’s répertoire (2 additional provisions); as well as three provisions taken from either Lerasle or
Guyot. 33 For reasons that will become evident later, no attempt has

(2003) (describing Digest as “heavily indebted to the French civil-law tradition”
for its “form” and “structure”).
32. See Vernon Valentine Palmer, The French Connection and the Spanish
Perception: Historical Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of French Influence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1067, 1074 (2003) (discussing Digest’s “classic three-book arrangement” and resemblance to Code Napoléon); see
also Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code in French: Translation and Retranslation, 9 J. CIV. L. STUD. 223, 230–31 (2016) (noting similarities in Digest’s
structure and Institutes of Gaius).
33. See Appendix to the present study (table of sources). In some instances, it
was not possible to distinguish between two phraseologically-similar encyclopedia entries, especially where sources exhibit a mutual reliance on an earlier (sometimes recognizable, sometimes indeterminate) third source. Indeed, Lerasle and
Guyot had both copied from the Paris folio, as well as from each other. See
Avertissement, supra note 21, at vi (Lerasle, justifying the Encyclopédie
méthodique’s copying from Guyot’s first edition, while also noting that Guyot had
borrowed entries in his 1775–83 répertoire from Diderot). For this reason, many
of Batiza’s 1974 attributions to Guyot’s répertoire are actually for provisions that
come from Lerasle. For example, Batiza wrongly attributed Bk. III, Tit. I, Art.
172, a verbatim equivalent of 5 Encyc. Juris. 593, ¶ 1 (on licitation), to an “a.v.
(in part)” provision in Guyot’s répertoire; likewise, he attributed Bk. III, Tit. XX,
Art. 2, a verbatim equivalent of 6 Encyc. Juris. 247, ¶ 2 (on occupancy), to a
“substantially identical” provision found in Guyot. However, in both cases, Lerasle has the stronger claim on the basis of phraseological resemblance and identical paragraph structure.
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been made to trace the possible non-verbatim influence of French
legal encyclopedia entries on the rest of the Digest.
As a whole, the findings in the Appendix’s table of source attributions are significant: in total, ancien droit encyclopedia entries
constitute the Digest’s most-influential genre of source material after the French codes and ancien droit commentators, 34 accounting
for almost 5% of the 1808 code’s 2,000 or so provisions, while Lerasle’s Encyclopédie méthodique is the Digest’s fourth most frequently copied verbatim source after the Code civil, the Projet of
Year VIII, and the Loix Civiles. 35
To illustrate the redactor’s technique, Table 1 provides a representative example of Moreau Lislet’s verbatim use of entries in
French legal encyclopedias to draft articles for Louisiana’s first civil
code. Table 1 begins by reproducing in column 1 the official Frenchlanguage text for Articles 1–3 in Book III, Title XX (of Occupancy,
Possession and Prescription). 36 The three articles define the civilian
concept of occupation, or novel possession, as well as the Romaninfluenced “cinq manières” of acquiring property by occupancy. 37
34. Compare the present study (Appendix identifying 90 provisions taken
verbatim or almost verbatim from French legal encyclopedic literature) with
Batiza’s 1971 study, which identified 1,531 source attributions for French legislation (the Code civil, projet, Custom of Paris, and Ordinance of 1667) and 306
source attributions for French commentators (Domat, Pothier, and Domat/Pothier). Cf. Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 11–12 & n.47.
35. With respect to verbatim and almost verbatim source attributions (i.e.,
excluding hypothetical non-verbatim relationships), Batiza’s 1971 study traced
713 Digest provisions to the Projet of Year VIII, 675 to the Code civil, and 107 to
Domat’s Loix Civiles. See Batiza 1971, at 11 & nn. 42–43, 45. Lerasle’s 71 verbatim or almost verbatim source attributions therefore rank fourth, well ahead of
Pothier (32 almost verbatim provisions). Cf. Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 11 &
n.46.
36. All French-language Digest references are to the original Bradford & Anderson edition, A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY
OF ORLEANS (1808) [hereinafter Dig. Orl.], published online by the LSU Center
of Civil Law Studies (CCLS), available at https://perma.cc/R77Q-N69Z. For discussion of CCLS’ Digest Online Project, see Agustín Parise, The Digest Online
Project: A Resource to Disseminate the Legal Heritage of Louisiana, 12 J. CIV.
L. STUD. 283 (2020); Olivier Moréteau & Agustin Parise, The Bicentennial of the
Louisiana Civil Code (1808-2008), 2 J. CIV. L. STUD. 195, 197–98 (2009).
37. See, e.g., J. Inst. 2.1.12. Cf. David V. Snyder, Possession: A Brief for
Louisiana’s Rights of Succession to the Legacy of Roman Law, 66 TUL. L. REV.
1853 (1992) (discussing similarity of Articles 2 and 3 in Title XX with rules of
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Meanwhile, column 2 provides nearly-verbatim equivalents of Articles 1–3 from the entry on ‘Occupation’ in the Encyclopédie
méthodique. 38 Finally, column 3 reproduces two paragraphs from
Boucher d’Argis’ original entry on the same subject in the Paris folio; the two paragraphs in column 3 suggest the indirect phraseological relationship between the Louisiana Digest and Diderot’s Encyclopédie. 39
Table 1.
Dig. Orl. 1808, Book
III, Title XX
Art. 1er. L'occupation est
une manière d'acquérir,
suivant laquelle les
choses qui n'appartiennent à personne, passent
au pouvoir et en la propriété de celui qui s'en
empare, avec l'intention
de se les approprier.
Art. 2. Il est donc nécessaire pour que l'occupation soit un moyen légitime d'acquisition, que la
chose occupée n'ait point
de maître, qu'elle soit de

6 Encyc. Juris. 247
(1786) [Lerasle] (‘Occupation’)
[¶ 1] OCCUPATION, f. f.
(Droit naturel, des gens,
& civil.) est un moyen
d'acquérir, suivant lequel
les choses qui n'appartiennent à personne, passent au pouvoir & en la
propriété de celui qui
s'en empare, avec l'intention de se les approprier.
[¶ 2] Il est donc nécessaire, pour que l’occupation soit un moyen légitime d'acquisition, que la
chose occupée n'ait point
de maître; qu'elle soit de

11 L’Encyc. 335 (1765)
[Diderot] (‘Occupation’)
[¶ 2] Occupation est
aussi un moyen d’acquérir du droit des gens, suivant lequel les choses appellées nullius, c’est-àdire, qui n’ont point de
maîtres, & les choses appartenantes aux ennemis
sont au premier occupant.
[no equivalent]

Roman law, rejecting Pothier’s candidacy as an “actual source” for these articles,
and (rightly) concluding that, “[t]he redactors must have relied on the Institutes
directly, or on some other source.”).
38. See 6 Encyc. Juris. 247, ¶¶ 1–3 (1786) (‘Occupation’).
39. See 11 DENIS DIDEROT & JEAN LE ROND D’ALEMBERT, ENCYCLOPÉDIE
OU DICTIONNAIRE RAISONNÉ DES SCIENCES, DES ARTS ET DES MÉTIERS 335, ¶¶ 2–
3 (1765) (‘Occupation’) [hereinafter L’Encyc.].
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6 Encyc. Juris. 247
(1786) [Lerasle] (‘Occupation’)
nature à être appréhennature à être appréhendée ou conservée, et que dée & conservée, & que
l'occupant la détienne ef- l'occupant la détienne effectivement sous sa main, fectivement sous sa main,
avec l'intention de la gar- avec l'intention de la garder.
der.
Art. 3. Il y a cinq ma[¶ 3] Il y a, suivant le
nières d'acquérir ainsi
droit romain, cinq mapar occupation, savoir:
nières d'acquérir ainsi
La chasse aux bêtes
par occupation; savoir,
fauves;
venatus, la chasse aux
La chasse à l'oiseau;
bêtes fauves; aucupium,
La pêche;
qui est la chasse à l'oiL'invention, c'est-à-dire, seau; piscatio, la pêche;
lorsqu'on trouve des
inventio, lorsqu'on
perles sur le bord de la
trouve des perles sur le
mer, des choses abanbord de la mer, des
données, ou un trésor;
choses abandonnées, ou
Le butin que l'on fait sur un trésor; enfin, praeda
les ennemis.
bellica, c’est-à-dire, le
butin que l'on fait sur les
ennemis. Voyez les instit.
lib. 2, tit. 1.
Dig. Orl. 1808, Book
III, Title XX
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11 L’Encyc. 335 (1765)
[Diderot] (‘Occupation’)

[¶ 3] Il y a, suivant le
droit romain, cinq manieres d’acquérir ainsi
par occupation; savoir, venatus, la chasse
aux bêtes fauves; aucupium, qui est la chasse à
l’oiseau; piscatio, la
pêche; inventio, comme
quand on trouve des
perles sur le bord de la
mer, des choses abandonnées, ou un trésor;
enfin, præda bellica,
c’est-à-dire, le butin que
l’on fait sur les ennemis. Voyez les instit. liv.
II. tit. 1.

As Table 1 reveals, the Encyclopédie méthodique is the clear
“actual source” for Articles 1–3: the degree of phraseological similarity between Title XX’s definition of occupation and Lerasle’s entry on the same topic, as well as the consistency in paragraph structure (Articles 1–3 in Title XX are practically interchangeable with
¶¶ 1–3 in Lerasle’s entry), evidence the redactor’s close reliance on
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Lerasle. On the other hand, the drafter’s possible direct dependence
on Diderot’s original Encyclopédie, or another source based on the
Paris folio, may safely be excluded; although the definitions in the
Digest and Diderot are similar with respect to Article 3 (the “cinq
manières”), Article 1 is closer in style and lexicon to Lerasle, while
Article 2 has no equivalent at all in Boucher d’Argis’ original entry. 40
In retrospect, the fact that Moreau Lislet copied Digest articles
from Lerasle and other French legal encyclopedias should not be
surprising; indeed, the drafter was arguably following in the footsteps of his French counterparts. As Batiza noted elsewhere, the
“number of works used by the draftsmen [of the French Civil Code]
was quite impressive” and included not only institutional literature
but also “several legal multi-volumed encyclopedias such as those
by Denisart and Guyot.” 41 Batiza even claimed that the First Cambacérès Projet of 1793 could be “reconstructed almost in its entirety”
with texts from Domat, Pothier, Denisart’s Décisions nouvelles, and
Guyot’s répertoire. 42 In other words, the French draftsmen had been
eclectic in their choice of source material and often found inspiration
in legal encyclopedic literature; the Louisiana redactor proved no
different. On both sides of the Francophone Atlantic, codifiers were
drawing on similar sources.

40. Similar evidence from the Digest provisions on licitation confirms the
drafter’s use of Lerasle rather than the Paris folio. Compare Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit.
I, Art. 173–174 with 5 Encyc. Juris. 493, ¶¶ 8, 7, 10 (‘Licitation’) (almost verbatim equivalence between Digest and Lerasle for all three articles); contra 9 L’Encyc. 485, ¶¶ 8, 7 (missing equivalent provision for Art. 174).
41. See Rodolfo Batiza, The French Revolution and Codification: Comment
on the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the Napoleonic Codes, 18
VALP. U. L. REV. 675, 678 (1984) (emphasis supplied).
42. See Rodolfo Batiza, Origins of Modern Codification of the Civil Law:
The French Experience and Its Implications for Louisiana Law, 56 TUL. L. REV.
477, 526 (1982) [hereinafter Modern Codification].
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IV. THE ENCYCLOPEDIST CODE: THE REDACTOR’S PEDAGOGICAL
MOTIVATIONS EXAMINED
What circumstances motivated Moreau Lislet to resort to French
legal encyclopedic sources when drafting the Digest? How and in
what contexts did he use encyclopedia entries as verbatim source
material? The following analysis reveals three discernible patterns
that help answer these questions. First, Moreau Lislet copied definitions from encyclopedia entries in order to introduce basic civil law
concepts to a general or lay readership, usually at the beginning of
Digest titles and chapters. Second, the redactor used French legal
encyclopedia entries to supplement Digest provisions taken from
the Code civil, projet, or Domat, especially where he felt the French
codes or Domat insufficient or inadequate. Third, the drafter copied
encyclopedic source material to clarify the purpose behind new
code articles or resolve potential ambiguities in existing practice.
While distinct, Moreau Lislet’s patterns of verbatim borrowing collectively reveal a concerted effort to provide Louisiana’s bench and
bar with a civil code that was both didactic in spirit as well as explanatory in style.
A. Examples of Encyclopedic Borrowing: Introductory Rules and
Definitions
The most common reason Moreau Lislet consulted French legal
encyclopedia entries was to reproduce their initial descriptions of
basic civil law concepts. Indeed, as the Appendix’s table of sources
indicates, a substantial number of the Digest’s introductory rules and
definitions come not from the French codes or Domat, but from Lerasle, Denisart, and Guyot. These include the Digest’s definitions for
biens and choses in Book II, Title I (copied from Lerasle); 43 usufruit
in Book II, Title III (Denisart); 44 partage, licitation, and rapports a
43. Dig. Orl., Bk. II, Tit. I, Art. 1–3; cf. 2 Encyc. Juris. 43, ¶ 1 (‘Biens’); 2
Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶¶ 5, 9 (‘Chose’).
44. Dig. Orl., Bk. II, Tit. III, Art. 1–4; cf. 4 ANCIEN DENISART 665, num. 1–
2, 5–6 (‘Usufruit’).
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succession 45 in Book III, Title I (Lerasle), atermoiement (“respite”)
in Book III, Title XVI (either Guyot or Lerasle); 46 hypothèque in
Book III, Title XIX (Lerasle); 47 and the articles on occupation from
Title XX in Table 1 (also from Lerasle).
Importantly, Moreau Lislet placed these encyclopedia-derived
definitions at the beginning of Digest titles and chapters, where they
typically serve as didactic prelude to more-detailed provisions borrowed from the Code civil and projet. Strategic placement of encyclopedia-derived definitions at the beginning of Digest titles suggests the drafter’s intention to provide readers with relevant background and context for the legal rules that follow. The four chapters
in Book II, Title I (of Things) offer a representative example of Moreau Lislet’s layering of source material for this purpose. Title I begins with Chapter 1’s basic rules regarding the distinction between
categories of things, which the redactor largely copied from introductory paragraphs in Lerasle’s entries on ‘Biens’ and ‘Choses’.48
In contrast, Chapters 2–4 provide more-specific rules regulating immoveables, moveables, and estates; according to Batiza’s 1971
study, Moreau Lislet borrowed these provisions from the Code civil
and projet. 49
Not surprisingly, many of the Digest of 1808’s encyclopediaderived articles were subsequently incorporated into the Civil Code
of 1825, and several survive practically unchanged in the present
45. Partage: Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. I, Art. 157–158; cf. 6 Encyc. Juris. 475,
¶¶ 1, 12–13 (‘Partage’). Licitation: Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. I, Art. 172–174; cf. 5
Encyc. Juris. 493, ¶¶ 1, 7–8, 10 (‘Licitation’). Rapports a succession: Dig. Orl.,
Bk. III, Tit. I, Art. 192; cf. 7 Encyc. Juris. 186, ¶ 1 (‘Rapport a succession’).
46. Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. XVI, Art. 1–3, 5; cf. 1 Encyc. Juris. 540, ¶¶ 1–4
(‘Atermoiement’); but cf. 3 BATIZA 1974, at 112 (proposing “a.v. (in part)” attribution to Guyot).
47. Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. XIX, Art. 2; cf. 5 Encyc. Juris. 99, § 1, ¶¶ 1–2
(‘Hypothèque’).
48. Title I, chapter 1 contains 12 articles. Art. 1–3, 5–6, and 10–12 come verbatim or almost verbatim from the Encyclopédie méthodique. See Appendix (supporting references). Batiza traced Art. 7 to Domat, while Art. 4, 8 and 9 reflect
Roman rules found in the Institutes. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 62.
49. Chapters 2–4 contain 22 articles. According to Batiza, all but three provisions (Art. 13, 19 and 29 (in part)) follow the Code civil and/or Projet of Year
VIII. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 63.
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code. 50 For example, current Civil Code Articles 449 (“Common
things may not be owned by anyone. They are such as the air and
the high seas. . . .”) and 1295 (“Definitive partition is that which is
made in a permanent and irrevocable manner. . . .”) are both introductory provisions about basic civil law concepts that Moreau Lislet
originally took verbatim from the Encyclopédie méthodique two
centuries ago. 51 In fact, Lerasle’s own entries are themselves “almost verbatim” equivalents of Diderot’s originals, thus making the
Paris folio the indirect source for both provisions. 52 Characteristic
of the Digest’s Lerasle-derived material, the two Civil Code articles

50. Others have only recently been eliminated. For example, in Book III, Title XVIII (of Pledge), Moreau Lislet originally copied Articles 4 (“One may pawn
every moveable which is into commerce.”) and 19 (“The debtor who takes away
the pledge without the creditor’s consent, commits a sort of theft.”) from Lerasle’s
entry on ‘Gage’. Both provisions were first published in Diderot’s Encyclopédie
and both survived more or less unchanged until the 2015 revision of the Civil
Code’s title on pledge.
“One may pawn”: Compare language in LA. CIV. CODE art. 3154 (1870), a modified version of Dig. Orl. Bk. III, Tit. XVIII, Art. 4, which was copied verbatim
from 4 Encyc. Juris. 679, ¶ 5 (‘Gage’), which was in turn copied verbatim from 7
L’Encyc. 414, ¶ 7 (‘Gage’).
“Sort of theft”: Compare language in LA. CIV. CODE art. 3173 (1870), which is
identical with Dig. Orl. Bk. III, Tit. XVIII, Art. 19, which had been copied almost
verbatim from 4 Encyc. Juris. 680, ¶ 14 (‘Gage’), and, indirectly, 7 L’Encyc. 414,
¶ 34 (‘Gage’). For discussion of the revision of the title on pledge, see Michael
H. Rubin, Ruminations on the Louisiana Law of Pledge, 75 LA. L. REV. 697
(2015).
51. “Common things”: Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 449 (2019) with
Dig. Orl., Bk. II, Tit. I, Art. 3: “Things which are common are those whose property belongs to nobody, and which all men may freely use, comfortably to the use
for which nature has intended them, such as air, running water, and the sea and its
shores.” Article 3 in the Digest was adopted with minor variation as Article 441
in the 1825 Civil Code, and as Article 450 in the Revised Civil Code (1870). See
3 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana 255
(1940). Article 450 was revised again in 1978, but the phraseology and meaning
have not changed substantially. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS & RONALD J. SCALISE
JR., PROPERTY § 3:2, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (5th ed. 2019).
For Article 3’s dependence on Encyclopédie méthodique, compare Dig. Orl., Bk.
II, Tit. I, Art. 3 and 2 Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶ 9 (‘Chose’).
Partition: Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1295 (2019) with Dig. Orl. Bk. III,
Tit. I, Art. 158: “Every partition is either definitive or provisional; definitive partition is that which is made in a stable and irrevocable manner.”
For Article 158’s dependence on the Encyclopédie méthodique, compare Dig.
Orl. Bk. III, Tit. I, Art. 158 and 6 Encyc. Juris. 475 ¶¶ 12–13 (‘Partage’).
52. Cf. 3 L’Encyc. 374, ¶ 7 (‘Choses’); 12 L’Encyc. 85, ¶¶ 23–24 (‘Partage’).
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are illustrative rather than regulative; they read more like the encyclopedia entries that inspired them than modern codified legislation.
B. More Examples of Encyclopedic Borrowing: Supplementing the
French Code and Domat
Another common reason Moreau Lislet turned to French legal
encyclopedic literature when drafting Digest articles was to augment
rules taken from the Code civil or Domat. Supplementation took two
forms. First, the drafter often used verbatim extracts from encyclopedia entries to expound or amplify more-succinct provisions borrowed from the French code or the jurisconsulte auvergnat. For example, according to Batiza’s 1971 study, Moreau Lislet copied most
of Book III, Title XVIII’s twenty-seven articles on pledge from the
Code civil and/or the Projet of Year VIII. 53 Unbeknownst to Batiza,
the Encyclopédie méthodique’s entry on ‘Gage’ accounts for the rest
of the title’s provisions. 54 The intercalation of Title XVII’s encyclopedia-derived articles with the French Code’s provisions is typical
of the drafter’s conservative technique of supplementation: Moreau
Lislet used Lerasle’s description of the rights and duties of debtor

53. See source attributions in Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 125: Articles 1,
5–9, 12–14, 16–17, 22–27 (copied verbatim or almost verbatim from the French
code and projet) and Articles 2–3, 11 (substantially influenced by these sources).
54. See Appendix (identifying Lerasle as verbatim or almost verbatim source
for Articles 4, 10–11, 15, 18–21). In contrast, Batiza’s 1971 study had proposed
Pothier’s treatise on Nantissement and Domat’s Loix Civiles as non-verbatim
“substantially influential” sources for most of the missing articles. See Batiza
1971, at 125 (attributing Articles 4 and 15 to “substantial influence” of Pothier;
Articles 10 and 18–21 to “substantial” or “partial” influence of Domat). However,
when the Encyclopédie méthodique source material is properly taken into account,
Pothier and Domat become superfluous as “actual sources” for Title XVIII. Indeed, it seems strange that Moreau Lislet would have relied on Pothier verbatim
in several other titles of the Digest but used only the non-verbatim concepts from
the French jurist’s treatise on Nantissement for the Digest’s articles on pledge.
The identification of these articles’ “actual sources” in French encyclopedic literature confirms this intuition.
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and creditor to augment, rather than modify, the Code Napoléon’s
provisions on pawns and antichresis. 55
Second, Moreau Lislet regularly formed single (composite) articles for the Digest by combining fragments from the Code civil or
Domat with verbatim extracts from Lerasle. The drafter typically did
so by inserting encyclopedia-derived language between or immediately after extracts from Domat or articles from the French Code,
thereby elucidating or interpreting the more-laconic provisions in
the Napoleonic legislation or the Loix Civiles. At the same time, the
drafter’s unusual method sometimes led to integrated provisions that
subtly changed the original meaning of the ancien droit or post-Revolutionary sources. Tables 2–4 on the following pages provide a survey of the drafter’s creative approach using examples taken from
Book II, Title III, Article 27 (standard of care for usufructuary);
Book III, Title I, Article 206 (collation of goods); and Book III, Title
XVII, Article 4 (scope of arbitrability).
Table 2.
Dig. Orl. II.3.27
Dig. Orl. 1808, Book II,
Title III, Art. 27
[1] L’usufruitier doit conserver les choses dont il a
l’usufruit et en avoir le
même soin que prend un
bon père de famille de ce
qui est à lui.

Domat’s Loix Civiles,
Part. I, Liv. I, Tit. XI,
Sect. IV, n. III (1723)
[=1] Le troisiéme engagement de l’usufruitier est de conserver les
choses dont il a l’usufruit, & d’en avoir le
même soin que prend
un bon pere de famille
de ce qui est à luy c.

8 Encyc. Juris. 159, § II,
¶ 11 (‘Usufruit’) (1789)

55. That is, the articles taken from Lerasle do not contradict the Code civil’s
general provisions on pawn and antichresis, which Moreau Lislet otherwise followed. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 125–26.
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[=2] L’usufruitier est
responsable des détériorations qui proviennent
de son dol, de sa faute ou
de sa négligence.

Table 3.
Dig. Orl. III.1.206
7 Encyc. Juris. 187, § I
(‘Rapport a succession’) (1787)
[1] Néanmoins tous les
[p. 187, ¶ 3] [=1] Il
actes faits par un ascenfaut cependant remardant et dont quelques-uns quer que tous les actes
de ses descendans ressen- d’un père ou d’une
tent de l’avantage, ne sont mère, dont quelqu’un
pas sujets à rapport; il n'y de leurs enfans [sic]
ressent quelque avana que ceux par lesquels
l’ascendant fait passer
tage, ne sont pas sujets
quelque chose de ses
à rapport; il n’y a que
biens à quelqu’un de ses
ceux pour lesquels les
descendans, par une voie père & mère sont pascouverte et indirecte.
ser quelque chose de
[2] Ainsi il n’est pas dû
leurs biens à quelqu’un
de rapport pour les asso- de leurs enfans par une
ciations faites sans
voie couverte & indifraude, entre l’ascendant
recte. . . .
et l’un de ses descendans
légitimes; lorsque les conditions en sont prouvées
d’une manière certaine.
[3] Il en est de même de
[p. 189, ¶ 8] [=3] Les
toutes les obligations à
obligations à titre
Dig. Orl. 1808, Bk. III,
Title I, Article 206

Code civil, Article 854

[=2] 854. Pareillement, il
n’est pas dû de rapport
pour les associations
faites sans fraude entre le
défunt et l’un de ses héritiers, lorsque les conditions en ont été réglées
par un acte authentique.
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titre onéreux et des actes
de commerce que le fils
passe avec son père, lesquels ne donnent ouverture au rapport, que
lorsqu’il s’y trouve de la
part du père, une intention expresse ou tacite
d’avantager son fils, et
qu’en même-tems il sort,
par ce moyen, quelque
chose du patrimoine de
l’un pour entrer dans celui de l’autre.
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onéreux, & les actes de
commerce que le fils
passe avec son père, ne
donnent ouverture au
rapport que lorsqu'il
s’y trouve, de la part
du second, une intention expresse ou tacite
d’avantager le premier,
& qu’en même temps il
sort par ce moyen,
quelque chose du patrimoine de l’un, pour entrer dans celui de
l’autre.

Table 4.
Dig. Orl. III.17.4
Dig. Orl. 1808, Book III,
Title XVII, Art. 4
[1] On peut compromettre,
en général, de tous différens, ou seulement de
quelques-uns, en particulier,
[2] comme aussi on peut
compromettre sur un procès à mouvoir, de même
que sur un procès déjà mû,
et généralement, de toutes
choses qui concernent les

Domat’s Loix Civiles,
Part. I, Liv. I, Tit.
XIV, Sect. I, n. IV
(1723)
[=1] On peut compromettre ou en general de
tous differens, ou seulement de quelques-uns
en particulier. . . .

3 Encyc. Juris. 113, ¶ 6
(‘Compromis’) (1783)

[=2] On peut compromettre sur un procès à
mouvoir, de même que
sur un procès déjà mû,
& généralement de
toutes choses qui
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concernent les parties,
& dont elles peuvent
disposer.

As the three composite articles in Tables 2–4 demonstrate, Moreau Lislet generally used Lerasle to modify or amplify Domat
and/or the Code civil, rather than the other way around. For example,
in Book II, Title III, Moreau Lislet copied the first clause of Article
27 from Domat’s Loix Civiles, while the second clause he took verbatim from the Encylopédie méthodique’s entry on ‘Usufruit’. The
additional language from Lerasle principally serves to explicate, rather than qualify, Domat’s usufructuarial standard of care, specifying that liability will arise from waste due to fraud, default, or negligence. Likewise, in Article 206, the redactor “sandwiched” Article
854 in the Code civil between two verbatim fragments taken from
Lerasle’s entry on ‘Rapport a succession’; again, the fragments
merely illustrate additional applications or contexts for the French
Code’s rule. Finally, in drafting Article 4, Moreau Lislet paired Domat’s articulation of the principle of party autonomy in arbitration
with Lerasle’s litany of circumstances in which parties may submit
disputes to third-party neutrals. The result is Article 4’s broad presumption in favor of arbitrability. Atypically, the composite provision has gone beyond both Domat’s original principle of contractual
freedom and Lerasle’s description of the various contexts in which
it is advisable to compromise in order to enshrine a definite policy
in favor of informal dispute resolution.
C. Even More Examples of Borrowing: Unsolicited Legal Advice
Versus Clear Legal Rules
The final appeal of French legal encyclopedia entries for Moreau
Lislet was their treasury of insights into the nuances of legal practice. As legislative texts, the French Civil Code and the Projet of
Year VIII were necessarily concerned with the positing of clear legal
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rules. These rules were typically expressed in a short, epigrammatic
style. 56 In contrast, French legal encyclopedic literature contained
lengthier descriptions of how legal institutions functioned in their
everyday context. In the same spirit and for similar reasons, Moreau
Lislet occasionally copied informative extracts from legal encyclopedia entries directly into the Digest, where they served to emphasize best practices or provided helpful legal advice.
Book III, Title XVII (of Arbitration) provides an example of this
perhaps surprising aspect of the redactor’s technique. In Title XVII,
Moreau Lislet copied both Articles 24 and 25 from ¶¶ 5–6 in the
Encyclopédie méthodique entry on ‘Arbitre’. 57 The structure and
style of the two articles reflect the original encyclopedia entry’s
competing impulses to articulate broader legal principles while also
providing readers with practical help. For example, Article 24’s first
clause explains that the arbitrators’ power to decide disputes is dependent on the terms of the submission (what the civil law calls the
contract of compromise), while the second clause goes on to warn
parties seeking to refer disputes to amicable compounders (arbitrators who decide ex aequo et bono) to do so explicitly in the initial
agreement to arbitrate. 58 Otherwise, the Digest cautions, the

56. See, e.g., Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1088 (1988) [hereinafter Principles] (“The phraseology of codes . . . shows certain traits. The expression of the rules of law is generally direct and impersonal.”) (describing imperative style as sine qua non of
code phraseology).
57. Compare Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. XVII, Art. 24–25 and 1 Encyc. Juris. 409,
¶¶ 5–6 (‘Arbitre’).
58. Note that the Encyclopédie méthodique’s implicit presumption against
amicable composition was contrary to pre-Purchase Spanish law. See, e.g., CURIA
PHILIPICA 434, num. 13 (2 vols., 1797) [hereinafter Cur. Phil.] (“Arbitros [i.e.,
regular arbitrators] se dicen los que proceden, y determinan segun derecho; y
arbitradores [i.e., amicable compounders] los que lo hacen á su arbitrio,
conforme una ley de Partida. Y si por el Compromiso no consta si fue hecho en
árbitros, ó arbitradores, se presume ser hecho en arbitradores, segun Lanfranco
de Oriano, y Parladorio.”) (emphasis supplied). The rule in Curia Philipica had
not changed by the mid-nineteenth century. See 1 JOAQUÍN ESCRICHE,
DICCIONARIO RAZONADO DE LEGISLACIÓN Y JURISPRUDENCIA 327 (2d. ed. 1838)
(“No resultando del compromiso si se han nombrado árbitros ó arbitradores, se
presume haberse nombrado arbitradores. . . .”).
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arbitrators run the risk of exceeding their power and their award will
be null:
Art. 24. [1] Les arbitres ne peuvent excéder les bornes du
pouvoir qui leur est donné, à peine de nullité de leur sentence; [2] cependant, si les parties les ont autorisés à prononcer, comme amiables compositeurs, ou selon la bonne foi et
suivant l’équité naturelle, sans les astreindre à la rigueur de
la loi, alors ils ont la liberté de retrancher quelque chose du
bon droit de l’une des parties, pour l’accorder à l’autre, et de
prendre un milieu entre la bonne foi, et l’extrême rigueur de
la loi. 59
The hybrid purpose and structure of Article 25 is similar. While
the first clause of Article 25 reaffirms Article 24’s general principle
that arbitral power is circumscribed by the terms of the compromise,
the second clause suggests that, as a consequence of this principle,
parties to arbitration “ought” to, as a precaution, insert a “general
clause” in the initial agreement to arbitrate, lest new disputes arise
during the pendency of the submission which the arbitrators lack
authority to resolve:
Art. 25. [1] Le pouvoir des arbitres ne peut s’étendre que sur
les choses contenues dans le compromis, [2] ainsi lorsqu’il
survient de nouveaux chefs de contestation, un nouveau pouvoir est nécessaire; pour éviter cet inconvénient, il faut insérer dans le compromis une clause générale, pour donner aux
arbitres le pouvoir de juger toutes les contestations qui pourraient survenir entre les parties, pendant le cours de l’arbitrage. 60
Importantly, neither Article 24 nor Article 25 directly state the
legal rules that underly the practical advice being given. Indeed, it
is not even clear that a legal rule is being articulated. Instead, the
principle that arbitrators depend for their authority on the terms of
the parties’ initial contract to compromise is disarmingly prefatory
for a civil code, while important legal presumptions against amicable composition and plenary power to resolve future-arising disputes
59. Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. XVII, Art. 24.
60. Id. at Art. 25.
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are left implicit in the broader context of advice about best practices
when drafting agreements to arbitrate. Moreau Lislet may have later
had second thoughts about including such material in a modern civil
code. In the course of the 1825 Civil Code revision process, the Digest’s primary redactor, along with fellow revision commissioners
Edward Livingston and Pierre Derbigny, re-worded Article 25’s
original language to resemble legislation rather than advice from a
legal encyclopedia, while Article 24’s second clause (about the need
to appoint amicable compounders explicitly) was removed from the
Code altogether. 61
V. BATIZA’S 1971 AND 1974 NON-VERBATIM SPANISH SOURCE
ATTRIBUTIONS RECONSIDERED: SOME FRENCH LEGAL
ENCYCLOPEDIC COUNTER-EVIDENCE
In addition to revealing Moreau Lislet’s pedagogical ambitions
for Louisiana’s first codification project, the presence of a substantial corpus of French legal encyclopedic source material is also relevant to the lingering debate over the extent of Spanish law’s influence on the Digest’s redaction. In particular, comparison of the present study’s verbatim legal encyclopedic source attributions with
Batiza’s 1971 and 1974 proposed non-verbatim sources indicates
that many of Batiza’s original non-verbatim (especially Spanish)
source attributions are unreliable. Indeed, the Appendix alone identifies at least two dozen Digest provisions that Moreau Lislet copied
verbatim from Denisart, Guyot, and Lerasle’s encyclopedias but
which Batiza wrongly attributed to the Siete Partidas, Curia
Philipica, and Febrero Adicionado, as well as the Corpus Juris
61. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 3089 (1825) (successor to Article 25) (“The
authority of arbitrators extends only to the things contained in the submission,
unless it has been stated that they shall have power to decide all disputes which
may arise between the parties in the course of arbitration.”). See also 1 LA. LEGAL
ARCHIVES, Projet of the Civil Code of 1825, at 360 (1939) (Moreau Lislet, Livingston, and Derbigny recommending suppression of Article 24’s second clause);
cf. LA. CIV CODE art. 3088 (1825) (successor to Article 24) (“Arbitrators can not
exceed the power which is given to them; and if they exceed it, their award is null
for so much.”).
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Civilis. 62 The origins of Batiza’s mistaken source attributions are
easily discovered and, more importantly, suggest that his 1971 and
1974 studies systematically over-estimated the role of Spanish-language “actual sources” in the compilation of the Digest.
A. Batiza’s 1971 Methodology Revisited
According to his 1971 study, Batiza began his initial search for
the Digest’s “actual sources” (verbatim and non-verbatim) with the
redaction’s “two main [French-language] trails,” the Code civil and
the Projet of Year VIII; early in his search, Batiza also consulted
Domat and Pothier’s commentaries, as well as ancien droit legislation. 63 In a 1995 article, Batiza boasted that he had “spent only about
six months” consulting sources for his 1971 study. 64 Nevertheless,
using this relatively-small selection of French-language works,
Batiza was able to locate the “verbatim” or “almost verbatim” (i.e.,
literal) sources for most of the Digest’s 2,000 or so provisions. 65
Furthermore, in his 1974 revised study, Batiza expanded his search
to also include Desgodets’ Loix des bâtimens (1748), Guyot’s répertoire, and Ferrière’s 1773 translation of Justinian’s Institutes, where
he found additional evidence of direct borrowing. 66 Yet, if Batiza
consulted other genres of French-language source material, or
French legal encyclopedias besides Guyot’s, he did not
acknowledge doing so. 67 In any event, his 1971 and 1974 studies
failed to identify multiple verbatim sources, including Lerasle and
Denisart.
Having prematurely exhausted his search for the Digest’s
French-language verbatim sources, Batiza next proceeded to investigate possible non-verbatim sources for the Digest’s remaining
62. See Appendix (supporting references).
63. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 10 & n.39.
64. See Batiza, Justinian’s Institutes, supra note 5, at 1646.
65. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 10–12.
66. See BATIZA 1974, supra note 4, at [i].
67. Cf. Batiza 1971, supra note 1, Appendix A (Table of Sources of the Civil
Code of 1808) (listing sources consulted/used).
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provisions. 68 Despite uncovering considerable evidence of Moreau
Lislet’s preference for copying French-language materials, Batiza
frequently looked to Roman and Spanish texts to explain articles
with no apparent equivalent in the small number of French-language
sources he had already consulted. As a result, Batiza ultimately
traced hundreds of Digest articles to non-verbatim provisions in the
Siete Partidas, Curia Philipica, and Febrero, as well as the Corpus
Juris Civilis. 69 However, while Batiza’s “verbatim” and “almost
verbatim” French-language sources had been phraseologically identical or nearly-identical with language found in the Digest, and
therefore provided verifiable evidence of direct borrowing, Batiza’s
proposed non-verbatim (especially Spanish and Roman) sources resembled the Digest at the level of conceptual similarity only (i.e.,
these sources addressed the same legal rules as the Digest provision
in question but were distinct in terms of style and terminology). 70
Whether Moreau Lislet ever consulted or copied these sources is often a matter of speculation, and as the present study indicates, sometimes verifiably wrong.
B. The Pascal-Batiza Debate
What motivated Batiza to turn to non-verbatim Spanish and Roman sources where the French Code, projet, and Domat were silent?
Ironically, the answer probably lies with the “Spanish thesis” 71 of
Batiza’s principal antagonist, Robert Pascal. Prior to Batiza’s 1971
study, Louisiana legal historians had offered several theories to
68. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 10.
69. Id. at 12–13 (discussing 200+ Spanish source attributions).
70. Id. at 12 & n.48 (acknowledging that “the accuracy of some of the figures
given in the text for these [non-verbatim] sources is not as precise as that of the
French sources because of the difference in language and the number of instances
where several possible sources may account for one single provision.”). Although
Batiza did identify several articles in Book III, Title V (on marriage contracts)
that had been translated from Febrero. See BATIZA 1974, supra note 4, at 103
(identifying Febrero as “actual source” (in translation) of Articles 12–14).
71. For use of “Spanish thesis” to describe Pascal’s position, see Palmer, supra note 32, at 1069.
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explain Moreau Lislet and Brown’s apparent deviation from their
supposed mandate to make Spanish law the “ground work” of their
“civil code.” 72 Proponents of the Spanish thesis, including Pascal,
argued that the redactors used French-language sources such as the
French Civil Code and Domat primarily out of convenience (as the
Digest was to be compiled in the French language), but only where
the French sources’ rules were interchangeable with those of Spanish law. Where French and Spanish law differed, the redactors modified the French sources, used Spanish ones, or composed articles
from scratch. 73 According to this theory, the Digest of 1808 is a metaphorical “Spanish girl in French dress”; although the redaction may
be phraseologically French, the underlying legal institutions remain
substantively Spanish.74 Opponents of the Spanish thesis have increasingly disagreed with this characterization of the Digest as a
French-language restatement of “Spanish-Roman law.” In particular, John Cairns has argued persuasively that the drafters were “not
constrained by a narrow positivist view of the sources they could
employ” when drafting the Digest. Rather, after the manner of European codifiers, they used French-language and other sources more
creatively, to intentionally modify Louisiana civil law. 75

72. For a contemporaneous overview of the “Pascal-Batiza” debate, see A.N.
Yiannopoulos, The Early Sources of Louisiana Law: Critical Appraisal of a Controversy, in LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE 102–03 (E.F. Haas ed., 1983). See
also Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Recent Discovery of Moreau Lislet’s System
of Omissions and Its Importance to the Debate over the Sources of the Digest of
1808, 49 LOY. L. REV. 301, 302–07 (2003) (briefly reviewing controversy and
need for more comparative research to resolve conflicting claims).
73. Robert Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza,
46 TUL. L. REV. 603, 606 (1971); see also LEVASSEUR, supra note 16, at 176–77
(articulating similar theory of redaction).
74. See Pascal, supra note 73, at 606; see also Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the
Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REV. 301, 303 (1998) (26th Tucker Lecture) (referring to Digest of 1808 as “Spanish girl in French dress”).
75. See JOHN W. CAIRNS, CODIFICATION, TRANSPLANTS, AND HISTORY: LAW
REFORM IN LOUISIANA (1808) AND QUEBEC (1866) xv, 77, 439 (2015); see also
Olivier Moréteau, Codification, Transplants and History: Law Reform in Louisiana (1808) and Quebec (1866) (book review), 4 COMP. LEGAL HIST. 94 (2016)
(positively reviewing Cairns’ work and placing it within the history of PascalBatiza debate).
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Notwithstanding his well-known insistence on the Digest of
1808’s overwhelming French-language provenance, Batiza’s own
views were probably somewhere in the middle. Writing before
Cairns, Batiza did not have the benefit of the former’s demonstration
(mostly based on evidence in Book I) of the redactors’ use of
French-language sources as vehicles for departing from previouslyapplicable Spanish paradigms. 76 Although Batiza acknowledged
several provisions in the Digest where Moreau Lislet had supplemented Spanish rules with French ones, 77 he still assumed that the
redactors followed Spanish law on most major points. In fact, in a
1982 article, Batiza offered an assessment of Moreau Lislet’s likely
approach to French and Spanish source material that is substantially
compatible with the Spanish thesis’ hypothesis that the drafters
turned to Spanish authorities where the Code civil, Domat, and
Pothier were inconsistent with existing Louisiana law:
The first Louisiana codification in 1808, disregarding the explicit instructions of the Legislature in a manner that can
nevertheless be justified on technical grounds, drew upon
French rather than Spanish or Castilian sources: the French
Civil Code (1804), the Projet of the Year VIII (1800), the
Custom of Paris, and the writings of Domat and Pothier.
Only exceptionally, where Spanish law differed substantially from the French, did this first codification use
sources such as the Siete Partidas, the Recopilación de Castilla, the Fuero Real, Febrero Adicionado, the Curia
Philipica, and Roman Law. 78
Batiza’s presumption that Moreau Lislet avoided adopting
French rules that “differed substantially” from Spanish alternatives
76. See generally CAIRNS, supra note 75 (providing exhaustive comparative
analysis of Book I’s provisions on family relations and master and servant and
rejecting both Pascal’s hypothesis that Digest of 1808 is restatement of Spanish
law as well as opposite characterization of the Digest as a “slavish copy” of the
Code civil).
77. See, e.g., Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 29 (“The Spanish system of community of acquets or gains (sociedad de ganancias) that appears in the Code, rather than being opposed to the French system of communauté, supplements it.”).
78. See Batiza, Modern Codification, supra note 42, at 601 (emphasis supplied).
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appears to have also influenced the methodology behind his 1971
study. At the very least, the Spanish thesis’ characterization of the
nature of the legislature’s instructions decisively informed the
Tulane law professor’s strategy for finding the Digest’s supposed
non-verbatim sources.
C. Batiza’s 1971 Methodology Reexamined: An Illustrative Excursus on the “Actual Sources” of Book III, Title XVII
Batiza’s proposed “actual sources” for Book III, Title XVII (on
Arbitration or Compromise) provide a useful illustration of how the
1971 study’s flawed methodology led Batiza to over-estimate the
importance of Spanish-language sources. Unlike most of Book III,
Title XVII’s rules on compromis, the French contract of arbitration, 79 have no equivalent in the Code civil: much to Planiol’s annoyance, the French drafters had dealt with the subject of arbitration
separately, in the French Code of Civil Procedure (1806). 80 For this
reason, Moreau Lislet could not borrow provisions from the Code
civil or the projet when drafting Title XVII’s thirty-five articles, as
he had done elsewhere in Book III. Moreover, although Batiza’s
1971 study identified ten articles that Moreau Lislet had copied directly from Domat’s Loix Civiles, these accounted for less than a
third of Title XVII’s provisions. 81 Faced with a dearth of verbatim
source material in the “usual places” (Code civil, projet, Domat),
Batiza characteristically turned his search for Title XVII’s
79. The usage in the Digest is distinct from that of the 1825 and subsequent
civil codes, as well as current Louisiana practice, in which compromise is a supposedly civilian translation of a settlement agreement, or “transaction.” See, e.g.,
N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary, 54 LA. L. REV.
1265, 1297 (1994) (equating “transaction or compromise” with “settlement of a
lawsuit”). In the Digest, it is always a contract to arbitrate.
80. See CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] [Code of Civil Procedure] arts.
1005–1013 (1806) (Fr.); see also 2 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL
LAW 324 (La. State L. Inst. trans., 11th ed. 1939) (stating that “[a]rbitration is a
very important contract which is not regulated by our civil laws; it is only incidentally envisaged in Art. 1989 of the Civil Code and regulated by a few insufficient dispositions of the code of procedure. . . .”).
81. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 122–25 (tracing Title XVII Articles 1,
9–10, 14, 26–28, 34, and parts of Articles 4 and 29 to Domat’s Loix Civiles).
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remaining provisions to plausible Spanish-language alternatives, ultimately attributing most of the title’s non-Domat material to the
possible influence of non-verbatim, conceptually-relevant provisions in the Tercera Partida, Febrero, and Curia Philipica. 82 Indeed,
Batiza traced nearly all of the 1971 study’s proposed Curia Philipica
source material to Title XVII alone. 83 According to Batiza’s study,
Title XVII was, in quantitative terms, the most “Spanish” or “Spanish-influenced” title in the entire Digest. 84
In retrospect, however, such a high proportion of Spanish source
material almost certainly reflects Batiza’s approach, not the redactor’s. The Appendix reveals that at least six of Title XVII’s twentyfive non-Domat articles were actually taken from the Encyclopédie
méthodique (all or parts of Articles 3 and 4, 12, 24–25, and 33), 85
not Pothier, the Tercera Partida, Febrero, and/or Curia Philipica (as
Batiza had proposed), 86 while Article 6 was copied from the Loix
Civiles (not Curia Philipica), 87 and Article 8 was taken from Denisart. 88 Likewise, Batiza’s 1971 attribution of Article 7’s threemonth default term for compromises to the non-verbatim influence
82. See id. (attributing Articles 3, 5–7, 11–13, 15–18, 21–22, and 25 to nonverbatim “substantially” or “partially influential” provisions in the Partidas, Febrero, and/or Curia Philipica).
83. Apart from Title XVII (17 provisions), Batiza found possible influences
of Curia Philipica only in Book III, Titles III (1 provision) and XVI (1 provision).
See id. at Appendix B.
84. That is to say, the proportion of Title XVII’s articles that Batiza attributed
to the non-verbatim influence of Spanish, and only Spanish, sources is higher than
that of any other title in the Digest. See id.
85. See 3 Encyc. Juris. 113, ¶¶ 4, 9, 16 (sources for first two clauses in Title
XVII, Article 3, second clause of Article 4, first part of Article 33); 1 Encyc. Juris.
409, ¶¶ 5–6 (sources for part of Article 12 and all of Articles 24–25).
86. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 122–25 (attributing Article 3 to Febrero
Adicionado/Curia Philipica, Article 12 to Tercera Partida, Febrero Adicionado
and/or Curia Philipica, Article 24 to Pothier on Procédure Civile/Curia Philipica,
Article 25 to Curia Philipica, and Article 33 to Pothier, Febrero Adicionado
and/or Curia Philipica).
87. In the 1971 study, Batiza wrongly traced Article 6 to the “substantial influence” of both the Loix Civiles and Curia Philipica. See Batiza 1971, supra note
1, at 123. In the 1974 study, Batiza revised his earlier source attribution to include
only Domat, the article’s “almost verbatim” source. See 3 BATIZA 1974, supra
note 4, at 113.
88. See 1 ANCIEN DENISART 490, ¶ 50 (8th ed. 1773) (‘Compromis’) (nearverbatim source for Article 8).
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of Domat, Febrero, and/or Curia Philipica is unsupportable. 89 In the
Loix Civiles, Domat assumes that a compromise without a fixed
deadline is invalid; in the Spanish sources (including both Curia
Philipica and Febrero), arbitrators have three years, not three
months, to render an award. 90 Instead, the “actual source” for Article
7 is very likely Article 1007 in the recently-promulgated French
Code of Civil Procedure, which states that “Le compromis sera valable, encore qu’il ne fixe pas de delai; et, en ce cas, la mission des
arbitres ne durera que trois mois, du jour du compromis.” 91
In other words, once Domat, Lerasle, Denisart, and the French
code of procedure are taken into account, the probable “Spanish89. See Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. XVII, Art. 7 (“If the compromise does not limit
any time, the power of the arbitrators may continue in force during three months
from the date of the compromise unless the parties agree to revoke it.”); Batiza
1971, supra note 1, at 123 (identifying Domat, Febrero, Curia Philipica as Article
7’s “substantially influential” sources).
90. The rule in Domat: “It is usual, and even necessary, in Compromises, to
fix a time within which the Arbitrators shall pronounce their Award . . . because
it would not be just that it should be in the power either of the Arbitrators, or
Parties, to put off the Final Decision for ever.” 1 JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN
ITS NATURAL ORDER 224 (W. Strahan trans., 1722). The Spanish sources: “[I]f
the parties had fixed no time at which the judgment was to be rendered; then we
say the arbitrators ought to render it, as soon as possible; so that not more than
three years shall elapse. . . .” 1 THE LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 98–99 (L. Moreau Lislet & Henry Carleton trans., 1820) (reproducing 3 Part. Tit. IV ley 27);
see also Cur. Phil., supra note 58 (repeating same three-year rule); JOSÉ FEBRERO,
LIBRERÍA DE ESCRIBANOS Part. I, Cap. XIII, § 1, num. 10 (1789) (same);
ESCRICHE, supra note 58, at 527 (three-year default rule unchanged in middle of
nineteenth century).
91. CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 1007
(1806) (Fr.). The French Code of Procedure’s three-month rule appears to be
novel. Most ancien droit authorities state that a compromis without a stated deadline was not valid (following Domat) or at least revocable. See, e.g., ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, TRAITÉ DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE (1776), Part. II, Ch. IV, Art. II, ¶ 1
(listing deadline as required term for valid compromise); GUY DU ROUSSEAUD DE
LA COMBE, RECUEIL DE JURISPRUDENCE CIVILE 24 (4th ed., 1746) (declaring compromise without a term revocable). On the other hand, the Toulouse advocate
Marc-Antoine Rodier acknowledged several minority opinions: “d’autres qu’ils
doivent prononcer le même jour; . . . d’autres enfin soutiennent qu’ils peuvent
prononcer jusqu’à révocation du compromis, ou du moins dans les trois ans de la
date du compromis,” while Mongalvy states in his Traité de l’arbitrage (1837)
that some ancien droit authors had held that compromises could last up to 30 years
in certain circumstances. See MARC-ANTOINE RODIER, QUESTIONS SUR L’ORDONNANCE DE LOUIS XIV Tit. XXVI, Art. VIII, question 3 (1769); S.C.T. MONGALVY, TRAITÉ DE L’ARBITRAGE EN MATIÈRE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 162
(1837).
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ness” of Title XVII’s non-verbatim source material is significantly
reduced, while almost half of the Digest’s proposed Curia Philipica
source material is rendered hypothetical at best. This does not mean
that the redactor did not consult Spanish sources when drafting Title
XVII’s articles (it is entirely possible that he did). However, in most
instances, the French legal literature Moreau Lislet found in his own
law library would have been sufficient for his work. Moreover, at
least with respect to Article 7’s three-month default term and Article
24’s presumption against amicable composition, Spanish sources
were clearly not “substantially” influential. 92 More than the drafter’s
preference for the style of the Code Napoléon or the convenience of
the new French Code as a model is needed to explain Moreau Lislet’s repeated reliance on contradictory French source material in an
area of private law where Spanish law had a well-developed, preexisting body of legal rules.
D. The “Spanish Thesis” Re-re-examined
While Batiza’s purported Spanish source attributions (both in
Title XVII and elsewhere in the Digest) were quantitatively insignificant relative to Moreau Lislet’s extensive borrowing from the
French Code, projet, and Domat, their scattered presence throughout
Batiza’s reconstruction of the Digest’s source material has nevertheless created the impression that there is indeed a “Spanish-Roman”
substrate to the Digest, often without supporting comparative evidence. Inadvertently or not, Batiza’s findings have therefore helped
sustain the Spanish thesis’ central premise that the drafters worked
(or believed that they were working) on an Iberian canvas to paint
the “girl in French dress.” The mistaken attribution of French legal
encyclopedia-derived articles to non-verbatim Spanish sources no
doubt also explains Batiza’s otherwise curious conclusion that the

92. See supra note 58 (discussing French background to Article 24 and contrary rules in Spanish sources).
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redactor’s use of “Spanish law . . . gives the Code a somewhat didactic character.” 93
At present, further research is needed to ascertain the full extent
of French-language source material in the Digest of 1808. There are
likely French-language verbatim sources that Moreau Lislet copied
but which have not yet been identified (such as law dictionaries),
and there are also missing verbatim source attributions for Frenchlanguage materials that Batiza did consult. 94 Until scholars have
identified and exhaustively searched all of the Digest’s French-language sources for verbatim source material, Batiza’s non-verbatim
attributions to Spanish sources should, except where comparative
evidence supports them, 95 be treated with caution. In the meantime,
it is safe to assume that, because the Digest was originally written in
French, not Spanish, future discoveries of overlooked verbatim
source material will come disproportionately at the expense of
Batiza’s non-verbatim attributions to Spanish-language materials.
VI. CONCLUSIONS: THE PEDAGOGICAL ARCHITECTURE OF
LOUISIANA’S CIVIL CODES
As earlier sections have indicated, the supposed “cosmopolitanism” of the Digest’s source material has probably been over-emphasized. 96 While Moreau Lislet’s work was necessarily comparative,
he generally preferred to copy French-language texts whenever
93. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 28.
94. For example, the “actual source” for Bk. I, Tit. IX, Art. 15 is likely the
“almost verbatim” equivalent Article 503 in the Code Napoléon. In contrast,
Batiza’s 1971 study proposed “substantially influential” provisions in Pothier’s
treatise on Personnes and Blackstone’s Commentaries. Cf. Batiza 1971, supra
note 1, at 62.
95. E.g., with respect to ganancial property or the law of successions.
96. See, e.g., Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 28 (claiming that “the variety of
sources used in drafting the Code gives it a cosmopolitan and distinctive flavor
that differentiates it from either of its two principal models [the Projet and the
Code Napoléon].”); see also Vernon Valentine Palmer, Sounding the Retreat: The
Exit of Spanish Law in Early Louisiana 1805-1808, 31 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 121,
146 (2017) (stating of the 1971 study that “Batiza’s research showed too that the
drafters drew upon English, French, and Spanish writers such as Blackstone, Domat, Febrero, and Pothier. Clearly this was a cosmopolitan selection from across
national legal systems.”).
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possible. The redactor had thousands of articles to draft, and time
was of the essence. The immediate need for efficiency suggests that
he relied on a relatively small number of French-language materials
rather than exhaustively research all the extant Spanish legislation
or translate a substantial portion of it. 97 As Batiza’s 1971 study established, the Code civil, the projet, and Domat’s Loix Civiles were
Moreau Lislet’s most important sources. All three texts provided
useful civilian models of structure and French-language phraseology, while Domat had the added advantage of being both explicitly
sanctioned by the legislature and widely available in a popular English translation. 98
In contrast, French legal encyclopedia entries supplemented the
principal sources. Moreau Lislet had used Lerasle, Denisart, and
Guyot in everyday legal practice, and he was therefore familiar with
their strengths and weaknesses. During the drafting process, these
sources would have facilitated easy comparison of definitions and
rules penned by reputable French authorities. Moreau Lislet may
also have resorted to these sources to improve his own understanding of unfamiliar provisions in the Code Napoléon, itself a novel
compromise between Roman law and ancien droit. 99 Knowing that
fellow practitioners and ordinary citizens would require the same

97. This is hardly surprising given the state of Spanish law at the time of the
Digest’s redaction. According to John Tucker, the various Spanish codes, fueros,
and ordenanzas in force “constituted a tremendous volume of legislation applicable to Louisiana,” collectively “compris[ing] 23 volumes of 89 books of 1,543
titles containing 20,335 laws.” See John Tucker, Code and the Common Law in
Louisiana, 29 TUL. L. REV. 739, 743 (1955) (relying on GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT, THE
CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO 102 (1851)).
98. See Levasseur, supra note 28, at 620 & n.9 (for text of 1806 “declaratory
act” making Loix Civiles authoritative in Louisiana courts). The first English
translation of Domat was Strahan’s 1722 edition. See DOMAT, supra note 90; see
also Peter Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America,
52 VA. L. REV. 403, 406–07 (1966) (discussing popularity of Strahan’s translation
in common-law jurisdictions during early 19th century).
99. See, e.g., Bergel, Principles, supra note 56, at 1078 (describing the Code
civil as a “technical compromise between customary law and Roman law.”).
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elucidation likely prompted him to copy material from Guyot, Denisart, and Lerasle directly into the Digest. 100
There were also important legal-cultural reasons for supplementing the French Code and Domat with other genres of civilian
legal literature: the finished Digest was to be applied not only by
civilians, but also by lawyers trained in the common law. Between
1804 and 1810, Louisiana’s judges were mostly American immigrants, 101 and, if the Creole legislators’ Manifesto of 1806 is to be
credited, some knew neither Spanish nor French. 102 Moreover, in
the period immediately after the Purchase, lawyers from commonlaw states quickly outnumbered Francophone advocates, bringing
with them divergent legal vocabularies and methodologies. 103 In this
environment, the civilian approach to gap-filling could hardly be assumed, and lacunae in the new code would inevitably be cause of
future confusion or even intentional misinterpretation. The

100. On this point, see Barenot, infra note 111, at 16 (stating that “With the
advent of the Revolution and in the years that followed the promulgation of the
Civil Code, the main purpose of lexicographical works [both dictionaries and répertoires] was to facilitate the passage from the ancien droit to legal ecosystems
constructed on new paradigms.”).
In fact, the practice of using French encyclopedia entries to interpret the Digest
was not unheard of in the years after the Louisiana Code’s promulgation. See, e.g.,
Morse v. Williamson & Patton’s Syndics, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 282, 284 (La. 1814)
(Court referred to Encyclopédie méthodique to interpret legal term in Digest);
Amory v. Boyd, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 414, 415 (La. 1818) (Derbigny, J quoting Guyot’s
répertoire on subject of mandate). Sometimes legal argument rested on competing
entries from two French legal encyclopedias. See, e.g., De Armas, supra note 19,
at 140 (Moreau Lislet invoking Nouveau Denisart to undermine plaintiff’s reliance on Guyot’s répertoire).
101. See, e.g., Henry P. Dart, The History of the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
133 La. liii (1913).
102. See quoted language in LEVASSEUR, supra note 16, at 63: “The present
composition of the courts, the judges presiding over them and the jurists who
plead before them being almost all strangers to the French language and still
more to the language in which the greater part of the laws of this country are
written [i.e., Spanish] . . . renders indispensable . . . in the French and the English
language, a complete collection of the laws governing us.” (emphasis supplied).
103. Elizabeth Gaspard, The Rise of the Louisiana Bar: The Early Period,
1813-1839, 28 LA. HIST. 183, 187 (1987) (discussing immigration of AngloAmerican lawyers into Louisiana during early statehood period).

2020]

THE ENCYCLOPEDIST CODE

69

occasional encyclopedist definition or gloss would help mitigate this
possibility.104
In 1936, Mitchell Franklin famously stated that the difference in
length between the Louisiana Code and the Code civil was largely
the difference between a “code that was a code, and a code that was
a code, a law-school and doctrine all at once.” 105 Over the years,
Louisiana legal scholars have frequently agreed with Franklin’s assessment, although they typically express dissatisfaction with the
code’s dual orientation. 106 As David Hoskins and Shael Herman explain, “almost by reflex, civilians shy away from the suggestion that
the code performs legitimate pedagogical functions. . . . The code is
legislation, not doctrine, not a text-book of the civil law.” 107 However, while Franklin’s (and later scholars’) juxtapositions of “code”
and “doctrine” are no doubt descriptively accurate with respect to
the Digest’s (and its successors’) unusual style, they are also too
anachronistic. At the time of the Digest’s redaction, the paradigmatic status of the Code Napoléon, and mid-nineteenth century
French law’s categorical distinction between the role of legislation,
jurisprudence, and commentary in shaping legal norms, was still in
104. For similar insights on the relationship between the Digest’s pedagogical
style and the common law threat, see Palmer, supra note 32, at 1076 (concluding
that the “framers felt it was necessary to incorporate a good deal of doctrine within
the code itself. The judges to whom these instructions issued were all trained in
the common law and would have brought with them a completely different methodological inclination.”).
105. See Mitchell Franklin, Some Observations on the Influence of French
Law on the Early Civil Codes of Louisiana, in LE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS : LIVRESOUVENIR DES JOURNÉES DU DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 841 (1936) (quoted in Shael
Herman & David Hoskins, Perspectives on Code Structure: Historical Experience, Modern Formats, and Policy Considerations, 54 TUL. L. REV. 987, 1042
(1980)).
106. See, e.g., Justice Rost’s comments in Egerton v. Third Municipality of
New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 435, 437 (1846) (“Definitions are, at best, unsafe guides
in the administration of justice; and their frequent recurrence in the Louisiana
Code, is the greatest defect in that body of laws.”); see also THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, DAVID A. COMBE, AND SHAEL HERMAN, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A
HUMANISTIC APPRAISAL 202 (1981) (criticizing code as “much more verbose”
than French prototype and lamenting drafters’ decision to “make of the Civil Code
a pedagogical tool by incorporating long passages from venerable treatises.”).
107. Herman & Hoskins, supra note 105, at 1041.
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the making. 108 As Jean Maillet observed elsewhere, it was the process of codification itself that first “pushed into the background
other legal sources and techniques,” substituting an almost “entirely
statutory” conception of law for earlier models. 109 Having been
trained in the ancien droit, Moreau Lislet’s practical experience with
French legislation was not the “self-sufficient” civil code of common law stereotype 110 or the French Exegetical School, but the earlier period’s patchwork of ordonnances and jurisprudence, elucidated by myriad commentaries, legal encyclopedias, and works of
legal lexicography (the earlier “sources and techniques” described
by Maillet). The varied nature of the sources Moreau Lislet used to
redact the Digest naturally reflects this unique historical context,
when French legal culture was on the cusp of a crucial transformation in its own understanding of codified legislation’s relationship to other forms of legal literature.
From Moreau Lislet’s point of view, extracts from the Encyclopédie méthodique, Décisions nouvelles, and Répertoire de jurisprudence are therefore not awkward additions to Louisiana’s first
civil code, ornamenting (or adulterating) a “pure” civilian codification. Rather, legal encyclopedias and French-style civil codes should
be understood as existing along an evolving continuum between old
108. See ANDRÉ CASTALDO Y YVES MAUSEN, INTRODUCTION HISTORIQUE AU
§§ 1918 to 1920 (5th ed., 2019) (“Désireux d’expliquer (et de s’expliquer
sans doute à soi-même) le Code Napoléon, les premiers commentateurs ne se satisfont pas d’une simple paraphrase du texte; ce n’est que plus tard, au cours du
XIXe siècle, que l’expression d’«exégèse» prendra tout son sens à cet égard.”)
(contrasting post-codification renaissance in doctrinal analysis and continuity of
ancien droit methodologies of interpretation with mid-century French law’s retreat to pure exegesis); see also James Gordley, Myths of the French Civil Code,
42 AM. J. COMP. L. 459, 491–92 (1994) (suggesting that mid-19th century French
Exegetical School responsible for the “myth” of the French Civil Code’s selfsufficiency and independence vis-à-vis natural law and doctrine).
109. See Jean Maillet, Historical Significance of French Codification, 44 TUL.
L. REV. 681, 688–89 (1970) (discussing methodological changes wrought by codification); see also Pierre Legrand, Strange Power of Words: Codification Situated, 9 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 28–29 (1994) (agreeing that codification “simultaneously serves to close the past and open the future,” substituting new genres or
approaches to interpretation for older ones).
110. See also Aniceto Masferrer, French Codification and “Codiphobia” in
Common Law Traditions, 34 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 20–21 (2019).
DROIT
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and new models of making civil law comprehensible, with Moreau
Lislet’s final redaction falling somewhere in the middle. Indeed,
Pierre-Nicolas Barenot has recently proposed that the ancien droit
“legal dictionaries, lexicons or repertoires” popular among French
lawyers of Moreau Lislet’s generation should be regarded as eighteenth-century antecedents of modern codification, “for codes, like
lexicographical works, aim at making the law more accessible, by
bringing together and organizing separate legal texts in a single corpus.” 111
According to the cultural historian Robert Darnton, Denis Diderot’s original Encyclopédie had been offered to the French reading
public as a “compendium of all knowledge”, an Enlightenment cornucopia of abstract as well as technical information about a wide
range of important subjects. 112 In similar vein, the Avertissement to
Lerasle’s volumes claimed with justification that the Encyclopédie
méthodique: Jurisprudence would provide its readers with un système complet du Droit in eight volumes. 113 Although modern civil
codes do not typically aspire to the same didactic achievement as
legal encyclopedias, they nevertheless share a similar concern with
comprehending the whole landscape of private law in a systematic
arrangement. 114
In the end, by blending codified legislation and ancien droit
commentary with French legal encyclopedia entries, Moreau Lislet
was able to compile a hybrid Digest-Code which was both legislative and didactic, one specially designed to meet the immediate legal-cultural needs of an emerging mixed system. 115 Perhaps as a
111. See Pierre-Nicolas Barenot, A View of French Legal Lexicography – Tradition and Change from a Doctrinal Genre to the Modern Era, in LEGAL LEXICOGRAPHY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 13–14 (Máirtín Mac Aodha ed. 2014).
112. See Darnton, supra note 22, at 1352.
113. See Avertissement, supra note 21, at vi.
114. See, e.g., James Gordley, Codification and Legal Scholarship, 31 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 735, 735 (“Modern civil codes . . . are attempts to state the basic
rules of private law comprehensively and systematically.”).
115. See generally Michael McAuley, The Pedagogical Code, 63 LA. L. REV.
1293, 1297 (2003) (discussing the mixed legislative-pedagogical orientation of
the Louisiana Civil Code).
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result, the Digest of 1808’s sui generis style and eclectic Frenchlanguage source material display a striking affinity for (and continuity with) the ancien droit models it supposedly supersedes, even
as its structure and rules resemble its better-known Napoleonic prototype. 116 At the very least, the redactor’s choice of sources with
respect to the genre of French legal literature he consulted (and copied) provides a valuable window into the complex aspirations behind the pedagogical architecture of Louisiana’s encyclopedist code.

APPENDIX
The Appendix is a list of source attributions for encyclopediaderived articles appearing in Louisiana’s first civil code, the Digest of 1808. The Appendix is intended to be used as a supplement to Appendix C in Rodolfo Batiza’s 1971 study, “The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance,” published in volume 46 of the Tulane Law Review. For
utility of comparison, this Appendix uses Batiza’s 1971 study’s
categories of phraseological “resemblance” to describe the relationship between individual Digest provisions and French legal
encyclopedic sources (e.g., “verbatim”, “almost verbatim”, “almost verbatim (in part)”, etc., usually abbreviated “v.”, “a.v.”,
and “a.v. (in part)”). The present study has adopted Batiza’s categories primarily for reasons of consistency, despite the inherent
subjectivity of Batiza’s earlier approach.
116. In this last respect, the Louisiana drafter’s approach to codification resembles that of some Latin American codifiers later in the same century, who also
felt that the laconic Code civil, though admirable for its structure, nevertheless
required a return to earlier models for supplementation. See, e.g., M.C. Mirow,
Individual Experience in Legal Change: Exploring a Neglected Factor in Nineteenth-Century Latin American Codification, 11 SW. J.L. & TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 301, 311 (2005) (“Finally, concerning the style of drafting of [the Chilean
Civil Code], [Andrés] Bello noted that he sacrificed brevity (which he equated
with the French code) to include examples and illustrations, a style that in his view
was more like the method of the Siete Partidas.”) (quoting 12 ANDRÉS BELLO,
OBRAS COMPLETAS DE ANDRÉS BELLO 21 (1954)).
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The following sources were consulted in preparing the Appendix:
1. M. Lerasle, Encyclopédie méthodique : Jurisprudence (8
vols., 1782–89) (= “Encyc. Juris.”)
2. Jean-Baptiste Denisart, Collection de décisions nouvelles
(vol. 1 = 8th ed., 4 vols., 1773; vols. 2-4 = 9th ed., 4 vols.,
1775) (= “Denisart”)
3. Jean-Baptiste Denisart, Collection de décisions nouvelles
(Calenge ed., 13 vols., 1783–1807) (= “Nouveau Denisart”)
4. Joseph-Nicolas Guyot, Répertoire universel et raisonné de jurisprudence civile, criminelle, canonique et béneficiale (2d
ed., 17 vols., 1784–85) (= “Guyot’s Répertoire”)
5. Denis Diderot & Jean le Rond d’Alembert, Encyclopédie, ou
dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (1st
ed., 28 vols., 1751–66) (= “Did. Encyc.”)
A FINAL NOTE
Not infrequently, encyclopedia entries found in Lerasle, Denisart, and Guyot resemble one another, often verbatim, making it
difficult to know exactly which entry Moreau Lislet copied. Verbatim similarity in multiple encyclopedias is due to rampant borrowing between ancien droit legal lexicographers during the relevant period, as well as mutual dependence on shared sources
from the middle of the 18th-century (especially Diderot’s first
Encyclopédie). In these difficult cases, a “best guess” has been
made on the basis of other evidence (often paragraph structure or
sequence). Regardless, in all of these cases, the Digest appears to
follow language taken from French legal encyclopedic literature
rather than non-verbatim sources or Spanish law.
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Encyclopedic source
(Brostoff, 2020)
*with indirect relationships
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie
noted as appropriate

Actual source’s
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest (Brostoff,
2020)

Batiza, 1971
study proposed
actual source

[Vol. 13
Batiza, 1974 study
proposed actual
source, if revised
from 1971 study

Batiza, 1971/74
studies sources’
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest

Book II, Title
I (Of things
or estates)

Article 1

2 Encyc. Juris. 43,
¶ 1 in ‘Biens’

Article 2

2 Encyc. Juris. 620,
¶ 5 in ‘Chose’; see also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Choses’ in 3
Did. Encyc. 374, ¶ 6 (a.v.)

Article 3

2 Encyc. Juris. 620,
¶ 9 in ‘Chose’; see also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Choses’ in 3
Did. Encyc. 374, ¶ 7 (a.v.)

a.v.

v.

v.

Article 5

2 Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶ 11 in
‘Chose’

Article 6

2 Encyc. Juris. 621, ¶¶ 27, 29
in ‘Chose’

a.v. (in part)

Article 10

2 Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶ 5 in
‘Chose’

a.v. (in part)

Article 11

2 Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶ 6 in
‘Chose’; see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Choses’ in 3 Did.
Encyc. 375, ¶ 11 (a.v. in part)

v.

a.v. (in part)

Institutes of
Gaius, Justinian’s
Institutes (p. 62 in
Tulane Law Review article)
Justinian’s Institutes, Digest, Tercera Partida (p.
62)
Domat’s Loix Civiles, Justinian’s
Institutes, Digest,
Tercera Partida
(p. 62)

Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3 in Sources
1974, p. 38)

“p.i.” (Institutes);
“a.v. (in part)”
(Guyot)

1971 sources and
Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 38)

“s.i.”

Justinian’s Institutes, Tercera
Partida (p. 62)

1971 sources and
Curia Philipica,
Digest (vol. 3, p.
39)

Domat’s Loix Civiles, Justinian’s
Institutes, Tercera
Partida (p. 62)
Domat’s Loix
Civiles, Institutes
of Gaius
(p. 63)
Domat’s Loix
Civiles, Pothier on
Choses, Institutes
of Gaius
(p. 63)

“s.i.”

“s.i.”

“s.i.”

Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 41)

“s.i.”

1971 sources and
Digest (vol. 3, p.
41)

“s.i.”

2020]
Digest of
1808
Article

Article 12

Article 13

THE ENCYCLOPEDIST CODE

Encyclopedic source
(Brostoff, 2020)
*with indirect relationships
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie
noted as appropriate
2 Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶ 7 in
‘Chose’

2 Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶ 7 in
‘Chose’

Actual source’s
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest (Brostoff,
2020)

Batiza, 1971
study proposed
actual source

s.i.

Pothier on Choses
(p. 63)

a.v. (first par.)

Pothier on Choses
(p. 63)

75
Batiza, 1974 study
proposed actual
source, if revised
from 1971 study
1971 sources and
Guyot’s Répertoire, Segunda Partida (vol. 3, p. 41)
1971 sources and
French Civil Code,
French projet, Domat’s Loix Civiles,
Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 41)

Batiza, 1971/74
studies sources’
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest
“s.i.”

“s.i. (first part)”
(Pothier); “s.i.”
(sources in 1974
study)

Book II, Title
III (Of usufruct, use and
habitation)

Article 1

4 Denisart 665, num. 1 (‘Usufruit’)

Article 2

4 Denisart 665, num. 2 (‘Usufruit’)

Article 3

4 Denisart 665, num. 5 (‘Usufruit’)

Article 4

4 Denisart 665, num. 6 (‘Usufruit’)

a.v. (first par.)

a.v.

a.v.

v. (first par.)

French projet,
French Civil
Code, Domat’s
Loix Civiles, Justinian’s Institutes,
Digest (p. 65)
Domat’s Loix
Civiles
(p. 65)
French projet,
French Civil
Code, Domat’s
Loix Civiles, Justinian’s Institutes,
Digest (p. 65)
Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 65)

Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 42)

“s.i.” (1971
sources); “a.v. (in
part)” (Guyot)

1971 sources and
Pothier on Douaire
(vol. 3, p. 42)

“s.i.”

1971 sources and
Febrero Adicionado (vol. 3, p. 42)

“s.i.”

1971 sources and
Guyot’s Répertoire, Febrero Adicionado (vol. 3, p.
42)

“s.i.”
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Actual source’s
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest (Brostoff,
2020)

Batiza, 1971
study proposed
actual source

Batiza, 1974 study
proposed actual
source, if revised
from 1971 study

Batiza, 1971/74
studies sources’
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest

Article 14

8 Encyc. Juris. 161, § IV, ¶ 12
in ‘Usufruit’

v.

Digest, Tercera
Partida (p. 65)

Pothier on
Douaire, Febrero
Adicionado (vol. 3,
p. 43)

“s.i.”

Article 18

4 Denisart 666, num. 17
(‘Usufruit’)

a.v.

Digest (p. 65)

“s.i.”

Article 27

Domat’s Loix Civiles (first
par.); 8 Encyc. Juris. 159, § II,
¶ 11 in ‘Usufruit’ (second
par.)

a.v. (both pars.)

Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 66)

“a.v. (first par.)”

a.v. (both parts)

French Civil
Code, Domat’s
Loix Civiles
(p. 66)

a.v.

Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 66)

“p.i.”

v.

French Civil Code
(p. 67)

“p.i.”

a.v. (in part)

French projet,
French Civil Code
(p. 67)

“s.i.”

a.v. (first part)

French projet,
French Civil Code
(p. 67)

Digest of
1808
Article

Article 45

Article 47

Article 50

Encyclopedic source
(Brostoff, 2020)
*with indirect relationships
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie
noted as appropriate

[Vol. 13

8 Encyc. Juris. 160, § III, ¶ 1
in ‘Usufruit’ or possibly 17
Guyot 396, § III, ¶ 1 (first
part); French Civil Code, article 599 (second part)
8 Encyc. Juris. 160, § III, ¶ 3
in ‘Usufruit’ or possibly 17
Guyot 396, § III, ¶ 5
8 Encyc. Juris. 160, § III, ¶ 8
in ‘Usufruit’ or possibly 17
Guyot 396, § III, ¶ 10

Article 59

8 Encyc. Juris. 163, § V.III, ¶
1 in ‘Usufruit’

Article 60

4 Denisart 668, num. 35
(‘Usufruit’)

Book II, Title
IV (Of predial services
or services of
land)

French Civil Code,
article 599 (second
part) (vol. 1, p. 45);
first part unidentified

1971 sources, Febrero Adicionado,
and Tercera Partida (vol. 3, p. 46)

“a.v. (in part)”

“s.i.”

2020]
Digest of
1808
Article

Article 18

Article 19

THE ENCYCLOPEDIST CODE

Encyclopedic source
(Brostoff, 2020)
*with indirect relationships
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie
noted as appropriate
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Actual source’s
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest (Brostoff,
2020)

Batiza, 1971
study proposed
actual source

8 Encyc. Juris. 286–87, § VI,
¶ 1 in ‘Voisinage’

a.v. (first part)

French projet,
French Civil
Code, Digest, Tercera Partida (p.
69)

8 Encyc. Juris. 287, § VI, ¶ 1
in ‘Voisinage’

a.v. (first part);
a.v. (in part)
(second part)

Domat’s Loix
Civiles
(p. 69)

1971 sources and
Tercera Partida,
Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 48)

“s.i.” (Domat);
“a.v. (in part)”
(Guyot)

a.v.

Domat’s Loix Civiles, Pothier on
Successions (p.
79)

1971 sources, Sexta
Partida, and
Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 73)

“s.i.”

v.

Pothier on Successions (p. 79)

a.v. (first par.)

French projet,
French Civil
Code, Domat’s
Loix Civiles, Pothier on Successions (p. 80)

v.

Pothier on Successions (p. 80)

a.v.

French projet,
French Civil
Code, Domat’s

Batiza, 1974 study
proposed actual
source, if revised
from 1971 study

Batiza, 1971/74
studies sources’
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest

“s.i.”

Book III, Title I (Of successions)
Article 157

Article 158

Article 162

Article 165

6 Encyc. Juris. 475, ¶ 1 in
‘Partage’; see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Partage’ in 12
Did. Encyc. 85, ¶ 1 (a.v.)
6 Encyc. Juris. 475, ¶¶ 13–14
in ‘Partage’; see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Partage’ in 12
Did. Encyc. 85, ¶¶ 23–24
(a.v.)

3 Denisart 458, num. 8 (‘Partage’)

6 Encyc. Juris. 475, ¶¶ 5–6 in
‘Partage’; see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Partage’ in 12
Did. Encyc. 85, ¶¶ 5–6 (v.)

Article 171

6 Encyc. Juris. 475, ¶ 4 in
‘Partage’; see also Boucher

“p.i.”

1971 sources and
Febrero Adicionado (vol. 3, p. 73)

“s.i.”

“s.i.”
1971 sources and
Febrero Adicionado, Sexta

“s.i.”

78
Digest of
1808
Article

Article 172

Article 173

Article 174
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Encyclopedic source
(Brostoff, 2020)
*with indirect relationships
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie
noted as appropriate
d’Argis on ‘Partage’ in 12
Did. Encyc. 85, ¶ 4 (a.v.)
5 Encyc. Juris. 493, ¶ 1 in
‘Licitation’; see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Licitation’ in 9
Did. Encyc. 485, ¶ 1 (v.)
5 Encyc. Juris. 493, ¶¶ 7–8 in
‘Licitation’; see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Licitation’ in 9
Did. Encyc. 485, ¶¶ 7–8 (v.)
(first par.)
5 Encyc. Juris. 493, ¶ 10 in
‘Licitation’

Actual source’s
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest (Brostoff,
2020)

v.

Pothier on Successions (p. 80)

Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 75)

“s.i.” (Pothier);
“a.v. (in part)”
(Guyot)

v. (first par.); a.v.
(second par.)

Domat’s Loix Civiles, Pothier on
Successions (p.
80)

Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 75)

“p.i.” (1971
sources); “a.v. (in
part)” (Guyot)

a.v.
a.v. (in part)

Article 178

3 Denisart 460, num. 20
(‘Partage’)

a.v. (in part)

Article 180

3 Denisart 460, num. 21
(‘Partage’)

v.

Article 181

3 Denisart 460, num. 22
(‘Partage’)

v.

Article 205
Article 206

Batiza, 1971/74
studies sources’
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest

Partida, Fuero
Real (vol. 3, p. 74)

Article 177

Article 192

Batiza, 1974 study
proposed actual
source, if revised
from 1971 study

Loix Civiles, Pothier on Successions (p. 80)

3 Denisart 460, num. 19
(‘Partage’)

7 Encyc. Juris. 186, ¶ 1 in
‘Rapport a succession’; see
also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Rapport a succession’ in 13 Did.
Encyc. 800, ¶ 1 (a.v.)
7 Encyc. Juris. 187, § 1, ¶ 2 in
‘Rapport a succession’
7 Encyc. Juris. 187, § 1, ¶ 3 in
‘Rapport a succession’ (first

Batiza, 1971
study proposed
actual source

[Vol. 13

a.v.

a.v. (in part)
a.v. (all three
pars.)

Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 80)
French projet,
French Civil Code
(p. 80)
French projet,
French Civil Code
(p. 80)
Unidentified
(p. 80)
French projet,
French Civil Code
(p. 80)
French projet, Domat’s Loix Civiles, Pothier on
Successions
(p. 81)
Pothier on Successions (p. 81)
Pothier on Successions (p. 82)

“s.i.”
1971 sources and
Pothier on Successions (vol. 3, p. 75)

“s.i.”

“s.i.”
Pothier on Successions (vol. 3, p. 76)
1971 sources and
Pothier on Successions (vol. 3, p. 76)
1971 sources and
Febrero Adicionado (vol. 3, p. 77)

“p.i.” (Pothier)
“s.i.” (1971
sources); “p.i.”
(Pothier)

“s.i.”

“s.i.”
French Civil Code,
article 854 (second

“s.i. (first par.)”
(Pothier); “a.v. (in

2020]
Digest of
1808
Article

Article 207

THE ENCYCLOPEDIST CODE

Encyclopedic source
(Brostoff, 2020)
*with indirect relationships
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie
noted as appropriate
par.); French Civil Code, article 854 (second par.); 7 Encyc.
Juris. 189, § I, ¶ 18 in ‘Rapport a succession’ (third par.)
7 Encyc. Juris. 189, § I, ¶¶
11–13 in ‘Rapport a succession’ (second, third, and fourth
pars.); see also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Rapport’ in 13 Did.

Actual source’s
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest (Brostoff,
2020)

Article 208

Article 209
Article 213
Article 214

a.v. (second,
third, and fourth
pars.)

a.v. (in part)
(first par.); v.
(second par.)
a.v. (in part)

Article 216
Bk. III, Title
II (Of donations inter

French projet,
French Civil
Code, Pothier on
Successions (p.
82)
French projet,
French Civil
Code, Pothier on
Successions (p.
82)
Pothier on Successions (p. 82)

Batiza, 1971/74
studies sources’
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest
part)” (French
Civil Code)

1971 sources and
Domat’s Loix Civiles, Febrero Adicionado
(vol. 3, p. 80)

“s.i.”

Febrero Adicionado (vol. 3, p. 80)

“s.i.”

“s.i.”

v. (in part) (first
par.); v. (second
and third pars.)

Pothier on Successions (p. 82)

“s.i.” (1971
study); “a.v.”
(1974 study)

a.v.

Pothier on Successions (p. 82)

“a.v. (in part)”

§ IV, ¶¶ 14–16 in ‘Rapport a
succession’

a.v. (in part)

Pothier on Successions (p. 82)

7 Encyc. Juris. 193,

a.v. (first and
second pars.); v.
(third par.)

French Civil
Code, Pothier on
Successions (p.
82)

8–10; 193, ¶ 11 in ‘Rapport a
succession’
7 Encyc. Juris. 193, § IV, ¶ 13
in ‘Rapport a succession’
7 Encyc. Juris. 193,

Article 215

Batiza, 1974 study
proposed actual
source, if revised
from 1971 study
par.); other two
pars. unidentified
(vol. 3, p. 80)

Encyc. 801, ¶¶ 8–10 (a.v.)

7 Encyc. Juris. 189, § I, ¶ 16
in ‘Rapport a succession’; see
also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Rapport’ in 13 Did. Encyc. 801,
¶ 13 (a.v., in part)
7 Encyc. Juris. 192, § IV, ¶ 4
in ‘Rapport a succession’
7 Encyc. Juris. 192, § IV, ¶¶

Batiza, 1971
study proposed
actual source

79

§ IV, ¶¶ 17–19 in ‘Rapport a
succession’

“s.i.” (1971
study); “a.v. (in
part)” (1974
study)
“s.i.” (1971
study); “a.v. (in
part)” (1974
study)
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Actual source’s
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest (Brostoff,
2020)

Batiza, 1971
study proposed
actual source

Batiza, 1974 study
proposed actual
source, if revised
from 1971 study

Batiza, 1971/74
studies sources’
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest

a.v.

Domat’s Loix Civiles, Pothier on
Testamens, Sexta
Partida (p. 87)

1971 sources and
Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 85)

“s.i.”

a.v. (in part)

Pothier on Testamens (p. 87)

1971 sources and
Sexta Partida (vol.
3, p. 85)

“s.i.”

Article 85

2 Encyc. Juris. 700, ¶ 9 in
‘Codicille’

v.

French Civil
Code, Domat’s
Loix Civiles
(p. 87)

1971 sources and
Febrero Adicionado (vol. 3, p. 85)

“s.i.”

Article 86

2 Encyc. Juris. 700,
¶ 14 in ‘Codicille’

a.v.

Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 87)

Digest of
1808
Article

Encyclopedic source
(Brostoff, 2020)
*with indirect relationships
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie
noted as appropriate

[Vol. 13

vivos and
mortis causa)

Article 83

Article 84

2 Encyc. Juris. 699, ¶ 2 in
‘Codicille’; see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Codicille’ in 3
Did. Encyc. 586, ¶ 2 (a.v., in
part)
2 Encyc. Juris. 700, ¶ 10 in
‘Codicille’; see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Codicille’ in 3
Did. Encyc. 587, ¶ 9 (a.v., in
part)

“s.i.”

Bk. III, Title
III (Of contracts and of
conventional
obligations in
general)
Article 222
Article 223

1 Guyot’s Répertoire 144, ¶ 7
in ‘Acte’
1 Guyot’s Répertoire 144, ¶ 7
in ‘Acte’

a.v. (in part)
a.v. (in part)

Unidentified (p.
101)
Unidentified (p.
101)

Bk. III, Title
V (Of marriage contract)
Article 26

4 Encyc. Juris. 35, ¶ 9 in
‘Dot’; see also Boucher

v.

Domat’s Loix
Civiles
(p. 104)

“s.i.”

2020]
Digest of
1808
Article

Article 27

Article 28

Article 29

Article 30

THE ENCYCLOPEDIST CODE

Encyclopedic source
(Brostoff, 2020)
*with indirect relationships
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie
noted as appropriate
d’Argis on ‘Dot’ in 5 Did. Encyc. 64, ¶ 13 (v.)
4 Encyc. Juris. 35, ¶ 10 in
‘Dot’; see also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Dot’ in 5 Did. Encyc.
64, ¶ 14 (a.v.)
4 Encyc. Juris. 35, ¶ 11 in
‘Dot’; see also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Dot’ in 5 Did. Encyc.
64, ¶ 15 (a.v., first part)
4 Encyc. Juris. 35, ¶ 12; see
also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Dot’
in 5 Did. Encyc. 64, ¶ 16 (a.v.)
4 Encyc. Juris. 35, ¶ 13; see
also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Dot’
in 5 Did. Encyc. 64, ¶ 17 (a.v.)

81

Actual source’s
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest (Brostoff,
2020)

Batiza, 1971
study proposed
actual source

Batiza, 1974 study
proposed actual
source, if revised
from 1971 study

Batiza, 1971/74
studies sources’
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest

v.

Unidentified (p.
104)

French projet,
French Civil Code
(vol. 3, p. 104)

“p.i.”

a.v. (first part)

Domat’s Loix
Civiles
(p. 104)

1971 sources and
Febrero Adicionado (vol. 3, p.
104)

“s.i.” (1971
sources); “p.i.”
(1974 sources)

a.v.

French Civil Code
(p. 104)

a.v.

Unidentified (p.
104)

v. (both pars.)

Domat’s Loix Civiles (first par.);
second par.
unidentified (p.
104)

a.v. (in part)

Pothier on Obligations (p. 121)

v. (first and second pars.); a.v.

Pothier on Obligations, Febrero

“s.i.” (1971
study); “p.i.”
(1974 study)

Bk. III, Title
VI (Of sale)

Article 1

Domat’s Loix Civiles (v.)
(first par.); 2 Gabriel Argou,
Institution au droit français
189 (1773) (v.) (second par.)

“v. (first par.)”

Bk. III, Title
XVI (Of respite)

Article 1

Article 2

1 Encyc. Juris. 540, ¶ 1 in
‘Atermoiement’; see also
Toussaint on ‘Atermoyement’
in 1 Did. Encyc. 798, ¶ 1 (a.v.,
in part)
1 Encyc. Juris. 540, ¶ 2 in
‘Atermoiement’; see also

Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 112)

“s.i.” (1971
sources); “a.v. (in
part)” (Guyot)
“s.i.”
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Encyclopedic source
(Brostoff, 2020)
*with indirect relationships
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie
noted as appropriate
Toussaint on ‘Atermoyement’
in 1 Did. Encyc. 798, ¶ 3 (a.v.)

Actual source’s
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest (Brostoff,
2020)
(in part) (third
par.)

Article 3

1 Encyc. Juris. 540, ¶ 5 in
‘Atermoiement’

a.v. (first part)

Article 5

1 Encyc. Juris. 540, ¶ 4 in
‘Atermoiement’

a.v. (in part)

Article 6

1 Encyc. Juris. 541, ¶ 12 in
‘Atermoiment’

a.v. (first part)

Pothier on Obligations (p. 122)

Article 8

1 Encyc. Juris. 542, ¶ 2 in
‘Atermoiment’; see also Toussaint on ‘Atermoyement’ in 1
Did. Encyc. 798, ¶ 2 (s.i.)

s.i.

Curia Philipica
(p. 122)

a.v. (first two
pars.); s.i. (third
par.)

Febrero Adicionado, Curia Philipica (p. 122)

a.v.

Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 122)

a.v.

Domat’s Loix Civiles, Pothier on
Procédure Civile
(p. 123)

Digest of
1808
Article

Batiza, 1971
study proposed
actual source
Adicionado (p.
122)
Pothier on Obligations, Pothier
on Procédure Civile (p. 122)
Pothier on Procédure Civile (p.
122)

[Vol. 13
Batiza, 1974 study
proposed actual
source, if revised
from 1971 study

Batiza, 1971/74
studies sources’
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest

Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 112)

“s.i.” (1971
sources); “a.v. (in
part)” (Guyot)

Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 112)
Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 113)

“s.i.” (1971
sources); “a.v. (in
part)” (Guyot)
“s.i.” (1971
sources); “a.v. (in
part)” (Guyot)
“s.i.”

Bk. III, Title
XVII (Of
compromises
or arbitration)

Article 3

Article 4

Article 8

3 Encyc. Juris. 113, ¶ 9 in
‘Compromis’; see also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Compromis’
in 3 Did. Encyc. 779, ¶ 10
(a.v., first two pars.)
Domat’s Loix Civiles (first
clause); 3 Encyc. Juris. 113,
¶ 6 in ‘Compromis’ (second
clause); see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Compromis’ in 3
Did. Encyc. 779, ¶ 7 (a.v.)
1 Denisart 490, ¶ 5 in (‘Compromis’)

Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 113)

“s.i.” (Spanish
sources); “a.v. (in
part)” (Guyot)

“a.v. (first part)”

1971 sources and
Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 113)

“s.i.”

2020]

THE ENCYCLOPEDIST CODE
Actual source’s
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest (Brostoff,
2020)

Batiza, 1971
study proposed
actual source

Article 12

1 Encyc. Juris. 408, ¶ 2, 409, ¶
5 in ‘Arbitre’

a.v. (in part)

Tercera Partida,
Febrero Adicionado, Curia Philipica (p. 123)

Article 24

1 Encyc. Juris. 409, ¶ 5 in ‘Arbitre’; see also Toussaint on
‘Arbitre’ in 1 Did. Encyc. 579,
¶ 6 (a.v., in part)

a.v. (in part)

Pothier on Procédure Civile, Curia
Philipica (p. 124)

Curia Philipica
(vol. 3, p. 115)

“s.i.”

Article 25

1 Encyc. Juris. 409, ¶ 6 in ‘Arbitre’

a.v.

Curia Philipica
(p. 124)

Domat’s Loix Civiles, Tercera Partida (vol. 3, p. 116)

“p.i.”

a.v. (first part)

Pothier on Procédure Civile, Febrero Adicionado,
Curia Philipica
(p. 124)

1971 sources and
Domat’s Loix Civiles (vol. 3, p.
116)

“s.i.”

v.

Pothier on
Nantissement (p.
125)

1971 sources and
Febrero Adicionado (vol. 3, p.
117)

“s.i.”

v.

Domat’s Loix
Civiles
(p. 125)

Digest of
1808
Article

Article 33

Encyclopedic source
(Brostoff, 2020)
*with indirect relationships
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie
noted as appropriate
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3 Encyc. Juris. 113, ¶ 4 in
‘Compromis’

Batiza, 1974 study
proposed actual
source, if revised
from 1971 study

Batiza, 1971/74
studies sources’
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest
“s.i.”

Bk. III, Title
XVIII (of
pledge)
Article 4

Article 10

4 Encyc. Juris. 679, ¶ 5 in
‘Gage’; see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Gage’ in 7 Did.
Encyc. 414, ¶ 7 (v.)
4 Encyc. Juris. 679, ¶ 13 in
‘Gage’; see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Gage’ in 7 Did.
Encyc. 414, ¶ 14 (v.)

Article 11

4 Encyc. Juris. 679, ¶ 14 in
‘Gage’

Article 15

4 Encyc. Juris. 680, ¶ 7 in
‘Gage’; see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Gage’ in 7 Did.

a.v.

French projet (p.
125)

v.

Pothier on
Nantissement (p.
125)

“p.i.”
1971 sources and
Pothier on Nantissement, Tercera
Partida (vol. 3, p.
117)
1971 sources and
Tercera Partida
(vol. 3, p. 117)

“s.i.”

“s.i.”
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Encyclopedic source
(Brostoff, 2020)
*with indirect relationships
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie
noted as appropriate
Encyc. 414, ¶ 27 (a.v., first
part only)

Actual source’s
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest (Brostoff,
2020)

Batiza, 1971
study proposed
actual source

Batiza, 1974 study
proposed actual
source, if revised
from 1971 study

Batiza, 1971/74
studies sources’
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest

1971 sources and
Pothier on Nantissement, Tercera
Partida (vol. 3, p.
117)

“s.i. (first part)”

Article 18

4 Encyc. Juris. 680,
¶ 11 in ‘Gage’; see also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Gage’ in 7
Did. Encyc. 414, ¶ 32 (a.v.)

a.v.

Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 125)

Article 19

4 Encyc. Juris. 680,
¶ 14 in ‘Gage’; see also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Gage’ in 7
Did. Encyc. 414, ¶ 34 (a.v.)

a.v.

Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 125)

Article 20

4 Encyc. Juris. 680,
¶ 15 in ‘Gage’; see also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Gage’ in 7
Did. Encyc. 414, ¶ 35 (v.)

v.

Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 125)

4 Encyc. Juris. 680,
¶ 16 in ‘Gage’; see also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Gage’ in 7
Did. Encyc. 414, ¶ 36 (v.)

v.

Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 125)

5 Encyc. Juris. 99, § 1, ¶¶ 1–2
in ‘Hypothèque’

a.v. (first par.);
a.v. (in part)
(second par.)

Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 126)

Article 21

[Vol. 13

“s.i.”

1971 sources and
Pothier on Nantissement (vol. 3, p.
117)

“p.i.” (1971
sources); “s.i.”
(1974 sources)

“s.i.”

Bk. III, Title
XIX (Of privileges and
mortgages)
Article 2

Article 8

5 Encyc. Juris. 99, § 1, ¶ 6 in
‘Hypothèque’

a.v.

Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 126)

“s.i.” (1971
study); “p.i.”
(1974 study)
1971 sources and
French projet,
French Civil Code,
Pothier on Hypotheque, Curia
Philipica, and

“s.i.” (1971
sources); “p.i.”
(1974 sources)
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Encyclopedic source
(Brostoff, 2020)
*with indirect relationships
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie
noted as appropriate

Actual source’s
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest (Brostoff,
2020)

Batiza, 1971
study proposed
actual source

5 Encyc. Juris. 99, § 1, ¶ 10 in
‘Hypothèque’

v. (first par.)

Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 126)

5 Encyc. Juris. 100, § 1, ¶¶ 8–
10 in ‘Hypothèque’

s.i. (first par.);
a.v. (second
par.); s.i. (third
par.); a.v. (fourth
par.)

Domat’s Loix Civiles, Pothier on
Hypothèque (p.
127)

a.v.

Domat’s Loix Civiles, Pothier on
Hypotheque (p.
127)

a.v.

French projet,
Pothier on Hypotheque (p. 127)

Article 30

5 Encyc. Juris. 100, § 1, ¶ 12
in ‘Hypothèque’

Article 31

5 Encyc. Juris. 100, § 1, ¶¶ 14
in ‘Hypothèque’

Article 32

5 Encyc. Juris. 101, § 3, ¶ 1 in
‘Hypothèque’

a.v.

French projet,
French Civil
Code, Pothier on
Hypotheque (p.
127)

Article 33

5 Encyc. Juris. 101, § 3, ¶¶ 4–
5 in ‘Hypothèque’

a.v. (in part)

Pothier on Hypotheque (p. 127)

a.v. (first clause);
v. (num. 1); a.v.
(num. 2); a.v. (in
part) (num. 3)

Domat’s Loix
Civiles (p. 128)

Article 39

5 Encyc. Juris. 104,
§ V, ¶ 16–17
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Batiza, 1974 study
proposed actual
source, if revised
from 1971 study
Febrero Adicionado (vol. 3, p.
118)
1971 sources and
Pothier on Hypotheque, Febrero
Adicionado (vol. 3,
p. 119)

Batiza, 1971/74
studies sources’
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest

“s.i.”

“s.i.”

1971 sources and
Febrero Adicionado, Curia Philipica (vol. 3,
p. 120)
Domat’s Loix Civiles, Febrero Adicionado (vol. 3, p.
121)
1971 sources and
Quinta Partida,
Febrero Adicionado (vol. 3,
p. 121)
Domat’s Loix Civiles (vol. 3, p.
121)

“s.i.”

“s.i.”

“s.i.”

“s.i.” (1971
sources); “p.i.”
(1974 sources)
“s.i.”
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Encyclopedic source
(Brostoff, 2020)
*with indirect relationships
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie
noted as appropriate

Actual source’s
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest (Brostoff,
2020)

Batiza, 1971
study proposed
actual source

Article 1

6 Encyc. Juris. 247, ¶ 1 in ‘Occupation’; see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Occupation’ in 11
Encyc. 333, ¶ 1 (a.v.)

a.v.

Pothier on Propriété (p. 130)

Article 2

6 Encyc. Juris. 247, ¶ 2 in ‘Occupation’

v.

Pothier on Propriété, Justinian’s
Institutes (p. 130)

Article 3

6 Encyc. Juris. 247, ¶ 3 in ‘Occupation’; see also Boucher
d’Argis on ‘Occupation’ in 11
Did. Encyc. 333, ¶ 3 (a.v.)

a.v.

Pothier on Propriété (p. 130)

Digest of
1808
Article

[Vol. 13
Batiza, 1974 study
proposed actual
source, if revised
from 1971 study

Batiza, 1971/74
studies sources’
phraseological
resemblance to
Digest

Bk. III, Title
XX (Of occupancy, possession and
prescription)
“s.i.”

Guyot’s Répertoire
(vol. 3, p. 123)

“p.i.”

“s.i.”
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ABSTRACT
The traditional deterrence-based paradigm of civil liability may
be understood as indirect market regulation, as the risk of incurring
liability for damages provides an incentive to invest in safety. Such
an approach, however, has proven to be inappropriate in medical
civil liability. Extensive literature shows that the increase in the
asymmetric protection of patients by extending medical civil liability beyond a certain limit does not improve safety; instead, that
strategy determines the adoption of “defensive” techniques (the so* Associate Professor of Commercial Law, Giustino Fortunato University
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called “defensive medicine”). Paradoxically, this approach leads to
a reduction in market efficiency and overall patient safety.
The traditional paradigm of medical civil liability, moreover, is
very likely to prevent the intensive use of artificial intelligence and
robotization to further develop the healthcare landscape. In fact,
under the current paradigm of civil liability, redress is allowed only
insofar “somebody” is identified as liable to pay damages (either
because of fault or based on strict liability). However, robots and
software may “behave” far independently from instructions initially
provided by designers and programmers. This possibility may represent a disincentive to new AI technologies, as in this model designers and programmers could be held liable even if the damage
derives from the “correct” operation of algorithms and robots.
This article proposes that the law of redress in healthcare should
evolve from an issue of civil liability to one of financial management
of losses. No-fault redress schemes could be an interesting and valuable regulatory strategy in order to allow such an evolution. Also,
some pieces of “no fault” legislation are discussed, and a few proposals and comments are provided.
Keywords: healthcare, medical malpractice, civil liability, “nofault,” strict liability, guidelines, artificial intelligence, robots
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Civil liability may be considered, under a functional point of
view, as a technique of indirect market regulation, since the risk to
incur liability for damages provides an incentive to invest in safety. 1
The idea is that any raise of the stick of civil liability for a given
activity would determine a corresponding increase of efforts, by
firms and professionals operating in the relevant market, aimed at
reducing the risk or compensation until the point where, roughly

1. On the different “functions” of civil liability, among others, see H.
Koziol, Comparative conclusions, in BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 746 (H. Koziol ed., Jan Sramek Verlag 2015).
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speaking, any further investment in safety would cost more than the
risk to pay redress to damaged clients and users.
The above technique of indirect market regulation may work
only insofar as the risk to compensate damages is allocated onto the
same subject called to invest further resources in safety. Therefore,
such a paradigm 2 of civil liability invariably requires identification
of a person liable for redress, which is likely to be the producer of a
given product of the provider of a given service. 3
This deterrence-based approach works in several scenarios (e.g.,
damages for defective products), but is inappropriate in others, such
as healthcare, where increased liability may lead, and has actually
lead, to “defensive medicine” strategies (i.e., practices that are not
in the interest of patients, aimed at protecting doctors against potential plaintiffs), 4 which have proven to be harmful for the whole system and also for patients themselves. 5
It seems, therefore, necessary to unwind the increase of civil liability against doctors and hospitals in order to guarantee that
healthcare systems may develop a more efficient and safer approach.
2. A paradigm is the conceptual tool defining methods and problems and
solving problems accepted by a given community: see T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (U. Chicago Press 1962). Paradigms influence interpretation in two ways. First, they allow one to detect objects and relationships
that each paradigm allows to detect, but they prevent detection of objects and
relationships incompatible or “hidden” to it (id. at 151). Paradigms, in other
words, provide schemes with which is it possible to “order” the world (id. at 44),
so that without such schemes there would be only a “great blooming, buzzing
confusion” (id. at 141, quoting William James). Second, and consequently, the
paradigm accepted in each moment represents the conceptual tool with which one
defines problems that are considered solvable and the relevant solution methods.
See id. at 58 and 138, where reference is made to “normative” functions of paradigms.
3. See infra §§ II and III.
4. “Defensive medicine occurs when doctors order tests, procedures, or visits, or avoid certain high-risk patients or procedures, primarily (but not necessarily
solely) because of concern about malpractice liability.” U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (Government Printing Office 1994).
For the sake of completeness, one should note that some authors contest the relevance of defensive medicine in this field; see, e.g., M. J. Saks & S. Landsman,
The Paradoxes of Defensive Medicine, 30 HEALTH MATRIX 25.
5. See infra § IV.
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This is especially so because the negative consequences brought by
defensive medicine are particularly harsh, both in terms of costs for
national communities and of the increase in other negative externalities.
This complex situation does not allow for simple solutions but
requires a well-designed action to allow public healthcare to remain
in place the way we know it. The claim in this paper is that the problem of defensive medicine could be much reduced by introducing
an alternative compensation system for damage caused by medical
treatments.
This claim, calling for an evolution towards an alternative paradigm, may also be extended to artificial intelligence markets, as they
are likely to be prone to similar negative externalities when civil liability is applied as a regulatory strategy based on deterrence.
In this article, I propose that “no-fault” systems, existing in
many countries, may provide direction for a future reform. The concept of “no fault” is used here with reference to a system where redress is provided by a dedicated fund regardless of any fault by the
agent being established; it does not make reference, instead, to strictliability schemes that likewise ignore “fault” as a condition to impose liability but operate in the opposite direction, by imposing the
obligation to redress on agents regardless of their culpability.
I also recall peculiarities and weaknesses of such schemes, in
order to demarcate the scope of their usability as models for reform.
As evidenced in the title, this article is aimed at representing as a
call toward the setting of a research agenda on the issue, rather than
having the ambition of providing fully worked-out answers. These
may be a long way ahead, but I believe that a clear statement of the
pitfalls of current legislation and the scope of its future reformation
represent a sound step in that direction.
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II. THE “TRADITIONAL” PARADIGM OF CIVIL LIABILITY BASED ON
DETERRENCE
The current paradigm of civil liability laws is mainly based on
the assumption that civil liability plays and should play an important
role in deterrence. It is thought that any increase of liability on producers and suppliers of goods and services will increase investments
in safety, aimed at preventing liability. The belief is that the tougher
civil liability rules on producers and other professionals, the higher
the overall level of safety within the system. 6
As noted above, such technique of indirect market regulation
may work only insofar as the risk to compensate damages is allocated to the same subject called to invest further resources in safety.
This may be done via fault-based liability or strict liability. The first
one is rooted in fault and requires an “offender,” i.e., a person found
responsible for a given damage and therefore liable to redress it.
In fact, the idea that civil liability requires somebody’s “fault” is
deeply rooted in legal thinking: it emerged in Justinian law and was
further consolidated in the jus commune and canon law, 7 beginning
approximately one thousand and five hundred years ago. This idea,
inspiring the whole system of civil liability as a paradigmatic principle, was called, in German literature, the “dogma of fault”
(Verschuldensdogma). This approach is represented by the wellknown expression “Nicht der Shaden verpflichtet zum Schadensersatz, sondern die Schuld” (the obligation to pay compensation derives from fault, not from damage), formulated by von Jhering. 8
6. G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (Yale U. Press 1970); R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 336338 (6th ed., Pearson/Addison Wesley 2008); J. Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Assessing the Insurance Role of Tort Liability After Calabresi, 77 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 135 (2014). More recently, see Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181 (2011).
7. Among others, see H. MAZEAUD & A. TUNC, 1 TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE DÉLICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 422
(5th ed., Éditions Montchrestien 1957).
8. R. VON JHERING, DAS SHULDMOMENT IM RÖMISCHEN PRIVATRECHT 40
(Brühl 1867).
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A. Evolution Toward a “Solidarity Approach”
The paradigmatic centrality of “deterrence” evolved over time
but remained in place when most relevant social, political and economic changes made legal thinking advance toward an increasing
quest for solidarity in all western legal systems, regardless of their
civil-law or common-law basic structure 9—though the common law
is traditionally less concerned with solidarity in private relationships
than the civil law is.
The quest for solidarity, greatly prompted by the factual consequences and upheavals derived from the industrial revolution, made
legislators to consider it unjust that damages following certain (intrinsically risky) activities should be borne by consumers and other
end users of goods and services unless “fault” by producers or other
professionals could be proven in court.
Such evolution brought a relevant variation in civil liability legislations (within the same paradigm, I believe), which lead to an
“asymmetric” discipline of civil liability and to the adoption of lossspreading strategies for civil liability laws. 10 Under such development, which evolved throughout the whole 20th century, legislators
reallocated the cost of accidents from customers and end users to
producers and other professionals, since the latter were thought to
be in a better position to spread the cost of accidents and arrange for
appropriate prevention policies.

9. In Italy see, e.g., A. DE CUPIS, IL DANNO: TEORIA GENERALE DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE 66 (Giuffrè 1979); in France, see L. Josserand, Les transports, in XVIII TRAITÉ GÉNÉRAL THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL
457 (Edmond-Eugéne Thaller ed. 1910); in Germany, see H. SPERL, ÜBER DAS
SCHADENERSATZRECHT NACH DEM DEUTSCHEN BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHE
154 (Manz Verlag 1902); in England, see M. LUNNEY & K. OLIPHANT, TORT LAW
TEXT AND MATERIALS 15 (Oxford U. Press 2000). For a more general and comparative perspective, see S. TAYLOR, DIFFERING CULTURES OF CIVIL LIABILITY
IN MEDICAL ACCIDENT LIABILITY AND REDRESS IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW
(Cambridge U. Press 2015).
10. M. COMPORTI, ESPOSIZIONE AL PERICOLO E RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE (Morano 1965). For an economic point of view, see R. D. COOTER, Economic Theories
of Legal Liability, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 11-30 (1991).
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In other words, liability became less dependent on the fault that
caused the damage and was more and more dependent upon the risky
nature of some activities (among which one should especially note
industrial production).
This need to reallocate the cost of accidents to producers and
other professionals widened the potential of deterrence raised by
civil liability law. The borders of civil liability were extended beyond the cases where plaintiffs could establish “fault” by the producer or professional, i.e., to all those cases where producers and
professionals could not show that the damage was not attributable
to them, cases in which there was scientific uncertainty as to the
cause of the harmful effects or even where such cause was unknown. 11
This evolution was pursued through similar techniques in different western legal systems, mainly the reversal of the burden of proof
and the imposition of strict liability on producers and other professionals, the development of the precautionary principle in many
fields of application, etc.
In medical civil liability, this path included sector-specific evolutions, such as the imposition of an obligation of result with respect
to many therapies and especially routine ones (in English law
through the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, 12 in Germany through the Anscheinsbeweis or prima facie Beweis doctrine, 13 etc.). Some jurisdictions even turned extra-contractual medical liability into contractual liability (which favors patients, inter alia, as regards the burden
of proof) following the German doctrine of faktische

11. R. MONTINARO, DUBBIO SCIENTIFICO E RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE (Giuffrè
2012); for an economic analysis of law perspective, see M. G. Faure, L. T.
Visscher, F. Weber, Liability for Unknown Risk – A Law and Economics Perspective, 7 J. EUR. TORT LAW 198-228 (2016).
12. See Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
13. M. STAUCH, THE LAW OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 73 (Hart Publ’g 2008).
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Vertragsverhältnisse, 14 as it happened in Italy with the theory of
contatto sociale. 15
As briefly noted above, this evolution, even if relevant and
somehow innovative, represented mere incremental advancement of
the same traditional paradigm based on deterrence. In fact, the development just summarized was limited, basically, only to reallocate
the “cost of accidents” from customers and users to producers and
professionals (in healthcare, from patients to doctors and hospitals)
within the same conceptual and legal framework already in place
(including the deterrence function).
What changed, in other terms, was the balancing of interests, not
rethinking techniques to satisfy them, insofar as the concept of deterrence was widened. In some cases that widening was toward strict
liability, simply in order to widen its potential also to cases where
fault could not be positively assessed in court, with the aim of inducing producers and other professionals to increase investments in
safety accordingly. 16
The same (mere) incremental evolution may be observed in the
adoption of loss-spreading techniques, such as the provision of mandatory insurance for producers and professionals. In fact, mandatory
insurance is mainly thought to protect damaged consumers and other
end users of goods and services from the risk that producers or other
professionals have insufficient patrimony to pay redress.
It is certainly true that the development of insurance is based on
a solidarity model, aimed at spreading losses among all insured producers and professionals, and it is likewise true that in markets
where mandatory insurance is provided the deterrence element is diluted by insurance itself, insofar as the extra cost of negligence is
14. G. Haupt, Über faktische Vertragsverhältnisse, 124 LEIPZIGER
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE STUDIEN (1943).
15. Cass. Jan. 22, 1999, No. 589; on this issue, see C. Castronovo, Obblighi
di protezione, in ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA (Treccani 1990).
16. R. SAVATIER, 1 TRAITÉ DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE EN DROIT FRANÇAIS CIVIL, ADMINISTRATIF, PROFESSIONNEL, PROCÉDURAL 3 (2d ed., Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence 1945); M. COMPORTI, ESPOSIZIONE AL PERICOLO E RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE (Morano 1965).
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marginally distributed amongst all the insured. However, the mere
existence of insurance coverage may not necessarily modify the traditional paradigm of civil liability based on deterrence. In fact, insurance determines a reallocation of the obligation to pay compensation, but producers and other professionals may remain liable for
damages in case insurance coverage is not applicable (e.g., when the
event is not covered by the contract or in case of willful misconduct
or, often, even gross negligence). In any case, they remain subject
to deterrence at least indirectly, since after paying compensation insurers would shift to the relevant producers and professionals the
cost of any redress paid on their behalf by applying higher insurance
premiums. 17
B. The Remaining Centrality of the “Traditional” Paradigm
The above-mentioned paradigm may be considered indisputable
in legislation, where civil liability is invariably considered also for
its potential of deterrence and, therefore, the increase of civil liability is considered as a regulatory technique to foster investments in
safety by producers and professionals. Also in law-and-economics
literature, the paradigm is very rarely contested: it is sometimes disputed if civil liability rules should be imposed in some sectors to
enhance safety instead of ex ante regulation and when such rules
could be capable of producing appropriate incentives. However, it
is assumed that civil liability plays an indirect-regulation role, insofar as the cost of compensating harmed customers and end users
(whether or not it is spread out to the entire sector by insurance)
represents an incentive of producers and other professionals to invest in safer products and services.
17. The relationship between insurance coverage and deterrence is discussed
by G. Wagner, Tort Law and Liability Insurance, 31 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK
AND INS.—ISSUES AND PRACTICE 277 (2006); H. Luntz, Torts and Insurance: The
Effect on Deterrence (conference paper) (Dec. 2010), available at
https://perma.cc/GH6A-2JG9; S. Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS.—ISSUES AND
PRACTICE 166 (2000).
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This consensus on the traditional paradigm prevails even when
civil liability rules are approached critically, for instance, by authors
reconsidering the efficiency of civil liability rules in preventing
safety risks. In pursuing such strategies, however, they seem to suggest a preference for ex ante regulation with reference to some markets. 18 Occasionally, the literature points out that the incentives produced on safety by civil liability rules may be inappropriate in some
markets. However, critics tend to focus on the context in which such
rules are applied rather than on the rules and their design. 19
It is not common, in fact, that steps are taken to rethink and redesign the concept of civil liability; most of the times, the latter
keeps being considered, as such, invariably designed as a deterrence
instrument (even if sometimes not appropriate) having a direct positive impact on safety.
Even sophisticated studies at the supranational level have considered, and still consider, civil liability as performing the central
function of deterrence along with that of compensation. 20 A similar
approach is to be found in the Principles of European Tort Law
(PETL) drafted by the European Group on Tort Law, 21 especially as
regards linking redress to someone’s liability to compensate damage
(art. 1:101(1)) and to liability based either on fault or “strict liability” (Title III). This comes as no surprise, since the Principles represent a summary of existing European laws, in which the deterrence-based paradigm is certainly in place.

18. See, e.g., M. G. Faure, The Complementary Roles of Liability, Regulation
and Insurance in Safety Management: Theory and Practice, J. RISK RES. (2014);
M. G. Faure, Private Liability and Critical Infrastructure, 6 EUR. J. RISK REG.
229-243 (2015).
19. See, e.g., Rebecca K. Viscusi, Does Product Liability Make Us Safer?,
35 REGULATION 24-31 (2012).
20. OECD, Medical Malpractice. Prevention, Insurance and Coverage Options, 11 POLICY ISSUES IN INSURANCE 27 (2006).
21. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW:
TEXT AND COMMENTARY (Springer 2005).
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III. THE “BREACH” OF THE “TRADITIONAL” PARADIGM IN
HEALTHCARE AND DEFENSIVE MEDICINE
The deterrence paradigm proves to be reliable and appropriate
in several instances, e.g., with reference to general consumer legislation such as Council Directive 85/374/EEC of July 25, 1985 on the
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, imposing strict liability on producers for damage caused by
defective products. 22
The paradigm, however, proves inappropriate in other cases,
such as healthcare. A rich and valuable literature shows that the increase in the asymmetric protection of patients by extending medical
civil liability beyond a certain limit does not improve safety 23 but,
instead, determines the adoption of “defensive” strategies (the socalled “defensive medicine”) and brings about a number of negative
externalities that are listed below.
A significant externality is that costs related to defensive medicine account for a relevant percentage of the overall cost incurred
with respect to national health systems. Preliminarily, one should
note that health expenditure binds a relevant part of the GDP
22. The liability for defective products clearly shows how the function of deterrence is implemented, in civil law systems, pursuant the idea of “solidarity,” as
evidenced above. One may think, in this respect, of the very inspiration of Directive 85/374/EEC, insofar as liability without fault on the part of the producer
(established under art. 1) was thought to be “the sole means of adequately solving
the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment
of the risks inherent in modern technological production.” The deterrence function is evidenced in different passages of that directive, e.g., art. 6, which provides
that “a product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is
entitled to expect,” taking into account all relevant circumstances.
On this issue it is possible to read, among others, the five reports on the
application of Directive 85/374/EEC concerning liability for defective products
(1995, 2000, 2006, 2011, and 2018), available at https://perma.cc/P8EP-AQZS.
23. OECD, supra note 20, at 16; M. Catino, Blame Culture and Defensive
Medicine, 11 COGNITION, TECH. & WORK 245-253; M. Catino & S. Celotti, The
Problem of Defensive Medicine: Two Italian Surveys, in DETECTION AND PREVENTION OF ADVERSE DRUG EVENTS 206 (R. Beuscart, W. Hackl & C. Nøhr eds., IOS
Press 2009); M. Catino, Why do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine? The SideEffects of Medical Litigation, 15 SAFETY SCIENCE MONITOR 1 (2011).
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throughout the world and is currently moving upward. Limiting attention to the last years, the world average expenditure in healthcare
grew, from 2000 to 2017, from 8.622% to 9.896% of the GDP. In
the euro area the increase moved from 8.640% to 10.135%; in the
U.S., from 12.503% to 17.061%. 24
It is not possible to provide any accurate estimate of how much
such an expense is due to defensive medicine; however, available
data show that the latter amounts to a rather high percentage thereof.
As an example, one may consider that a study, conducted by authors
from Harvard University and the University of Melbourne and published in 2010, concluded that more than 80% of the overall annual
USA medical liability system costs (estimated to be $55.6 billion in
2008 dollars, or 2.4% of total healthcare spending), i.e., $45.6 billion, were due to defensive medicine. 25 As regards Italy, in 20142015 defensive medicine was estimated to cost roundly 10 billion
euros a year (i.e., 10.5% of the GDP) and to represent the first category of healthcare waste (26% of the total). 26 One may also add the
following:
− over-prescription of exams, therapies, and medicines that
causes an increase of iatrogenic risks and damage;
− some inefficiencies and loss of quality of the healthcare system;
− abandonment of the sector by insurers and an overall increase of insurance premiums;
24. World Bank, Current Health Expenditure (% of GDP), WORLD BANK
OPEN DATA, available at https://perma.cc/467C-Z5CM.
25. M. M. Mello, A. Chandra, A. A. Gawande & D. M. Studdert, National
Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1569 (2010). It ought
to be noted that such a number did not “attempt to estimate social costs or benefits
of the malpractice system, such as damage to physicians’ reputations or any deterrent effect it may provide.”
26. V. Di Gregorio, A. M. Ferriero, M. L. Specchia, S. Capizzi, G. Damiani
& W. Ricciardi, Defensive Medicine in Europe: Which Solutions?, 25 EUR. J.
PUBLIC HEALTH 145. This study also highlighted that in Europe litigation for medical malpractice increased significantly over the last decade, ranging from more
than 50% in Britain, Scandinavia, the Baltic countries, and Eastern Europe to
more than 200–500% in Germany, Italy, the Iberian and Mediterranean Area
countries.
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− abandonment of risky specialities by doctors, hospitals and
universities;
− the refusal to provide treatment in particularly serious cases.
What is most relevant is that, in some sectors such as healthcare,
beyond certain limits the current paradigm of civil liability based on
deterrence is completely unreliable, since further increases of civil
liability do not procure any gain in safety and, to the contrary and
paradoxically, lead to a reduction of market efficiency and overall
patient safety.
A. Defensive Medicine as an Obstacle Toward Safer Healthcare
Risk Management
Moreover, the deterrence paradigm, as it is currently understood
and applied in most western jurisdictions, produces perverse effects
capable of preventing, or at least hindering, the development of
well-grounded risk-management systems.
In fact, several civil liability systems, inspired by the traditional
paradigm, provide doctors with a disincentive to share information
on risks, harmful events, and latent errors and failures. They are required to define evidence-based safety standards and, therefore, develop reliable guidelines, 27 since this may increase their risk of being held liable. As an example, a research carried out in 2006-2007
on approximately one thousand doctors in eighteen Italian hospitals
showed a shocking result: the great majority of doctors considered
reporting and learning systems very useful for their profession, but
less than half of them made any contributions of relevant information fearing legal consequences. 28 Italian legislation on this issue
changed in 2017 in light of this problem, even if it is not clear
27. J. REASON, HUMAN ERROR (Cambridge U. Press 1990); C. Bayley, What
Medical Errors can Tell us About Management Mistakes, in MANAGEMENT MISTAKES IN HEALTHCARE: IDENTIFICATION, CORRECTION AND PREVENTION 74-83
(P. B. Hofmann & F. Perry eds., Cambridge U. Press 2019).
28. See S. Albolino, R. Tartaglia, T. Bellandi, A. M. V. Amicosante, E.
Bianchini & A. Biggeri, Patient Safety and Incident Reporting: Survey of Italian
Healthcare Workers, 19 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY (2010).

100

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

whether the solution proposed is capable of resolving it completely. 29
In addition, it is undisputable that evidence-based medicine
(EBM 30) nowadays allows the development of more accurate and
reliable guidelines whose application is capable of reducing the
overall risk of death and damage. 31 However, the current civil liability rules provide doctors with a disincentive to apply them consistently, since their observance may not be sufficient to relieve
them from civil liability 32: the problem seems rather well spread in
29. It ought to be noted that civil liability law was reformed, in Italy, through
Law No. 24 of March 8, 2017. As regards the issue at stake, art. 16 provides that
reports and documents resulting from clinical risk management cannot be acquired or used in the context of legal proceedings. Even if this rule appears to take
into consideration the problem discussed above, in the text, it still leaves two
problems open. First of all, it is possible that such information could be published
in the semi-annual report provided by art. 1, co. 539, let. d bis, Law No. 208 of
December 28, 2015 on adverse events occurred within the facility, the causes that
produced the adverse event, and the resulting initiatives put in place. Secondly, it
is not clear whether such information could be obtained by the Ombudsman under
art. 2 of Law 24/2017. On this issue, see E. Marchisio, Evoluzione della responsabilità civile medica e medicina “difensiva,” 1 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO CIVILE
212 (2020); L. M. Franciosi, The New Italian Regime for Healthcare Liability and
the Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines: A Dialogue Among Legal Formants, 11
J. CIV. L. STUD. 371 (2018).
30. G. H. Guyatt, Evidence-Based Medicine, 114 ACP J CLUB A-16 (1991);
Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, Evidence-Based Medicine: A New
Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420-25; D. L. Sackett, W. M. C. Rosenberg, J. A. M. Gray et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: What it
is and What it Isn’t, 312 BMJ 71-72.
31. See, e.g., S. A. R. DOI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE IN HEALTH CARE: USING CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY (Palgrave Macmillan 2012); J. H. HOWICK, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE (Wiley-Blackwell 2011).
32. There is much research on the issue of medical guidelines and on the impact, they have, or should have, on civil liability. On these issues in Italy, see, e.g.,
C. M. MASIERI, LINEE GUIDA E RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE DEL MEDICO (Giuffrè
Francis Lefebvre 2019); Simone Calvigioni, Linee guida e buone pratiche clinicoassistenziali, in I PROFILI PROCESSUALI DELLA NUOVA DISCIPLINA SULLA RESPONSABILITÀ SANITARIA 216 (A. D. De SANTIS ed., RomaTrE-Press 2017); M. FRANZONI, Colpa e linee guida nella nuova legge, 22 DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ 278
(2017); C. Scognamiglio, Regole di condotta, modelli di responsabilità e risarcimento del danno nella nuova legge sulla responsabilità sanitaria, 34 CORRIERE
GIURIDICO 740 (2017). Comparative remarks are developed in SIMON TAYLOR,
MEDICAL ACCIDENT LIABILITY AND REDRESS IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW
(Cambridge U. Press 2015). At the European level, see HERMAN NYS, REPORT ON
MEDICAL LIABILITY IN COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE LEGAL AND FACTUAL SITUATION IN MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2005), available at https://perma.cc/6ZWP-UUJG; PERSONAL
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different jurisdictions, regardless of their belonging to either civil
law or common law traditions. 33
Interestingly, in other areas of scholarship, such problems are
studied in depth and scholars reached the conclusion that risky activities incorporate a certain percentage of risk depending not on the
person performing them but on the activities themselves. 34 Errors
happen and will happen regardless of how severe civil liability is.
There is, therefore, no point in increasing it beyond the limit where
all actors in the relevant market are disadvantaged.
This situation is not going toward market self-correction. Instead, the market is reacting by adjusting to the perverse incentives
provided by the law, so that “medicine of jurisprudential obedience” 35 is nowadays induced from doctors’ very university
INJURY AND DAMAGE ASCERTAINMENT UNDER CIVIL LAW 537 (S. D. Ferrara, R.
Boscolo-Berto & G. Viel eds., Springer 2016); S. D. Ferrara, E. Baccino, T. Bajanowski, R. Boscolo-Berto, M. Castellano, R. De Angel, A. Pauliukevičius, P.
Ricci, P. Vanezis, D. Nuno Vieira, G. Viel & E. Villanueva, Malpractice and
Medical Liability: European Guidelines on Methods of Ascertainment and Criteria of Evaluation, 127 INTL. J. LEG. MED. 545-557.
33. In regard to the United States, see, e.g., L. L. LeCraw, Use of Clinical
Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 3 J. OF ONCOLOGY PRACTICE 254 (2007). In the U.K., see S. Ash, S. Jo & M. Gunn, Legal Considerations
of Clinical Guidelines: Will NICE Make a Difference?, 96 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED.
133-138 (2003). In connection with French law, see III THE DEVELOPMENT OF
MEDICAL LIABILITY 76 (Ewoud Hondius ed., Cambridge U. Press 2010). Under
Italian law, see art. 7(3) of Law No. 24 of March 8, 2017, which expressly provides that respect for guidelines and best practices can be considered by the judge
only with respect to the definition of redress and not when assessing civil liability
in the first place.
34. On this point, see the “Swiss cheese model” developed in J. Reason, The
Contribution of Latent Human Failures to the Breakdown of Complex Systems,
327 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON B, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 475-484 (1990). Also see T. Aven, Risk Assessment and Risk
Management: Review of Recent Advances on their Foundation, 253 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RESEARCH 1-13 (2016); J. Aldred, Justifying Precautionary Policies:
Incommensurability and Uncertainty, 96 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 132-140
(2013); T. Aven, The Risk Concept—Historical and Recent Development Trends,
99 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING AND SYSTEM SAFETY 33-44 (2012); DENNIS V.
LINDLEY, UNDERSTANDING UNCERTAINTY (Wiley 2006); C. E. Althaus, A Disciplinary Perspective on the Epistemological Status of Risk, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 567588 (2005).
35. A. Fiori, La medicina delle evidenze e delle scelte sta declinando verso
la Medicina dell’obbedienza giurisprudenziale?, 4 RIVISTA ITALIANA DI MEDICINA LEGALE 925-931 (2007). On this issue, see also E. J. Cassell, Consent or
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education. 36 The current situation, therefore, requires a prompt revolution of the civil liability paradigm, since past increases of liability
on doctors and hospitals in the recent past did not enhance safety
and, instead, imposed severe negative externalities on the whole
healthcare system. 37
B. A Claim in Favour of Relieving Doctors and Hospitals from Liability
The above-reported negative externalities could be reduced,
without losing the safety and efficiency of the healthcare system if
doctors and hospitals could be relieved from civil liability for damages in cases in which there is no evidence of negligence, imprudence, or unskillfulness and scientifically-validated standardized
actions (guidelines, among others) are observed.
This claim is made based on the assumption (and its relevance
is limited insofar as this assumption is confirmed, which is to be
verified when drafting guidelines) that following standard actions
inspired by evidence-based medicine makes overall accidents and
damage lower than those experienced in a system in which standards
are not defined or observed. 38 In other words: even if the observance
of standards could determine unwanted damages on patients in some
cases, adherence to scientifically-validated standards should be

Obedience? Power and Authority in Medicine, 352 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 328-330
(2005).
36. W. F. Johnston, R. M. Rodriguez, D. Suarez & J. Fortman, Study of Medical Students’ Malpractice Fear and Defensive Medicine: a “Hidden Curriculum?,” 15 WEST. J. EMERGENCY MED. 293-298 (2014); K. J. O’Leary, J. Choi,
K. J. D. Watson & M. V. Williams, Medical Students’ and Residents’ Clinical
and Educational Experiences With Defensive Medicine, 87 ACADEMIC MEDICINE
142 (2012).
37. See OECD, supra note 20.
38. See, e.g., A. B. Haynes, T. G. Weiser, W. R. Berry et al., A Surgical
Safety Checklist to Reduce Morbidity and Mortality in a Global Population, 360
NEW ENG. J. MED. 491 (2019); P. G. Shekelle et al., Making Health Care Safer
II: An Updated Critical Analysis of the Evidence for Patient Safety Practices,
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY (2013), available at
https://perma.cc/7GC7-CT4Z.
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promoted in all cases in which such adherence appears, at a systemic
level, as a safer strategy than any other.
Of course, this should not prevent doctors from leaving aside
guidelines and standards when this appears appropriate in a particular case, in order to apply their professional knowledge. This approach should be an option in those specific instances in which, in
their judgment, guidelines are not suitable: professional knowledge
should not be depreciated by defensive medicine. In fact, practitioners understand and experience defensive medicine “as unnecessary
and meaningless medical actions, carried out mainly because of external demands that run counter to the GP’s professionalism.” 39 This
possibility to depart from the standard, however, would not contradict the “safe harbor” nature of adherence to the standard.
IV. THE NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM OF (MEDICAL) CIVIL
LIABILITY IN THE WAKE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
As far as its scope is concerned, the law regulates economic and
social activities in order to contribute to the pursuit of welfare. But
the law cannot define its goals and means arbitrarily. It needs to take
into the highest consideration the functioning of economic and social contexts addressed, in order to develop well-grounded, affordable, reliable, and effective rules. 40
As noted above, the failure of the deterrence paradigm may be
observed and empirically proved. This conclusion is indisputable
when one notes that the recent increases in civil liability worsened
the position of both doctors and patients, also plaguing healthcare
systems with significant negative externalities. A radical modification is therefore required.

39. E. A. Hvidt, J. Lykkegaard, L. B. Pedersen, K. M. Pedersen, A. Munck
& M. K. Andersen, How is Defensive Medicine Understood and Experienced in
a Primary Care Setting? A Qualitative Focus Group Study Among Danish General Practitioners, 7 BMJ OPEN (2017).
40. E. R. de Jong, M. G. Faure, I. Giesen & P. Mascini, Judge-Made Risk
Regulation and Tort Law: An Introduction, 9 EUR. J. RISK RES. 6-13 (2018).
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Such a modification appears particularly important these days
because of the incentives to practice “defensive medicine.” What
may even be more relevant, however, is that the traditional paradigm
of medical civil liability is very likely to prevent the development of
markets toward intensive use of artificial intelligence and robotization, which are likely to play an increasingly more relevant role in
healthcare, especially through machine learning and deep learning
technologies.
In fact, artificial intelligence can contribute to healthcare in two
main areas. The first one relates to developing medical knowledge
and standards. This is happening through the use of sophisticated
algorithms that combine big data in order to relate a much higher
number of variables and allow drafting medical guidelines and databases that are incredibly more reliable. 41 Such a change, it ought
to be noted, will evolve sharply also due to the pursuit of open-access and open-data strategies by most legal systems, including the
EU. 42
The second one relates to the use of artificial intelligence in performing medical activities—artificial intelligence provides robots
with the ability to execute even complex interventions with an increasingly higher autonomy. 43
41. G. H. Guyatt, Evidence-Based Medicine, 114 ACP JOURNAL CLUB A-16
(1991); Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, Evidence-Based Medicine: A
New Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420-25 (1992);
D. L. Sackett, W. M. C. Rosenberg, J. A. M. Gray, R. B. Haynes & W. S. Richardson, Evidence-Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t, 71 BMJ 312
(1996).
42. In 2003, the European Commission set up a legal framework to allow the
reuse of public sector information through the so-called “PSI Directive” (Directive 2003/98/EC), last revised in 2013 by Directive 2013/37/EU. Open-data
policies include the EU Open Data Portal, set up in 2012, following European
Commission Decision 2011/833/EU on the reuse of Commission documents. On
these issues, see European Commission, Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, Policy: Open Data, https://perma.cc/SA5Z-HKS4.
43. See, e.g., Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning for Healthcare,
SIGMOIDAL, Dec. 21, 2017, https://perma.cc/9AAV-K7EJ; D. Hernandez, Artificial Intelligence Is Now Telling Doctors How to Treat You, WIRED, June 2, 2014,
available at https://perma.cc/3UFH-7LPA; PWC, What Doctor? Why AI and robotics will define New Health, June 2017, available at https://perma.cc
/TT7M-TFPT.
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Even if artificial intelligence can contribute to develop much
safer healthcare, its development could be hindered by the “traditional” paradigm of civil liability law. In fact, the current paradigm
allows redress to damaged patients under the rules that need to identify a “somebody” liable to pay such compensation either because
of his or her fault or by virtue of a strict liability rule. This means
that, in case of damage produced by a robot, judges and lawyers
would seek to impose civil liability either on its producer or on the
author of the computer program that makes it work—the only
“somebody” available to be held liable; the “nearest human,” as it
was noted. 44
This does not consider that artificial intelligence systems evolve
over time (and will do so even more in the near future) on the basis
of the information and feedback gathered and processed by thousands of different shared sources (the so-called “machine learning”
and “deep learning”). In fact, it may be said that robots do not only
perform activities, they also learn how to perform them over time. 45
In fact, the possibility that robots and programs “behave” far independently from instructions initially provided by programmers
and constructors is extremely probable. This possibility has led the
European Parliament to propose “creating a specific legal status for
robots, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots
could be established as having the status of electronic persons with
specific rights and obligations.” 46 I understand that the main reason
for this proposal is that of using legal personality as a technique to
44. K. Hao, When Algorithms Mess Up, the Nearest Human the Blame, MIT
TECH. REV. (May 28, 2019) available at https://perma.cc/WSW9-RP9Q.
45. H. SURDEN, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); S.
RUSSEL & P. NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. A MODERN APPROACH 693
(Pearson College Div. 2010).
46. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report with
Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics
(2015/2103(INL)), § 31(f) (May 31, 2016). See also A. Amidei, Robotica intelligente e responsabilità: profili e prospettive evolutive del quadro normativo europeo, in INTELLIGENZA ARTIFICIALE E RESPONSABILITÀ 63 (U. Ruffolo ed., Giuffrè
2017); G. GUERRA, LA SICUREZZA DEGLI ARTEFATTI ROBOTICI IN PROSPETTIVA
COMPARATISTICA (Il Mulino 2018).
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hold the robot liable and, therefore, insulate its obligations (including redress for damage) from those of its producer and programmer.
I believe that such proposal is undesirable, since robots cannot and
should not be considered “persons” under current civil law. 47 That
approach, however, clearly shows the need to shift “obligations”
away from producers and programmers when robots are capable of
acting rather autonomously from their original design. 48
All what was noted above with reference to artificial intelligence
clearly shows that the cause-and-effect relationship as regards damage causation in this field might not be linear as we are used to believing 49 (though not everybody agrees 50) and that adoption of a
“no-fault” approach (within the meaning defined above, under §1 51)
47. The issue is very wide, and it is not possible to address it here appropriately. A discussion of the issue can be found in G. Wagner, Robot, Inc: Personhood for Autonomous Systems, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 591 (2019); G. Wagner, Robot Liability (Münster Colloquium on EU Law and Digital Economy, Liability for
Robotics and the Internet of Things) (Mar. 12, 2018), available at
https://perma.cc/435N-MGC7; H. Eidenmüller (2017), The Rise of Robots and the
Law of Humans, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT, 765, 771-772;
S. CHOPRA & L. F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL
AGENTS (Michigan 2011); B. J. Koops, M. Hildebrandt & D.-O. Jaquet, Bridging
the Accountability Gap: Rights for New Entities in the Information Society?, 11
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 497 (2010); A. Bertolini, Robots as Products: The Case
for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications and Liability Rules, 5 L., INNOVATION AND TECH. 214-247; C. Boscarato, Who is Responsible for a Robot’s Action? An Initial Examination of Italian Law Within a European Perspective, in
TECHNOLOGIES ON THE STAND: LEGAL AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS IN NEUROSCIENCES AND ROBOTICS 393 (B. van der Bergh & L. Klaming eds., Wolf Legal Publishers 2011).
48. This need appears in legal literature: for example, see M. U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and
Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 399 (2016).
49. With specific reference to artificial intelligence, see E. A. Karnov, The
Application of Traditional Tort Theory to Embodied Machine Intelligence, in ROBOT LAW 51 (R. Calo, A.M. Froomkin & I. Kerr eds., Edward Elgar 2016); M. U.
Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353-400 (2016).
50. D. C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117 (2014); F. P. Hubbard, Sophisticated Robots: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV., 1803
(2014).
51. This is with reference to a system in which redress is provided by a dedicated fund and not by a “culpable” agent and not with reference to strict liability
schemes, which also prescind from “fault” but operate in the opposite direction,
by imposing liability on the agent regardless of any culpability.

2020]

MEDICAL CIVIL LIABILITY

107

to medical liability could prove more efficient than the current system.
There is undoubtedly no convergence on this issue and many
proposals have been made 52 in order to address artificial intelligence
devices, either fault-based rules 53 or strict-liability regimes, 54 including an extension of the rules on defective products 55 or on animals under the custody of humans. 56 However, I claim that the application of the traditional paradigm of civil liability would not foster safety even with respect to these technological issues; instead, it
would expose producers and programmers to unforeseeable and potentially unlimited claims for civil liability without any “fault” or
any disregard for a foreseeable risk being in place. This would likely
deter them from entering the market or developing it, thus hindering
technological evolution—what is sometimes called the risk of “technology chilling.” 57
52. A comparative analysis with reference to the different approaches in the
U. S., Europe, and China can be found in M. Infantino & W. Wang, Algorithmic
Torts: A Prospective Comparative Overview, 28 TRANSNATL. L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 309 (2018). An attempt at reconstructing the different strategies available
under Italian law was made by U. Ruffolo, Per I fondamenti di un diritto della
robotica self-learning; dalla machinery produttiva all’auto driverless: verso una
“responsabilità da algoritmo”?, in INTELLIGENZA ARTIFICIALE E RESPONSABILITÀ 1-30 (U. Ruffolo ed., Giuffrè 2017).
53. See, e.g., R. Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm
of Tort Liability, 86 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2018); B. Casey, Robot Ipsa Loquitur, 108
GEO. L.J. 225 (2019).
54. In favor of a strict-liability regime, see, e.g., L. BUONANNO, CIVIL LIABILITY IN THE ERA OF NEW TECHNOLOGY: THE INFLUENCE OF BLOCKCHAIN,
BLOCKCHAIN AS THE BACKBONE OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY-BASED CIVIL LIABILITY
REGIME (European Law Institute 2019), available at https://perma.cc/G8K36SK8.
55. J. S. Borghetti, LA RESPONSABILITÉ DU FAIT DES PRODUITS : ÉTUDE DE
DROIT COMPARÉ 495 (LGDJ 2004).
56. E. Schaerer, R. Kelley & M. Nicolescu, Robots as Animals: A Framework
for Liability and Responsibility in Human-Robot Interactions 72 (paper presented
at the XVIII IEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication, Toyoma, Japan) (Sept. 27, 2009), https://perma.cc/N9PY-XUYN.
57. Among others, see W. K. Viscusi & M. J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship Between Product Liability and Innovation, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST. COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 125
(P. H. Schuck ed., W. W. Norton & Company 1991); THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE
IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION (P. W. Huber & R. E.
Litan eds., Brookings Institution Press 1991); G. Parchomovsky & A. Stein, Torts
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Also, in this case it appears that the problems and disincentives
evidenced above are somehow connected to the issue of standardization and standardized action. In my opinion, the above-noted
problems and disincentives, capable of affecting the market of artificial intelligence devices, could be reduced if producers and programmers could be relieved from civil liability for damage at least
in certain cases: when there is no evidence of negligence, imprudence, or unskillfulness and the robot (both in its physical components and in its artificial intelligence aspects) complied with scientifically validated production and programming standards. 58
Of course, in this case respect for standards could lead to unwanted damage to patients. However, my claim is made on the same
assumption (to be further verified in all relevant cases) that in several cases, the adoption of artificial intelligence and robots determines a relevant increase in safety within healthcare systems and
reduces the risk of injury and death when compared to healthcare
based only on human action. 59
It is undisputable that investments in research on new technologies should be fostered and supported or, at least, not discouraged:
new technologies produce a sensible increase in safety within
healthcare systems and reduce the risk of injury and death, as available data already show with respect to the current situation. 60
and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285 (2008). The problem is also discussed in
J. Morgan, Torts and Technology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION AND TECHNOLOGY 522 (R. Brownsword, E. Scotford & K. Yeung eds., Oxford U. Press 2017).
58. For the issue of technical safety standards with specific reference to robots is dealt with, among others, see G. GUERRA, LA SICUREZZA DEGLI ARTEFATTI
ROBOTICI IN PROSPETTIVA COMPARATISTICA 104 (Il Mulino 2018) and G. S. Virk,
The Role of Standardisation in the Regulation of Robotic Technologies, in LAW
AND TECHNOLOGY. THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 311 (E. Palmerini & E. Stradella eds., Pisa U. Press 2013).
59. See, e.g., K. W. Kizer & L. N. Blum, Safe Practices for Better Health
Care, in IV ADVANCES IN PATIENT SAFETY: FROM RESEARCH TO IMPLEMENTATION (K. Henriksen, J.B. Battles, E.S. Marks et al. eds., Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality 2005), available at https://perma.cc/V9P5-9RHQ. So the
provision of incentives to technological innovation, provided that it respect scientifically validated standards, appears as a safer strategy than any other.
60. See id.
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This is one of the reasons why I believe that modern technology,
sometimes, requires new specific legislation instead of mere adjusting of existing laws; a “law of the horse,” as it was said 61: without
appropriate ad hoc legislation, in fact, rules developed centuries ago
in very different contexts could provide perverse incentives and produce undesirable negative externalities.
V. SHIFTING LIABILITY AWAY FROM DOCTORS, HOSPITALS, AND
PRODUCERS AND PROGRAMMERS OF AI DEVICES
As shown above, the healthcare system is affected by a set of
perverse incentives induced by the traditional paradigm of civil liability law. The problem could be reduced by shifting the liability
away from doctors, hospitals, and producers and programmers of AI
devices.
What is most important to note, however, is that such shifting
away should not reduce civil liability and the corresponding patients’ right to redress in case of damage. In fact, on the patients’
side, claims for redress based on health injury are commonly recognized, in most jurisdictions, as deriving from acknowledged constitutional rights to health. The right to health was also internationally
recognized in the Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health
Organization (1946); it was then included in art. 25 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and art. 12 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).
Moreover, the “solidarity” approach that now pervades legal
systems, briefly mentioned above, 62 would not allow that damaged
61. The debate on whether modern technology requires new specific legislation or existing legislation and concepts may be adjusted to it may be dated back
to F. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U. CHI. LEG. FORUM 207
(1996) and L. Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501. More recently, among others, see R. Calo, Robotics and the
Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CAL. L. REV. 514 (2015); E. Stradella, Approaches for
Regulating Roboting Technologies: Lessons Learned and Concluding Remarks,
in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY: THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING TECHNOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENT 345 (E. Palmerini & E. Stradella eds., Pisa U. Press 2013).
62. See supra § II. A.

110

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

patients not be compensated for any damage incurred because of
medical therapies. Redress in favor of damaged patients may be considered, as such, a non-controversial right, which would be rather
difficult to repeal.
However, at closer sight, the redress of wrongs suffered by medical patients does not necessarily imply that the obligation to pay be
imposed on doctors and hospitals, or producers and programmers of
AI devices. What the solidarity approach requires, in fact, is that the
loss does not remain with the damaged patients; its imposition on
doctors and hospitals, or producers and programmers of AI devices,
should depend on whether it enhances or, instead, weakens safety.
VI. FROM CIVIL LIABILITY TO FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF LOSSES
The thesis in this article is that a new legal approach should be
developed in medical civil liability law, aimed at maintaining redress for damage on the patients’ side (micro-systemic level) but
shifting the obligation to pay for such redress away from doctors and
hospitals (when there is not evidence of negligence, imprudence, or
unskillfulness and scientifically validated standards of action are
complied with). A further claim is that a similar development should
shift away that obligation also from producers and programmers of
artificial intelligence devices, when there is no evidence of negligence, imprudence, or unskillfulness and scientifically validated
standards of production and programming are complied with. This
evolution would reduce incentives to practice defensive medicine,
reduce disincentives to invest in medical technology, and decrease
inefficiencies and negative externalities deriving from defensive
medicine (macro-systemic level). 63
In other words, the law of redress for medical damage should
evolve from an issue of civil liability to one of financial management
of losses, which would take into a much higher account the
63. Such evolution toward a “no-fault” system was also supported in OECD,
supra note 20, at 62 et seq., however without deepening the issue as to how it
could be pursued.
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“systemic” need of appropriate functioning of complex institutions
and markets such as modern healthcare systems. One may note that
this evolution could appropriately be carried out at the European
level, even if the matter is rather controversial and excessively cumbersome to be discussed in this article. 64
In fact, what appears to favor a single patient in the short run
(e.g., sentencing a doctor to compensate the damage suffered by the
patient after a very complex surgical intervention, whether or not
evidence of fault is adduced) may eventually damage all future patients if it prevents the whole healthcare system from functioning
appropriately and developing into a more technological, evidencebased, and safer system (because of the incentives and disincentives
brought about by the sentencing itself; in the example: doctors
would refuse future complex surgical interventions).
The possibility of balancing these two apparently conflicting
goals is not unknown to some legal systems. “No-fault” legislation
on redress following medical damage (within the meaning of “nofault” adopted here, which makes reference to a system where redress is provided by a dedicated fund regardless of any fault by the
agent being established and not based on strict-liability schemes 65)
may be found in some jurisdictions like New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden. 66
A detailed exam of such models would fall beyond the scope of
this article. However, it may be noteworthy to highlight that “nofault” schemes appear to differ, at a very broad view, with respect
to five main variables: the extent of eligibility criteria for compensation (which may be limited to specified damage, as it happens in
Virginia and Florida with respect to birth-related neurological
64. See, e.g., F. Toriello, La responsabilità medica in prospettiva (incerta) di
armonizzazione europea, 2 RESPONSABILITÀ MEDICA 291 (2017); G. Wagner, The
Project of Harmonizing European Tort Law, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2005 670
(H. Koziol & B.C. Steininger eds., Springer 2006); H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, in BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
686 (H. Koziol ed., Jan Sramek Verlag 2015).
65. See supra § I.
66. See OECD, supra note 20, for a presentation on these systems.
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injury, 67 or apply to all “treatment injuries,” as in New Zealand after
reform in 2005 68); whether the scheme prevents continued access to
courts or not; how these schemes are funded (mainly: privately, publicly, or through a mixed scheme 69); whether redress is imposed a
financial cap or not; definition of the financial entitlement (only economic or also non-economic damages). 70 It is not clear whether such
pieces of legislation are simply capable of being “transplanted” into
different legal systems and of reducing (if not resolving) the problem of defensive medicine. Several issues need be taken into account in this respect.
First, such foreign “no-fault systems” are not targeted at the
problem of standardization and are mainly conditioned upon the
damaged patient waiving civil litigation, instead. Therefore, they
have a narrower scope with respect to the issue of enhancing standardization in view of a safer system. I propose, instead, that, as far
as healthcare is concerned, legal systems should tolerate that the application of scientifically validated standards could determine harmful consequences in individual cases insofar as, under a systemic

67. In regard to Virginia, see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 et seq., known as
the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act. Further information may be found on the program website: https://perma.cc/9AE9-SNME.
With respect to Florida, see FLA. STAT. §§ 766-301 et seq. Further information
may be found on the program website: https://perma.cc/5S2F-KYZ5.
68. In fact, reforms in 2005 removed the final “fault” element still present in
the system and designed it as a true “no-fault” scheme, see M. Bismark & R. Paterson, No-Fault Compensation In New Zealand: Harmonizing Injury Compensation, Provider Accountability, And Patient Safety, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1.
69. In regard to financing, there are several models available, ranging from
systems financed through contributions made by healthcare providers to systems
funded via tax revenues. See OECD, supra note 20, for a comparative analysis on
this issue; M.M. Mello, A. Kachalia & D.M. Studdert, Administrative Compensation for Medical Injuries: Lessons from Three Foreign Systems (2011), available
at https://perma.cc/F9LQ-AMUS; K. DICKSON, K. HINDS, H. BURCHETT, G.
BRUNTON, C. STANSFIELD & J. THOMAS, NO-FAULT COMPENSATION SCHEMES: A
RAPID REALIST REVIEW (UCL Institute of Education 2016); T. Vandersteegen,
W. Marneffe, I. Cleemput & L. Vereeck, The Impact of No-Fault Compensation
on Health Care Expenditures: An Empirical Study of OECD Countries, 119
HEALTH POLICY 367 (2015).
70. These variables are compared among different “no-fault” compensation
schemes in DICKSON ET AL., supra note 69.
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point of view, such application allows a significant reduction of the
overall risks and damages. 71
Even if this idea is somehow disruptive and would influence the
way this issue is understood, also under an ethical point of view, its
feasibility may be found in some small and limited pieces of legislation (without any possibility of extensive application by way of
interpretation) that provide similar mechanisms of compensation in
standardized medical activities bearing some statistical risks but
much more beneficial effects: it is the case, for example, of compensation following adverse effects attributed to vaccination, whose adverse effects are very rare in comparison with the more than 2.5 million deaths prevented only in 2008 by vaccination. 72 The issue resembles, under this point of view, that of mandatory seat belt in
71. In other and more detailed words, under the proposal made in this article,
redress of (statistically) “inevitable” damages resulting from compliance with scientifically-validated standards, within sectors characterized by high risk and high
scientific or technological content, should not be imposed on persons performing
the relevant activities or supplying products to the market as long as there is no
evidence of negligence, imprudence, or unskillfulness and given criteria, to be
developed within an agreed framework, are complied with (e.g., treatment is appropriate, guidelines complied with scientific validation principles and were applied appropriately, etc.).
72. A review of World Health Organization Member States based on 2018
data showed that no-fault compensation systems for vaccine injuries have been
developed in a few high-income countries for more than 50 years, mostly at the
central or federal government level, and are government-funded. Claimants are
compensated with either: lump-sums; amounts calculated based on medical care
costs and expenses, loss of earnings or earning capacity; or monetary compensation calculated based on pain and suffering, emotional distress, permanent impairment or loss of function; or combination of those. It is noteworthy that, in most
jurisdictions, vaccine injury claimants have the right to seek damages either
through civil litigation or from a compensation scheme, but not both simultaneously: see R. G. Mungwira, Ch. Guillard, A. Saldaña, N. Okabe, H. Petousis-Harris, E. Agbenu, L. Rodewald & P.L.F. Zuber, Global Landscape Analysis of NoFault Compensation Programmes for Vaccine Injuries: A Review and Survey of
Implementing Countries, 15 PLoS ONE (2020). On this issue, see also WHO,
STATE OF THE WORLD’S VACCINES AND IMMUNIZATION (3d ed., 2009), available
at https://perma.cc/DAK5-34BX; C. Looker & H. Kelly, No-fault compensation
following adverse events attributed to vaccination: a review of international programmes, BULLETIN OF THE WHO (2011), available at https://perma.cc/4KVD79XB; C. Looker & H. Kelly, No-Fault Compensation Following Adverse Events
Attributed to Vaccination: A Review of International Programmes, 89 BULLETIN
OF THE WHO 371; S. F. HALABI & S. B. OMER, A Global Vaccine Injury Compensation System, 317 JAMA 471 (2017).
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motor vehicles: as it was noted, “seat belts can cause injuries but it
is vastly more likely that they will protect you. It is all about probabilities and the chances are on the side of wearing seat belts.” 73
Second, foreign “no-fault” systems recalled above are rather different and their features depend upon the different jurisdictions they
belong to. As noted above, within the existing “no-fault” schemes
there is no uniformity as to the extent of eligibility criteria for compensation; whether the scheme should prevent continued access to
courts or not; how these schemes are to be funded (the option being
via tax revenues, privately, or via a mixed solution); whether a financial cap should be imposed on redress; 74 whether the financial
entitlement should limit to economic damage or include also noneconomic damage. Moreover, in some cases they apply rather automatically upon the occurrence of the event (as it happens in Florida
and Virginia if proof is given that the neurological birth injury occurred as a result of the birth process) while in others an avoidability
standard is adopted (as in European Nordic countries such as Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland, where it is verified whether injuries could have been avoided if the care provided had been of optimal quality). 75 Finally, the effect for the community depends on
the legal and institutional context the scheme operates in, in particular with reference to the way the social security net is designed in
each different country. 76
Therefore, it appears difficult to transplant any given scheme
into a different jurisdiction without adaptation. I believe that there
is much room for future research in order to classify the most relevant variables, within legal systems, capable of influencing the way
“no-fault” schemes (with the usual warning on the meaning of this
concept adopted here 77) may operate and define how such schemes
73. A. Giubilini & J. Savulescu, Vaccination, Risks, and Freedom: The Seat
Belt Analogy, 12 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 237 (2019).
74. See, supra note 69, and the text this footnote refers to.
75. On this issue, see DICKSON ET AL., supra note 69, at 9.
76. Id. at 4.
77. See supra § I.
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need be adjusted in order to adapt to the different legal systems they
are implemented into.
Third, the legal transplant of any of such foreign “no-fault systems” may not reduce, in itself, excessive litigation (and, therefore,
“defensive medicine”). As it was noted, the rather positive outcome
experienced in New Zealand seems to depend on “the absence of a
culture of suing in New Zealand” that pre-existed in the country, 78
which makes it unreliable that introduction of similar legislation
could lead to similar results in jurisdiction where civil litigation is
much higher and showed increase in the last decades. 79 It is necessary, therefore, to take into account cultural differences between
countries and assess how much they may influence the outcome of
the proposed reform.
Fourth, foreign “no-fault systems” are currently showing deficiencies as regards incentives to safety, in the absence of the deterrence brought about by civil liability 80: in fact, pure “no-fault” models (within the meaning referred to here) raise concerns as to their
appropriateness to limit the risk of moral hazard, exactly as it happens in New Zealand, since “the principal weakness of no-fault
schemes is the difficulty of ensuring that the socially optimal
amount of care is taken by potential loss-causers, as the links between their potential to cause loss and the costs of their actions are
severed.” 81 In this sense, I claim that “no-fault” schemes, within the
meaning proposed here, should not apply out of the scope briefly
mentioned here (i.e., compliance with scientifically validated
78. K. A. Wallis, No-Fault, no Difference: No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injury and Healthcare Ethics and Practice, 67 BRITISH J. GEN. PRACTICE 3839 (2017).
79. OECD, supra note 20, at 16 et seq.
80. In general, on this point, see also DICKSON ET AL, supra note 69, at 5; K.
Wallis, New Zealand’s 2005 ‘No-Fault’ Compensation Reforms and Medical Professional Accountability for Harm, 126 NEW ZEALAND MED. J. 33 (2013). Of
course, such a point is raised with particular emphasis by those who believe that
deterrence should be considered as an indispensable effect of legislation on redress; see, e.g., A. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181.
81. B. Howell, J. Kavanagh & L. Marriott, No-Fault Public Liability Insurance: Evidence from New Zealand, 9 AGENDA 137 (2002).
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standards where there is no evidence of negligence, imprudence, or
unskillfulness); otherwise the system would lose the deterrence factor that civil liability may still offer (e.g., providing application of
“fault” rules in case of negligence).
Moreover, such “no-fault” schemes should be combined with
“fault” rules in order to take advantage of the benefits brought by
each of them, narrowing their flaws by their reciprocal interplay. In
any case, where these schemes apply, they should be matched with
a set of rules capable of providing incentives for safety. I believe
that, in those cases where no one can be blamed for ignoring the
standards established, such set of rules should be uncoupled from
deterrence on individuals (e.g., deterrence induced by civil liability
should not be replaced with deterrence induced by disciplinary sanctions, as it happened in New Zealand) and should rather be inspired
by organizational and procedural criteria, thus shifting paradigmatic
centrality from individuals to systemic risk management. 82
Of course, such an evolution would need to be accompanied by
a cultural shift aimed at abandoning the desire for revenge often felt
by damaged patients and their families and at rediscovering the importance of a constructive relationship between doctors and patients.
This issue falls outside the scope of this article and, regretfully,
82. Such a shift would be particularly relevant if one considers that many (if
not most of the) medical injuries relate to unavoidable human error in a context of
system failure: see TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (L.
T., Kohn, J.M. Corrigan & M.S. Donaldson eds., National Academies Press
2000); K. Watson & R. Kottenhagen, Patients’ Rights, Medical Error and Harmonisation of Compensation Mechanisms in Europe, 25 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 1
(2018). New Zealand is a relevant example in this respect. Before 2005, in New
Zealand compensation was granted upon evidence of medical error. Since all findings of error were reported to the Medical Council, “compensation could bring
disciplinary repercussions for doctors,” which discouraged doctors and sometimes even patients from participating in the compensation claims process. This
knot was untied in 2005, when eligibility was extended to all injuries caused by
treatment and the prior reporting duties were replaced by a new duty to report
“risk of harm to the public” to the “authorities responsible for patient safety,”
which reduced doctors’ fear and improved information flows within the system:
see K. A. Wallis, No-Fault, No Difference: No-Fault Compensation for Medical
Injury and Healthcare Ethics and Practice, 67 BRITISH J. GEN. PRACTICE 38
(2017).
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cannot be dealt with here. It is relevant to note, even only incidentally, that such a shift would require a more appropriate and effective attitude to dialogue in healthcare, 83 in particular as regards
acquisition of the informed consent. 84
Finally, foreign “no-fault systems” are designed, interpreted,
and applied as “exceptions” to “common” civil liability systems,
which are considered applicable by default. On the other hand, I believe that no-fault redress schemes (following the lexical convention
proposed in this research) should rise, in relevant sectors and with
reference to relevant cases, to the role of an independent and alternative system of redress on an equal footing to “fault” civil liability—a sort of “double track” legislation on redress for damage.
Of course, the adoption of such a redress system for medical injuries, targeted at the need to foster standardization of medical treatments, would require the definition of many different variables—
which may only be briefly referred to here. First, it is based on the
objective definition of certain standards as “scientifically validated,”
also requiring an appropriate validation system. A third, independent party, must be in charge of assessing redress to damaged patients
in application of the scheme, and care must be taken of its functioning and funding. It will also be needed to define standardized
amounts of compensation. This is a critical issue under a systemic
point of view, and the acceptance of such standardized compensation may strongly depend upon the way the social security net is
designed in each different country. 85 On all these issues, it seems
83. As it was noted, “the doctor-patient relationship is shaped by the quality
and manner of information exchange”: see K. Watson & R. Kottenhagen, Patients’ Rights, Medical Error and Harmonisation of Compensation Mechanisms
in Europe, 25 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 1.
84. On this issue, see, e.g., R. R. FADEN & T. L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY
AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (Oxford U. Press 1986); L. Asveld, Informed Consent in Fields of Medical and Technological Practice: An Explorative
Comparison, 10 TECHNÉ: RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 18
(2006).
85. It is acknowledged that “no-fault” schemes are likely to lead to lower
compensation in favor of damaged patients. There appears to be evidence to suggest that “no-fault” schemes providing standardized compensation are more easily
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possible to draw inspiration, at least in part, from jurisdictions such
as Sweden and New Zealand. 86

accepted in countries such as New Zealand and Scandinavia, where healthcare is
understood as an important provision by central government and other forms of
social insurance exist. On the other hand, countries with less of a social security
safety net to support individuals with ongoing health and disability issues, such
as the U.S., are understandably more reluctant to deny claimants the possibility of
attaining damages through the court process: see DICKSON ET AL.,supra note 69,
at 4, 54.
86. A. Antoci, A. Fiori Maccioni & P. Russu, The Ecology of Defensive Medicine and Malpractice Litigation, 11 PLOS ONE (2016); P. C. Weiler, The Case
for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908 (1993); A. Towse & P.
Danzon, Medical Negligence and the NHS: An Economic Analysis, 8 HEALTH
ECON. 93. See OECD, supra note 20, at 13 et seq., which also mentions the cases
of Denmark and Finland.
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In the spring 2020, as most of the world was in lockdown mode
due to the sanitary crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Journal of Civil Law Studies decided to hold a colloquium online to
discuss the Opportunities of Distance Teaching. Agustín Parise, Associate Editor-in-Chief, led the initiative and coordinated the event
from Maastricht University (the Netherlands), in liaison with Olivier
Moréteau, Editor-in-Chief, who was at the time in sabbatical in
Lyon (France). Five colleagues were invited to join to speak at the
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colloquium, so that Africa, North and South America, Asia, and Europe would be represented. Accordingly, Xiangshun Ding (Renmin
University, China), Nadia Nedzel (Southern University Law Center,
U.S.A.), Christa Rautenbach (North-West University, South Africa), Michel Séjean (University of Southern Brittany, France), and
Fernando Toller (Austral University, Argentina), each shared their
own perspectives on the current scenario that legal education is facing. The two-hour colloquium was free and open to the public, and
took place via Zoom on May 14, 2020, with attendees from different
parts of the world.
It was afterwards agreed that each participant would share a note
of circa 1,000 words, giving a summary of thoughts and comments
about the experience of teaching law students remotely, without
much preparation if any, in a variety of contexts such as: size of
university and classes, location, and socio-economic context. These
notes are published in this journal as one set in the alphabetic order
of their authors’ names, at a time when law schools worldwide keep
readjusting their course offerings with a substantial amount of distance learning to face the aftermath of a long-term crisis.
Readers are hereby invited to reflect upon the experiences that
were shared during the colloquium and that now find a forum in this
journal. A new learning environment is currently being experienced
by students and professors. Distance teaching offers challenges, yet
these are outweighed by the numerous opportunities that are out
there and that should be embraced. The notes that follow are only a
sample of the many paths that actors can follow when engaging in
legal education across the globe in this new learning environment.
O.M. & A.P.
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TEACHING COMPARATIVE LAW COURSES IN CHINA
VIRTUALLY
Xiangshun Ding ∗
No one at Renmin University expected to stay away from campus for an uncertain period of time when heading home for a long
winter vacation in mid-January 2020. I heard that the city of Wuhan
had been locked down on January 20 to prevent COVID-19 from
spreading. At the time, I was on a leisure tour in southern China to
celebrate the Spring Festival. But even under such unprecedented
circumstances, I still could not have predicted how serious the aftermath of coronavirus would be, among which the university was not
able to open the campus on February 17 as scheduled.
During the spring semester, I taught two courses: one scheduled
for the first eight weeks of the semester and the other scheduled for
the last eight weeks of the semester, both were joint teaching seminars for master students from the department of comparative law.
Each course met eight times for three hours.
In the class of Comparative Law on Selected Issues, which aims
to improve students’ analysis skills on selected issues from a comparative perspective, there were 11 students registered, including
one who is a Chinese exchange student studying in France. Given
the unexpected pandemic circumstance, I selected two legal topics.
One is hate speech resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and the
other is the jurisdiction issue over cruise ships affected by coronavirus, which all relate to combatting the global pandemic in different
countries. I hoped students would sharpen their minds and legal
∗ Professor of Comparative Law at School of Law, Renmin University of
China. I am grateful that Professor Olivier Moreteau and Associate Professor
Agustin Parise invited me to attend the colloquium, which has led to creation of
this note. I also want to thank my colleague at Renmin University, Professor Michael Paul who polished this article. The Research Office of Renmin University
has provided financial support for this research.
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knowledge on heated topics from the changing and challenging
global visions. I prepared all reading materials related to the above
issues in English while Chinese was the language spoken in class.
Each student was required to make a presentation after reading the
materials assigned; the other members and I gave feedback on their
performance. Some points were highlighted and discussed based on
the perspective of international and comparative law. In the end, I
assigned essay writing work on the topic relating to how to handle
the issue of hate speech in different countries as the final arrangement. Generally, this course went on smoothly without obstacles except there was less interaction compared to a regular in-person class.
As most students preferred to keep their camera off during the online
virtual class video session, I could not check the reactions and performances of the students, which reduced instant interaction and
communication.
Therefore, I decided to make some adjustments to the seminar
of Comparative Law on Foreign Judicial System, which was cotaught with Professor Michael Paul who is a full-time U.S. professor
at Renmin Law School. The course was taught in English focusing
on the legal systems in common law countries and Northeast Asian
countries. The content lectured by Professor Paul was fundamental
jurisprudence and adjudicative techniques in the United States such
as the basic principles of rule of law, separation of powers, precedent, judicial review, etc. Nevertheless, my focus was on judicial
systems in Japan and South Korea. The reading materials were in
English, meanwhile, resources in Hangul and Japanese were also introduced to students. To promote interaction during class time, I instructed all the students to turn on their camera mandatorily. I also
intentionally distributed the latest cases as teaching materials. In the
Japanese judicial system part, the profile case of Carlos Ghosn’s escape from Japanese criminal injustice was used for discussion. Carlos Ghosn a successful businessman who served as the Nissan chairman and CEO of Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi in Japan, was arrested
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and charged by Japanese prosecutors at the end of 2018 for allegations of misappropriating company funds, but later while out on bail
he successfully fled from Japan to Lebanon and claimed that he fled
from injustice as he was suppressed by the Japanese criminal procedure. The Carlos Ghosn case provides a contemporary example to
demonstrate the merits and demerits of the Japanese judicial system
for comparative law study. By discussing the case, students are also
able to better understand the relationship between international law
and domestic law and how international relationship influences national judicial practice.
Teaching virtually eliminated the chance of in-person face-toface discussions between the instructor and the student; while it is
also fostering accessibility to teaching resources remotely. For example, we invited a senior official in charge of policing policy to
lecture on the practice of Japanese criminal justice. In this class, I
also explained the judicial system in the Republic of Korea by discussing the recent cases with regard to historical issues with Japan
adjudicated by the Constitutional Court of Korea. From this, students may understand how decisions of the domestic court in Korea
affect the diplomatic relationship with Japan and vice versa. As I am
developing this note, this class is still going on. As part of the final
examination, I will evenly divide students into two groups and assign each group to act as lawyers representing the positions of Carlos Ghosn and the Japanese government, respectively. Improving the
pedagogy of this comparative law course by having students discuss
the latest cases in different countries has led to the dramatic improvement of virtual class learning.
For me, this is not the first-time classes were suspended due to a
pandemic. Compared to the situation of SARS in 2003 when campuses were closed without continuity of class, the campus during the
COVID-19 pandemic has been accessible to students by teaching
virtual classes. Especially for the comparative law courses at
Renmin University, which aim at training students with bilingual or
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trilingual legal skills, virtual teaching connects students and instructors at every corner in the world and also extends teaching opportunities worldwide. If we define this as an opportunity to strengthen
international and comparative legal education, I think it has been an
unexpected benefit we receive from the crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic.

A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE ON E-LEARNING:
REMOTE CAN MEAN CLOSER
Olivier Moréteau ∗
In the early fall of 2000, as I was visiting from Lyon to teach my
annual Introduction to Civil Law course at Boston University, Professor Jacques Vanderlinden called me from the Université de
Moncton, New-Brunswick, Canada, inviting me and my alma mater,
Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3, to join forces in creating an online
program to teach the common law in French. The target was the
University of the South Pacific. The university educates Vanuatu
lawyers who are called to practice in a jurisdiction where one third
of the population speaks French, but they only have access to legal
education in English. A few months later, a consortium was created,
which also included the Université Paris 12, with the support of the
Lyon Bar Association. The project became Campus numérique Multidroit, one of the very few pilot Campus numériques français
funded by the French Government. 1
Six course modules were taught in an entirely asynchronous
manner, as students were spread out on all continents, in multiple
time zones. The Université de Moncton hosted the course platform.
∗ Professor of Law, Russell B. Long Eminent Scholars Academic Chair,
Director of the Center of Civil Law Studies–Louisiana State University.
1. Catherine Rollot, Mon campus du bout du monde, LE MONDE, Apr. 3,
2002, https://perma.cc/77JZ-J2Y2.
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Pre-recorded lectures were ruled out, as we wanted to move away
from the traditional European format. For each weekly module, the
student had a one-page screen explaining the content and the learning objectives of that unit. Four set of questions followed, broken
down into a number of sub-questions. Hyperlinks led to texts: case
excerpts, legislation, or doctrine. Students sent their answers to the
instructor, who delivered individual and collective feedback. Assessment was continuous in part, with the addition of a mid-term
and a final exam. I developed the material for one course and a half
and had the experience of teaching those during several years, until
the program was terminated, as a sequel of my move to Louisiana.
The COVID-19 outbreak caught me years after, during a sabbatical semester that took me back to France. After having taught two
short courses in Lyon and Aix-en-Provence, I was due to teach Comparative Contract Law in a master’s program at Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne when the country was completely shut down. I was asked
to teach remotely though without technical support, with the possibility to opt out. I resolved to face the challenge, reminiscing my
earlier e-learning experience.
From my father’s house in Lyon, I managed to scan my teaching
material and made it available on a drive. I had divided the course
into six units, each of them including questions and sub-questions,
often in the form of hypothetical cases. I gave individual feedback
to students. I recorded short videos on my smartphone, to give collective feedback. I found a way to compress the videos and post
them on the drive. All 20 students engaged almost from day one and
I could see them learn and improve their skills whilst adjusting to an
interactive style. I had to be flexible on deadlines, some students
facing challenging circumstances. One-to-one conversation led to
counselling and mentoring. My Sorbonne students were grateful not
to be left behind and to be spared long pre-recorded lectures. They
appreciated the individual approach, uncommon in France, and
found the short videos useful and to the point. These videos were
reactive, focusing on points students had missed or found difficult.
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I recorded two videos of 15 minutes each rather than a lengthy one.
The whole experience was time consuming both for the students and
the instructor. This more than doubled the time I would have spent
on this class. Though I never met the students in person, I came to
know them as individuals.
My previous experience offered valuable guidance, as I was
away from my colleagues and deprived from institutional support.
The asynchronous format helped students who had moved back
home, some in East Asia or in the Middle East.
Back to Louisiana State University weeks after, I heard that my
first year class of Western Legal Traditions was to be taught remotely this coming fall semester, due to the needs of physical distancing: by university policy, we must not occupy our classrooms at
more than 50% capacity. All professors teaching a Legal Traditions
section or subsection agreed to pool resources, while an LSU Law
Online Group was set up for guidance, addressing the impact on the
syllabus, choice of teaching materials, recording videos, etc. Though
I have never taught a class on Zoom, I do not face the challenge
alone, benefiting from my colleagues’ experience in the spring and
summer semesters. The plan is to teach two thirds of the class in an
asynchronous manner and one third synchronous via a weekly live
Zoom session. I can see that technology has improved in twenty
years. What has not changed is the huge human investment needed
to develop proper course resources, particularly the preparation of
quizzes with true or false answers, multiple choice questions, and
self-assessment.
A huge benefit of e-learning is that it forces us to focus on learning objectives and adopt a student-based perspective. It is an invitation to discover a variety of learning strategies and be closer to the
individual we educate. The learning experience is entirely revisited,
with long lasting benefits even when we return to the classroom.
Most of us agree that nothing can replace the human touch and interaction of the classroom experience. One paradox that I discovered
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through my Campus Multidroit, Sorbonne, and upcoming LSU experiences is that remote can mean closer. Think of the intimacy of
the mouth-against-ear phone conversation or written correspondence, with limited interference of any form of institutional construct
and peer pressure. Opportunities of one-to-one communication are
manifold on the U.S. campus but are rare occurrences in mass-education systems like the French. I am to this date still in touch with
Campus Multidroit students in Vanuatu or in African countries, and
even happened to meet some of them. At the time, the happy few
who owned a computer faced weak networks and tropical outages.
Most had to take long rides, sometimes a one-or-two-hour walk, to
the nearest eClassroom of the Agence universitaire de la francophonie, to perform their weekly work within a limited time. My
contemporary French or U.S. students may not face such challenges,
but some have to share computer equipment and Wifi access with
other family members working remotely or with children attending
online classes.
Developing new ways of teaching in a context of scarce resources (my experience with Campus Multidroit) or a sanitary crisis
(COVID-19) forces us to focus on the learner and the learning process, away from the apparently and falsely equal environment of the
classroom. We move from the collective to the individual experience, reverting to those days when the learner was a prince receiving
a private education. Enabling the learner to take control of one’s
own life to the benefit of others is or should be the highest aspiration
of the legal educator.
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SUDDENLY DISTANCE LEARNING: CIVIL LAW IN A
COMMON LAW WORLD
Nadia E. Nedzel ∗
Southern University Law Center (SULC), where I teach Contracts (common law), Obligations (civil law), and Sale and Lease
(civil law), is an Historically Black Law School in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. Our law school’s mission is to prepare students from under-represented populations to practice law, and we produce approximately 75% of all African American lawyers in Louisiana. It is an
honor and a pleasure to teach these students and watch them become
successful attorneys. While I have taught students who are better
prepared for law school (at Tulane, for example), I have never taught
students who were, in general, more appreciative or more eager to
learn.
When COVID-19 hit in March, we were two-thirds through the
semester, with a full month of classes remaining. After a one-week
hiatus, we switched to distance learning. I was teaching two civil
law courses: Obligations (a first-year course) and Sale and Lease (an
upper-level course). SULC adopted Zoom, recording and making
our classes available on Panopto afterwards; consequently, our classes were primarily synchronous. Recorded classes were available
for those students who missed class or who wanted to review.
In addition to Zoom, because I have taught both courses for a
number of years, my students had access to several years of class
notes, quizzes, practice problems (i.e., hypotheticals), and even lectures online through my Westlaw TWEN class and lectures I have
recorded on YouTube. Students still had their coursebooks and were
required to prepare approximately 30 pages of reading material for
each class, as usual. I was also able to “jump-start” my forthcoming
∗
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Obligations casebook, which will be delivered online by means of
ChartaCourse, a law-professor developed platform that looks like an
expanded outline, with room for professors to add explanations, case
opinions, practice problems, and even videos. I think it is a great
improvement over the traditional common law casebook, which
leaves students wondering what it is they are supposed to learn, or
civil law textbooks that teach theory, but do not give students a great
deal of insight into how the law is actually used.
Unlike many other civilian jurisdictions where law is primarily
taught via a lecture method, Louisiana’s civil law is taught using
common law methodology. We use Socratic Dialogue and a combination of our Civil Code and judicial opinions. Our casebooksincluding my own on Louisiana Sale and Lease lawinclude a short
discussion of the applicable articles and long (though excerpted) judicial opinions. They look a great deal like common law casebooks.
In class, I start by reviewing the pertinent codal articles and then ask
individual students questions concerning each case they prepared for
class in order to help them reach a coherent understanding of the
topic.
I was lucky in that my classes were unusually small. Rather than
the usual 50 students, I had approximately 20 in each class. Consequently, I was still able to employ Socratic Dialogue in class, and
some of my students felt more comfortable talking on Zoom than
they did beforehand. Additionally, I took advantage of Zoom’s
screen sharing feature to share my lecture notes online as I went
through them. Other ways I engaged with students included email
and private Zoom sessions so that I could help them individually
with understanding difficult concepts like solidary liability as well
as help them with learning how to better answer the kinds of hypothetical questions that comprise final exams in the United States.
For some, there were fewer distractions, while for others who
had to “Zoom” with family around or who faced technological limitations, it was more difficult. Nevertheless, I think the adversity led
to increased student engagement, increased dialogue with individual
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students, and an improved level of learning, particularly with my
Obligations class. As one student said: “The way that you called on
us or a volunteer to do case briefs was important because it motivates students to push themselves. . . . You did a great job of keeping
us attentive, alert, and informed and I truly thank you for it!”
In addition to students having a better learning experience, I enjoy teaching more when I am able to get students to participate actively in class. I have had a number of opportunities to teach in civil
law countries and have taught a wide variety of students by various
methodologies, in person and online both synchronous and asynchronous. Because of Socratic Dialogue and the other tools I had at
hand in response to COVID-19, I found that online synchronous
learning was relatively equivalent to in-person class, assuming a
particular student was not facing either situational or technological
difficulties. When I have students who are not used to participating
in class (as when I taught Chinese students in Turin, Italy), I have
found it efficacious to divide them into groups of four to six, give
them a hypothetical problem to discuss for five minutes or so in light
of the particular concept studied, and then have a spokesman from
each group report to the class. I find it much more difficult (and
much less rewarding) to teach asynchronously, where I have no direct discussion with any students.
All in all, I found teaching by means of distance learning much
more rewarding now, because of technological advances, than I had
found it 20 years ago, when I was teaching common law reasoning
to law professors in Monterrey, Mexico primarily by email, and primarily asynchronously. In fact, I found it so rewarding that I volunteered to teach this coming fall semesters’ courses entirely online
and I am looking forward to learning how to use even more technology. Additionally, my law school has decided to retool classes so
that none of our classes (in-person or virtual) will have much more
than 30 students. All in all, I hope that more law schools, around the
world, will use this experience to help improve student learning.
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BRIDGING THE DISTANCE IN LEGAL EDUCATION
Agustín Parise ∗
This note aims to share personal reflections and experiences on
the way legal education was affected by the arrival of the COVID19. Let me start with the personal reflections. A first reflection relates to the fact that many have stated that the COVID-19 invites for
virtual teaching. I want to stress that teaching is not virtual, since it
is as real as it can get: students and instructors are real, experiences
are real. We should speak of distance teaching, as the title of this
colloquium indicates. I strongly believe the distances can disappear,
however. Distance can and should become an anecdote within the
entire teaching experience. It is up to all actors for that distance to
disappear. We have to bridge the distance, being open to listen, see,
speak, and reflect. We need to allow us to be touched in our souls,
because, after all, that is what teaching is about and is the best way
to secure that both students and instructors learn.
A second reflection alerts that the current teaching offers a classroom that is always open and travels with us. It reminds me of the
school wagons in the Wild West, where teachers would deliver their
courses in transit, while boomers crossed the great plains in caravans
to search for prosperity in the West. There, the classroom was omnipresent for students. Our classroom is available in the different
platforms and environments. We can all reach out, and it is always
open. We can constantly engage in communication, feed discussion
forums, and work on our assignments. This new teaching allows all
actors to embark in an ongoing journey of discovery.

∗ Associate Professor, Maastricht University, Faculty of Law (the Netherlands); LL.B., LL.D., Universidad de Buenos Aires (Argentina); LL.M., Louisiana State University (United States); Ph.D., Maastricht University.
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A third reflection invites to host participants without borders.
We can invite instructors we never even thought about due to geographic or financial constraints. Likewise, we can also include students who are not based at our universities. The new scenario invites
us indeed to involve new actors in our plays. Distances have disappeared in this new context, and that seems to be an irony when
speaking of distance teaching.
A fourth reflection points to the speed at which things evolve.
Everything evolves at high speed these days. Ideas indeed evolve at
high speed. For example, the organization of this colloquium required only a few days because we felt there was no need to wait to
get engaged. Technology evolves at high speed likewise, as we are
constantly reminded, and corrections are always made to the technological tools we have. People adapt at amazing speed, and I will
return to this.
A final reflection calls for our experiences to help us develop
repositories of knowledge. We can share experiences, knowledge,
successes, wrong paths, and timely changes. We can experience a
fast catch-up of expertise. For example, Julieta Marotta, a colleague
who directs a master programme at Maastricht University, was able
to speak with colleagues in China to learn how they had done the
transition to distance teaching a few weeks before. The catch-up was
incredible! The Chinese colleagues, in a very generous way, alerted
Marotta of the potential pitfalls and of the strong points. The colleague in Maastricht was then able to implement the transition in her
program, conveying an effective message to all instructors and students. Perhaps this colloquium helps us also in that sense, enabling
us to catch-up.
Let me now share experiences I had in this new distance teaching. I taught an honors course on law and literature and had to administer distance exams for a bachelor course on legal history. The
honors course was small while the legal history course had an enrolment of circa 400 students. Everyone had to adapt to a new environment for teaching and assessing. We used Zoom to hold meetings
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and Blackboard to assess assignments, using automatic hand-in
points, with the necessary plagiarism checks. We also held oral exams via WhatsApp, with two instructors present, offering a means
for all actors involved to be tête à tête. The teaching was synchronic,
yet the classroom was always open. Emails came back and forth,
and in every session, we allowed time to accommodate to this fast
speed evolution by means of extensive speaking and listening. I implemented teaching without borders, since half of the instructors and
students were abroad. I applied some leniency with the submission
deadlines of internal assignments, I must say; because our students
encountered personal problems back home, and priorities just
shifted overnight.
Everyone had an impressive ability to adapt. That adaptation
was not imposed, for the reason that we were well aware of the need
to adapt. That need was accompanied by timely explanations: simple, straight forward, and humane. Explanations were likewise bidirectional, that is to say, from instructors to students and from students to instructors. There were also timely explanations between
instructors and between students. We were all communicating by
means of emails, announcements, town hall meetings, phone calls
(yes, the phone was also there). The adaptation was accompanied by
the fact that we all understood what was going on.
I can therefore think of a main takeaway. This experience taught
me that we have a clear advantage when we explain things, when
we communicate, and when we understand. We can then undergo
change, and we can bridge the distance. We must be ready to listen,
see, speak, and reflect; and, above all, we need to allow us to be
touched in our souls. That takes us to the first reflection I shared: we
need to return to the basics of teaching.
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WHEN COVID-19 THROWS YOU A CURVEBALL, YOU
NEED TO READJUST AND FIND ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO
DO TEACHING AND LEARNING
Christa Rautenbach ∗
I. COURSE TAUGHT, NUMBER OF STUDENTS, LEVEL
This semester, I teach Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Religious Legal Systems. It is a fourth-year LL.B. elective course. Eighty
full-time students are registered, and I was half-way through the
course when COVID-19 struck.
II. TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE AND/OR USED
Usually, I would use a combination of teaching and learning
methods during a semester. There would be contact sessions of two
and a half hours per week in which I would give formal lectures
followed by class discussions, individually or in groups, and informal assessment activities. In general, the activities would be graded
by the students during the sessions, and all the marks would be
added up at the end of the semester to make up a small portion of
the students’ final participation marks. Doing class activities also
motivate students to attend the contact sessions and enables them to
assess their progress continually. I already used an interactive
eGuide available on the eFundi platform with detailed instructions
and resources that could guide the students through the course contents even without my presence. Still, I regarded contact as an essential component of my teaching and learning, and I continuously
devised ways to motivate them to attend the contact sessions.

∗ Professor of Law at the Faculty of Law, North-West University
(Potchefstroom Campus), South Africa.
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How has this changed in the e-learning environment? I have
tried to use as little new technology as possible, to prevent confusion
and information overload. I have already been using the eFundi platform where all the announcements, resources, assessments, chatrooms and eGuides are available on one platform and decided to
continue using it. It is a platform that is known to the students, and
most of the available data packages in South Africa allow access and
downloads for free. The university has agreements with many of the
data service providers in South Africa, which involve free access
and downloads on the eFundi platform. Thus, I could continue to
use it as usual but with a few additional features and the use of online
assessments to replace class activities.
III. TEACHING METHOD, ASYNCHRONIC OR SYNCHRONIC
Before COVID-19 compelled us to make a complete transition
to the e-learning environment, I have already been using asynchronic and synchronic teaching methods in my everyday teaching
and learning. Nevertheless, I had to make some adjustments after
moving to a distance e-learning environment with no physical contact at all.
Nowadays, I do asynchronic e-learning mostly via announcements, emails, and discussions through the eFundi platform, which
is similar to the Blackboard platform used elsewhere. Students do
not have to be online at the same time as I am, except when we use
the chatroom function that is available twice a week. Although I
could probably continue without additional e-learning material, I
felt that some form of contact with the students was necessary. Since
weekly physical contact was no longer an option, I designed new
shorter PowerPoint presentations with voice-overs and videos, followed by a short weekly online eFundi assessment, whichtheoretically at leastensure that they have to work through the material
to answer the questions. The assessments are marked online, and the
points will count towards the students’ final participation mark for
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the course. This method is similar to the weekly activities we did
during the contact sessions.
I also do a little bit of synchronic e-learning by using the chatroom function on eFundi during the scheduled contact sessions to
keep some measure of normality. At first, I suppose when students
still felt a bit uncertain about the whole e-learning process, my chat
sessions were well attended and questions were asked, but nowadays
they rarely log in for discussions. It is something that I do not force,
because I know that I give them enough guidance to progress
through the course contents at their own pace.
IV. DOCUMENTS AND ASSIGNMENT
The voice-over PowerPoint presentations are uploaded on the
eFundi platform in various formats, including MP4, which has been
reduced significantly by software such as Handbrake to reduce the
data usage for students. I also provide transcripts to those students
who have difficulties with video downloading and inadequate access
to data. Additional documents and videos are also uploaded on
eFundi. As already indicated, the university has agreements with
most of the cell phone providers not to charge students for data when
they download resources from the eFundi platform. Also, an eBook
format of the textbook is available to those students who left their
books in the hostels when the lockdown was announced. Of course,
we need to comply with copyright protection, and we have to keep
this in mind with the uploading of other documents and videos,
which is challenging.
One major obstacle is to redesign the assessment plan for the
course. Since it is a fourth-year course, the ideal is to test the students’ comprehension, application, analysis and synthesis of the
law. Therefore, this course has been designed to develop these skills
in the students. The final examination usually is authentic, and the
students have to draw legal documents based on fictitious legal scenarios, which is followed by an oral presentation in a moot court
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situation. This process could no longer be followed for apparent reasons, and I had to redraft the examination to accommodate online
submissions. However, I retained the method of using real-life scenarios, which the students need to solve in the final assessment.
They have to upload the answers onto the eFundi platform, where I
will access and download them for evaluation.
V. ENGAGING WITH STUDENTS
As already explained, personal contact with students is no longer
possible but that does not mean that we should no longer keep contact with them. Even before lockdown the contact (except when I
was in the classroom) was minimal. Typically, there were only a few
students who would visit me in my office. They are still the ones
that keep contact with me using emails or by posing questions in the
chatroom.
My office phone has been redirected to my cell phone at home,
but I rarely receive calls from students. They prefer emails or
WhatsApp messages. I get the impression that my physical absence
has not been a problem. Still, I would only be able to tell for sure
only after the students have provided feedback in their evaluation
forms, which have not yet been submitted.
VI. PRO AND CONS, TAKEAWAY FOR FUTURE EXPERIENCE
The situation at the North-West University is relatively unique
because of the socio-economic make-up of the students.
Let us begin with the challenges at the university. The delivery
sites of the faculty of law span over three campuses with lecturers at
each campus. The course content and assignments must be fully
aligned between the three campuses. The demographics of the students on the various campuses vary, and their home languages are
different, as are those of the lecturers. Under normal circumstances,
this is challenging, but the online teaching method complicates it
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even further. It is time-consuming to have the course content translated and to develop new materials by lecturers at all three campuses
is no easy feat. I am one of the lucky ones, because my course is
available at the one campus only, and although my materials and
assessments are bilingual, I have to teach only in English, which
makes it more manageable.
Another challenge is the socio-economic status of the students.
The university is mostly residential, which means that the students
are usually on campus, where they have access to the internet and
the library. Many of them are now in lockdown in rural areas where
the internet is not readily accessible, or they are from low-income
families who cannot afford to buy data, which is not available on the
eFundi platform. The university has tried its utmost best to accommodate these students by arranging free data on certain platforms
such as eFundi. It also provides funding to students to buy additional
data and provided iPads to those students without access to any devices that can be used for e-learning. Finally, the university also arranged for hard copies of the materials to be sent to the students
through courier services, where all other options were insufficient.
Of course, new challenges arise every day, but we tackle them
as we go along. Unfortunately, there is no template available for the
unique situation in which we are. I have learned a few lessons
through the whole process, which commenced with the lockdown in
March:
1. Change is not always a bad thing: I had to rethink my teaching
and learning methods and in the process I had to evaluate what
I was doing and what I wanted to achieve with what I am doing.
The uncertainty of everything took me out of my comfort zone,
which is not necessarily a bad thing. I also learned a lot about
myself and what I am capable of doing when I have to dodge the
proverbial curveball.
2. One shoe does not fit all: I had to accommodate the different
needs of the students, and I could no longer assume all of them
had had the same opportunities. I have tried to provide for all
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imaginable scenarios, but I might still have missed a few balls
along the way.
3. Online learning is not a quick fix: I thought that I was already
ready for online teaching and learning because I had already
been using the online platform quite extensively in my course.
This could not be further from the truth. I had to learn new tricks,
which for my generation is no easy feat. I learnt about making
videos, reducing them, creating a YouTube profile to download
voice-over PowerPoint videos for those students preferring to
download from there, how to use software that reduces file sizes,
how to do the narration on PowerPoint presentations, how to embed videos in PowerPoints, and much more. Just when I thought
I was finished, we got instructions to develop hard copies of all
our online teaching and learning activities for those students
who do not have access to the internet; back to square one!
Learning all these skills takes time and effort, and I suddenly
realized that I had no time for anything else.
4. Online teaching and learning require self-discipline and dedication: I must confess that I was looking forward to lockdown.
It felt like the ideal opportunity to focus on research without any
distractions, but quite the opposite happened. Thus far, I have
not been able to do any serious research, except to complete an
odd publication here and there. It takes tremendous effort to
comply with all the deadlines set by the teaching and learning
office, whose priority is the studentsand we cannot blame
them. The livelihood of universities, students and parents depends on our finding workable solutions.
5. It is a challenge to make the switch to e-learning academically productive for students: It took me hours and even days
to design e-learning materials to keep the students academically
productive online. They probably access and digest the e-learning activities in a much shorter time than it took me to create.
They can access the entire world of information while being as-
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sessed, because they will be online and unsupervised. Online assessment should, therefore, not be about their possession of
knowledge but their ability to manipulate it productively or creatively. It means that the lecturer needs to adopt a much less
prominent role in the e-learning process and the way online assessments are being conducted.
And finally, I have come to realize that it does not matter if you
do not know what is going to happen tomorrow. Not everything can
be controlled, and we do not have control over everything. To do
one’s best is good enough.

OPPORTUNITIES OF DISTANCE TEACHING AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN BRITTANY, FRANCE
Michel Séjean ∗
Context. The COVID-19 crisis has challenged the pedagogical
continuity in most universities. French universities have had to comply with an imposed lockdown since March 13, 2020. While the
views expressed in this publication are the author’s own, the following record also draws on an internal report presented on June 12,
2020 at the request of Anne-Sophie Lamblin-Gourdin, Dean of the
Faculty of Law, Economics, and Management of University of
Southern Brittany (UBS, University of Southern Brittany, France).
I. TEACHING METHODS AND ENVIRONMENT
Sharing is caring. Some faculty sent their presentation slides,
spreadsheets and documents of all sorts to their students via email,
or through a post on the intranet environment called “Moodle,” a
platform designed to deliver both distance and hybrid learning, the
∗
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hybrid offer being a mix of classroom and distance learning. A
smaller number of colleagues shared their entire handout in a PDF
format.
Watch me if you can. In addition to the previous methods, some
of our colleagues offered “virtual classes” on live streaming channels, using software devices like Teams (Microsoft), Skype, or the
less-renown interface called “Via.” The “Zoom” interface proved as
handy as controversial on matters of digital sovereignty. Our university has built a reputation in research on cybersecurity. During
the lockdown, the version of Zoom that most French universities
used did not offer end-to-end encryption, and what we lost in security and confidentiality was gained in fluidity and quality of transmissions. Zoom confronted us with our paradoxical behavior: on the
one hand, we wanted to rely on French or European tools, and on
the other hand we often used Zoom because it was simply more efficient in the short term. This controversy remained of low intensity,
as we had to tackle a bigger issue: more often than we thought, students did not have computers at home. Many of our colleagues faced
involuntary absenteeism. Our vice-presidency engaged a series of
efforts to invite local companies to give laptops to our university so
that we could lend them to our less privileged students.
II. DEALING WITH LEARNING OBJECTIVES
Review your learning objectives through the lens of technical
feasibility. We reviewed our learning objectives with the lens of
technical feasibility. We taught what we were able to evaluate, considering the technical difficulties that we faced: a strained bandwidth, a significant number of students that reside in rural areas
where the internet network is weak, and a series of repeated experiences of disconnection in the middle of an online task, not to mention colleagues who simply did not have the ability to have a quiet
room to deliver their classes.
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As a result, we collectively decided to reduce the length of written evaluations. We also promoted “open-book assessments,” which
enabled us to ask more general questions to our students and set the
learning objectives on reflection rather than recitation. Many colleagues have reported that this situation has forced them to clarify
their learning objectives to their students.
III. ENGAGING WITH STUDENTS
Shepherding the students more than engaging with them.
Engaging with students was one of the most difficult challenges,
bringing both frustration when students disappeared from our radars
and satisfaction when we managed to maintain a high-level of participation and commitment to our classes.
We maintained interaction with students using the widest spectrum of tools at hand, from phone conversations to a galaxy of online
chat apps and discussion forums on Moodle. Meanwhile, students
created their own discussion groups on Whatsapp and Facebook.
IV. PRO AND CONS, TAKEAWAY FOR FUTURE EXPERIENCE
Every cloud has a silver lining. On the bright side, students
have expressed a form of generous acknowledgment that they appreciated classroom education, and that they preferred proximity
with their fellow students and with their faculty rather than distance
education. The terms of this appreciation are bound to evolve: online
education may bring powerful proximity, and classroom education
may trigger a feeling of distance between faculty and students.
Another positive outcome lies in our positioning as professors:
we became instructors that accompany students to reach a learning
objective, and we had to walk down the high steps of being lecturing
professors: in this respect, many colleagues report that the crisis has
forced us to a change that we were predominantly reluctant to embrace. As far as I am concerned, I do not imagine going back to the
past positioning of thinking that I am a good professor because I can

2020]

OPPORTUNITIES OF DISTANCE TEACHING

143

talk in front of an audience. Eloquence says more about teaching
style than about learning efficiency. More often than not, online interactions have given me a closer proximity with my students than
classroom interactions. I am now reconsidering my whole method
of teaching through a new lens: I want to focus on how my students
learn instead of on how I teach.
Negative outcomes are numerous, but not overwhelming. First,
redesigning the way we give access to knowledge, and familiarizing
with so many digital tools was much heavier than we were prepared
for. Second, the lens of technical feasibility to assess our students
has led us to rely on quizzes instead of textual reflections, dissertations, or in-depth analyses. While grading was spectacularly faster,
quizzes gave us the impression of failing to raise the general level
of our studentsand in some way, the feeling of failing them. Third,
some colleagues regret having sent their handouts to the students,
and the fear of finding online their years of research is real. And
finally, our payroll system is inadequate to address an activity that
differs from traditional lecturing. Quantifying our workload and rewarding the faculty accordingly are the challenges we now need to
face.
Therefore, our faculty of law has collectively decided that nothing replaces lectures and classroom teaching, especially for freshmen. Most colleagues refuse that their lectures be recorded, but they
all have accepted their online streaming. Our biggest interrogation
is our ability to train new assistants in this hybrid context of classroom and distance teaching.
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ONLINE LEGAL EDUCATION: RECREATING THE MAGIC
OF TEACHING AND LEARNING
Fernando M. Toller ∗
I. DISTANCE LEARNING AND THE PARADOX OF GETTING CLOSER TO
PEOPLE
As early as February 2020, my institution started thinking of becoming a “distance law school,” trying to figure out how to deal with
the prospective closing of campus facilities. When the decision was
finally made to close the campus on March 14, we took the experience of more than three years of using Zoom-equipped classrooms
for special diploma programs and continuing legal education and
convert that into a massive legal education experience.
After more than five months of daily law school classes with
Zoom, our professors and LL.B. and LL.M. students realized several
things. Typically, distance teaching is qualified with modifiers like
virtual, online, by streaming, that imply a subpar experience. But an
intense legal discussion, with participants looking at each other’s
faces, calling them by their names helpfully displayed onscreen, is
not a “virtual” class: it is intensely real. It is not just an online class:
it is a live session. It is not simply unidirectional live streaming: it
is a truly interactive experience. In this sense, the “distance learning” became a very effective way for participants to become closer
to one another. Thus, the online session bore a deep resemblance to
a vivid classroom experience.

∗ Professor of Law and Director of the LL.B. Program, Austral University
Law School, Argentina.
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II. THE SOCRATIC METHOD FACES THE ONLINE TEACHING
CHALLENGE
Three or four years ago, faculty members at our law school expressed serious reservations and engaged in lively debates about distance teaching, due to our specific approach to legal education,
which introduced Anglo-Saxon methodologies—especially an extensive use of the case method—into the legal education of the civil
law system.
At those times, we were faced with questions such as whether it
would be possible to discuss a case with a screen separating the students and the professor, or whether it would be possible to have
group discussions in a digital environment. The clear result of myriads of sessions with different professors was that the online teaching may not be the best setting for engaging in the Socratic method,
but it is absolutely adequate to use a synchronous class to teach and
to learn by discussion. More importantly, in case-method sessions
in which students love to have group discussions, Zoom proved very
useful in managing both small-group and plenary discussions.
In sessions covering theoretical points that favor a “seminarstyle” method with intense, face-to-face dialogue and Socratic questions posed by the professors to the students—sessions in which the
more intense and vivid the exchange, the better—the digital environment proved extraordinarily helpful for teaching and learning.
Our experience, however, was not entirely perfect. It is not surprising that Zoom sessions are far more tiring for teachers and students than in-person sessions, especially when the weeks and
months have accumulated without a clear end. Regarding the prospective challenges of the “new normal,” it is interesting to remark
that in the previous years of online legal education we discovered
that hybrid or bimodal classes, with some students in the classrooms
and others at home, presented specific problems, requiring more
skills and effort from teachers and more sophisticated technology in
the classroom. Nonetheless, we found that it is possible to teach in
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this way, provided participants are conscious of some inevitable
shortcomings.
III. THE ASYNCHRONOUS OR SYNCHRONOUS DILEMMA
At present, some professors use digital platforms for asynchronous activities. For example, several professors are using “flipped
classrooms,” and they substitute most of the class hours with exercises in Moodle, with timers, enigmas, etc., that cover the topics of
the day. This kind of elaborate course is fascinating, and we are fortunate to have professors with the talent to conduct them. On the
other hand, I am conscious that this approach can be very tiring and
time-consuming for instructors, and that it calls for a lot of tech skills
often beyond the competencies of our law professors.
For these reasons, as Director of a LL.B. Program with more
than one hundred professors, several of them with more than forty
years in the classrooms and without previous expertise in streaming
legal education, facing the COVID-19 educational emergence, I preferred something that could be called a “let-it-flow approach.” From
the moment the academic lockdown was announced, I have been
pushing for something easier for most law professors: to use a synchronous system, engaging the students in live debate and inquiry
into the legal problem or legal institution of the day, and avoiding
the masterclass style. The idea has been to recreate the classroom
environment in the online realm.
IV. ONLINE EXAMINATIONS
Some universities decided to continue having classes but to defer examinations until classrooms can reopen. We decided to have
midterm and final examinations online, both in written form and
with oral exams.
For midterm exams, we are using different pedagogical tools,
from multiple choice in Moodle to open-book problem-solving or
case-solving exams. The professor is usually present through Zoom,
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in order to recreate the classroom atmosphere, answer questions and
preserve academic integrity.
Most of our law final examinations are oral exams in front of a
panel, in which the student must answer theoretical questions and
discuss practical situations that the professors present in the moment. We moved these exams into Zoom without difficulties.
In all these cases, the results are quite similar to an exam taken
in a classroom. The students are engaged with the system, and very
happy for the chance to advance in their careers despite the pandemic.
V. ENGAGING WITH STUDENTS
There are myriads of amazing possibilities for legal education
given the new technology. But at the end of the day, the most important thing in education is the magic that happens in good sessions, when a professor looks into the eyes of the students, in-person
or streaming through a screen, and uses an enigma to awaken in
them the desire to learn and to know. While the professor guides the
students with questions through a path toward new knowledge, there
often occurs a luminous moment, in which, together, they uncover a
previously undiscerned reality. Importantly, that process is possible
in synchronic distance teaching, just as in the traditional classroom.
These moments are what define the age-old relationship between
wise and generous masters and curious and enthusiastic disciples.
This empowerment is the very center of all university education.
VI. PROS, CONS, AND TAKEAWAYS FOR THE FUTURE
There is no question that face-to-face, in-person education in the
classroom has a lot of advantages. Time spent together, as professors
and students, engaged in conversation in the same space with a purpose—or, perhaps even better, without one—is an important part of
university life. Cor ad cor loquitur: heart speaks to heart. All of this
has an ineffable uniqueness.
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But distance education has very interesting potential, too. In our
field, during these times, professors and students are saving their
academic year without losing the core of the law school experience:
gaining new legal knowledge and lawyering skills. And that is just
the beginning of a fascinating new world.
After the pandemic, law schools will reopen stronger than before, because they will have more tools and possibilities, combining
the traditional methods and values, with new opportunities and having the chance to open their richness to a wider public, to a global
audience. Many people will become closer than ever to the universities, and this is an extraordinary thing.
We will become better professors after this experience, being
more flexible and more capable. After all this learning and effort,
we will probably be better and more capable human beings as well.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CIVIL LAW OF THE
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I. CODE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS
Law No. 19747 of April 19, 2019 introduced several important
amendments to the Code of Children and Adolescents (Law
No. 17823 of September 7, 2004), especially to articles 117 to 131.
One of these amendments has been the change in the title of Section
I, Chapter IX, now entitled “Protection of Children’s and Adolescents’ Threatened or Violated Rights.”
The amendments, in keeping with the Code’s objective of protecting children and adolescents, provide that:
in administrative and court proceedings for the redress of
threatened or violated rights, every child or adolescent has a
right to: (a) be treated with dignity, considering their age and
their special circumstances; (b) have their opinion, needs,
and expectations taken into particular account, regardless of
their age, with a view to the actual protection of their rights,
* Professor of Law, Universidad de Montevideo (Uruguay). Translated
from Spanish into English by Mariano Vitetta, Research Associate, Center of
Civil Law Studies, Louisiana State University.
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observing the principle of progressive autonomy whenever
appropriate; (c) not to be discriminated against based on sex,
age, ethnic origin, race, sexual orientation, gender identity,
financial or social position, disability, or place of origin or
residence; (d) be assisted and represented by a lawyer; (e) be
always accompanied by an adult whom they trust; (f) have
their private life, identity, and privacy respected; (g) be informed about the progress of the proceedings and the possible outcome; (h) receive full redress for any damage, by ordering the relevant agencies to take certain steps and actions
to make up for the rights violated, including, without limitation, the treatment and rehabilitation of their psychological
and physical health.
These provisions apply to children and adolescents whose rights
provided for in general terms under the Code of Children and Adolescents have been threatened or violated. An example of this approach is article 8, which provides that their opinions and preferences must be considered and that they must be heard in all matters
in which they are involved. Another example is article 15(b), which
provides for the protection against any form of discrimination.
Article 120(2), in its new wording, provides: “Children and adolescents must be represented by lawyers. Children’s and adolescents’ opinions, as well as the opinions of legal representatives or
persons in charge of their care, must be heard, paying special attention to expert reports.”
Also, the new wording of article 119 of the Code provides:
Notwithstanding other responsibilities inherent in the position, counsel for children and adolescents shall: (a) interview
the child or adolescent at the outset of their relationship to
learn about their situation, opinion, and needs; (b) inform
and assist the child or adolescent regarding their rights; (c)
hear and consider the child’s or adolescent’s opinion in all
stages of the proceedings and especially when taking decisions which directly affect their living conditions; (d) file
any legal actions necessary to reestablish, protect, and enforce the rights of the child or adolescent; (e) seek and take
into account the opinions of professionals and other experts
who have knowledge of or have taken part in the matter so
that their representation be consistent with the individual
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characteristics of the child or adolescent and their family and
social context.
Article 120.1 provides for the application of the court-ordered
and administrative measures involving children or adolescents established under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
was adopted in the Uruguayan legal order through Law No. 16137
of September 28, 1990. Article 120.1, in keeping with the Convention, clarifies that the following steps will be especially considered:
(a) preventing discrimination based on gender, age, ethnic or racial
origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, and social and financial
situation; (b) promoting life free from gender-based or domestic violence; (c) ensuring strict respect for the best interests of the child.
Article 120.4 includes a nonexhaustive list of steps that may be
taken to protect beneficiaries: (a) registering the child or adolescent
in the education system; (b) registering the child or adolescent in
other education or recreational institutions; (c) providing healthcare
treatment in coordination with government-funded and private
healthcare services; (d) participating in financial-support programs;
(e) participating in family-support programs with the Uruguayan Institute of Children and Adolescents (in their own family, in the extended family, or in a family that secures their development); (f)
warning parents or other caregivers so that they address or prevent
the threat or violation of the rights of children or adolescents under
their care and demanding the performance of all obligations they
have to protect any affected rights; (g) securing temporary social
and family orientation, support, and follow-up provided by recognized government-sponsored or private programs; (h) providing
outpatient, medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment in government-funded or private healthcare institutions; (i) taking any
other steps which benefit the comprehensive development of the
child or adolescent. Also, it is established that the court must state
the individual or agency responsible for taking those steps, and this
will be supervised by specialized teams created for that purpose.

152

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

In addition to the steps described above, the law provides for the
possibility that the child or adolescent whose right to life or physical
integrity is seriously threatened may be placed under the care of a
family selected by the Uruguayan Institute of Children and Adolescents which undertakes to provide comprehensive protection (article
120.5).
Under article 120.6, all children and adolescents have the right
to voluntarily access 24-hour treatment, care, and accommodation
programs. If the parents or caregivers challenge this, without prejudice to the immediate adoption of measures to protect the right of
children and adolescents, the court with competent jurisdiction will
make the final decision, considering the opinion and the best interests of the child or adolescent.
The institutionalization of children or adolescents against their
will shall only be adopted by court decision based on specialized
opinions by experts in the matter, as the last resort, and whenever it
is essential to preserve the life or integrity of the children and adolescents in question. The maximum institutionalization term shall be
for thirty days, which may be extended for periods of the same duration (article 120.7).
In articles 123 et seq. of the Code of Children and Adolescents,
under the title “Measures Against Sexual Violence and Abuse,” several options are given to protect the beneficiaries of these measures.
Article 123 provides:
Sexual violence or abuse against children or adolescents
means any kind of physical, psychical, or humiliating harm,
damage, or punishment, negligent disregard or treatment,
sexual abuse or exploitation in any modality, occurring
within the family, in an institution, or in the community.
Abuse against children and adolescents also includes their
exposure to gender-based violence against their mothers or
other caregivers.
To protect children and adolescents, all precautionary measures
may be taken which are intended to terminate any sexual-violence
abuse situation, to prevent any possible retaliation or threats, and to
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ensure the permanence of the child or adolescent with family members whenever possible. For that purpose, all measures considered
under article 10 of Law No. 17514 of July 2, 2002, aimed at eliminating all forms of domestic violence, may be taken, especially the
following: (a) restricting the alleged perpetrator from communicating, being in contact with, interviewing, or in any other way accessing the alleged victim or the person who reported the event; (b)
granting the provisional custody of the child or adolescent to close
relatives or any other persons with whom the child or adolescent has
a good relationship; (c) provisionally ordering any persons who are
under the obligation to pay child support to do so; (d) ordering the
removal of the alleged perpetrator from the common home, if any;
(e) referring the matter to the Uruguayan Institute of Children and
Adolescents. Any such measures shall be ordered without prejudice
to any other measures that the court with competent authority on
criminal matters may order with respect to the alleged perpetrator.
II. CHANGES INTRODUCED BY LAW REQUIRING URGENT DEBATE
NO. 19889 OF JULY 9, 2020
The 2019 Uruguay general elections produced a change in presidential administration, as well as the election of new members to
the Senate (31 members) and House of Representatives (99 members). As none of the candidates for president obtained a majority of
votes in the general election held on October 27, 2019, a presidential
runoff took place in November between the two tickets that had received the most votes (i.e., the Frente Amplio, which ran on a leftwing platform and had been in office since 2005, and the Partido
Nacional, which ran on a conservative platform). The Partido
Nacional obtained the majority in the run-off, and Luis Lacalle Pou
became president for the 2020–2025 term. Lacalle now governs with
the legislative support of the so-called Coalición Multicolor (Multicolor Coalition), which includes the Partido Nacional (also known
as Partido Blanco) as well as the Partido Colorado, the Partido
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Cabildo Abierto, the Partido de la Gente, and the Partido Independiente.
After the electoral victory, the president-elect promoted the
adoption of new legislation requiring “urgent debate” by Congress,
with the purpose of streamlining the exercise of his office. That
piece of legislation, passed by both legislative chambers with the
support of the Multicolor Coalition, was ultimately signed into law
on July 9, 2020 as Law No. 19889.
This new law amends many aspects of the Uruguayan legal order: public safety, education, payment systems, among others. Below is a comment of the main changes in the realm of private law,
including adoption, leases, and prescription.
A. Changes in Adoption
The Uruguayan Code of Children and Adolescents (CCT) was
originally enacted as Law No. 17823 of September 7, 2004 and has
been amended multiple times. Changes to the adoption laws had already been introduced by Laws Nos. 18590 of September 18, 2009
and 19092 of June 17, 2013, both of whose provisions had been incorporated into the CCT.
Now, Law No. 19889, in articles 403 to 406, has incorporated
several new amendments relative to the adoption regime.
The Uruguayan adoption system provides for the decisive role
of the Uruguayan Institute of Children and Adolescents (Instituto
del Niño y Adolescente del Uruguay, INAU). This institute was originally tasked with selecting adopting families; any other way of
choosing the adopting family was null.
Law No. 19889 maintains INAU’s important role in the Uruguayan adoption system, but the tendency of the legislation is to
weaken its primacy to some extent. A new article 132.6, CCT, provides that when the court orders the placement of a child or adolescent with a family, whether temporarily or within a definitive separation process, the family shall be selected by INAU. The court may
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only depart from INAU’s selection if it provides reasons, which
must have support from the social workers of the Judiciary, the Forensic Technical Institute, and other experts of the family courts
with specialized jurisdiction. In any such case, the court shall ask
that the INAU experts make a new selection in the same terms and
with the same conditions as in the first case. The most important
change is that the court may now ignore the selection made by the
experts of the INAU Adoptions Department. In this case, the court
shall issue an exceptional decision with grounds when the child or
adolescent is fully integrated in a family, having generated so significant bonds that cutting such bonds would entail a violation of the
child’s or adolescent’s rights, provided that the custody has been
lawful from the beginning, always prioritizing the best interests of
the child or adolescent in the case. In these cases, the court shall
require social and psychological reports from INAU experts or the
Judiciary. After obtaining favorable reports, at the discretion of the
court, the parties may file for the definitive separation and full adoption. The law establishes that if there are any siblings in the same
condition, all efforts shall be made so that they are jointly adopted.
B. Changes in Leases and Evictions
Articles 421 to 459, Law No. 19889 incorporate into the Uruguayan legal order a new regime for the lease of properties destined
to habitation. The key feature of this regime is that the lessee is not
required to present any kind of security for the performance of their
obligations.
The new regime is added to the one established under DecreeLaw No. 14219 of July 4, 1974, which is still in force, albeit with
multiple amendments since its enactment.
The new law also provides that evictions in leases of properties
without any security are subject to substantially shorter terms than
the ones in force in the ordinary regime.
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For the contract to fall within the new Law No. 19889, the following requirements need to be met: (a) the property must be used
primarily for habitation, although it is permissible to manage a small
household business, not exceeding two employees, as well as practice a profession requiring a university degree or similar qualification, on the premises, provided that such activities do not adversely
affect the neighborhood by creating emissions, vibrations, annoying
noise, and do not cause damage to the property, and providing that
the activity complies with any municipal regulations; (b) the contract must not provide for any security of any nature in favor of the
lessor; (c) the contract must be in writing; (d) the contract must expressly include the lease term and price; (e) the parties must express
their will to have the lease agreement regulated by the new law.
If any of the requirements mentioned above are not met, the provisions of Decree-Law No. 14219 continue to apply, and this means,
among other things, longer eviction terms than the contract incorporated in Uruguayan law.
The rent may be agreed upon in national or foreign currency, or
in readjustable or indexed units. Unless agreed otherwise, the rent
shall be due every month and shall be paid within the first ten days
of each month, at the place and according to the payment method
agreed upon by the parties. Under no circumstance shall the lessor
demand more than one month of rent in advance (article 422).
Under article 427, “unless otherwise provided in the lease agreement, the lessee shall be responsible for the payment of any consumption, common expenses, or services incidental to the lease.” If
the lessee fails to pay, and the lessor pays two or more months of
national or municipal taxes, consumption, common expenses or any
other incidental services whose payment has been provided for under the law or the contract as a responsibility of the lessee, the new
debt shall be considered indivisible with the existing rent, and the
lack of payment thereof shall amount to default on the rent itself.
Article 430 establishes a special summary action for eviction
based on the expiration of the term in the contract: “the court shall
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order eviction of the property, within thirty days from the day after
the judgment has been served on the lessee.” Under article 431, the
lessee shall have six business days to file any defenses. Once the
eviction order has become final and unappealable and the lease term
has lapsed, the lessor may at any time demand eviction of the lessee
who has not surrendered the property voluntarily, which eviction
shall become effective within fifteen business days from the service
on the lessee of the eviction order. The eviction term may be extended only once provided that the request for extension be filed at
least two business days before the day set for the eviction and the
lessee provides grounds by authentic means of the existence of an
event of force majeure. Any such extension cannot exceed seven
business days.
If the lessee is evicted for failure to pay, the court shall order the
eviction with a term of six business days, beginning from the day
following the day the judgment was served on the lessee (article
439). After the judgment ordering the eviction becomes final, the
eviction shall be effective after five business days since the date
when the judgment has been served on the lessee (article 442). In
that case, an extension of the eviction may also be prayed for, which
may only be granted for a term not to exceed five days.
C. Changes in Prescription
From the beginning, Uruguayan law has followed the trend in
other legal systems and identified two kinds of acquisitive prescription according to their defining elements: (a) “ordinary” or “abbreviated” prescription, and (b) “extraordinary” or “extended” prescription.
Ordinary prescription requires possession, which is the structural element in any case of acquisitive prescription, along with
good faith and just title. When these elements are present, prescriptive terms are shorter (before Law No. 19889, three years were
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required for movables and ten or twenty for immovables, depending
on whether the parties were present or absent persons).
Extraordinary prescription does not require good faith or just title, so the term to acquire ownership by prescription is extended (before the new law: six years for movables and thirty years for immovables).
Law No. 19889 did not modify the required terms or conditions
for acquiring ownership over movables by prescription, but many
changes were introduced in connection with immovables. These
were the main changes:
(a) The possession term for “extraordinary” or “extended” prescription was reduced from 30 to 20 years (current wording of article
1211, Civil Code, as amended by article 463, Law No. 19889).
(b) The possession term required to acquire with just title and in
good faith for the “ordinary” or “abbreviated” prescription is now
10 years (current article 1204, Civil Code). Based on this change,
the Uruguayan legal order no longer distinguishes between present
and absent persons for the purposes of prescription. The old system
considered whether the person against whom the prescription was
asserted was located in the country or was abroad. As a result, article
1205, distinguishing present and absent persons, was repealed.
(c) Article 467, Law No. 19889 includes a temporary provision
stating that any prescription actions which had been brought by the
date when the law became effective would follow the provisions of
the new law. It is also provided, however, that any prescriptions
which are running which, due to the reductions established by the
law, have run or shall run before the two-year term since the date
stated in the section above, shall only run after such term finishes.
Another change was the amendment of article 1206, Civil Code,
regarding “accession” of possessions: “The current possessor may
complete the term needed for prescription, adding to their possession the possession of the previous owner of that thing, by universal
or particular title, onerously, provided that both have started to possess in good faith.” That provision was a source of doubt for
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doctrinal authors, specifically regarding whether or not it was applicable only to the abbreviated prescription or also to the extended
prescription. A third section was added to the article, according to
which that provision is only applicable to ordinary or abbreviated
prescription, and not extraordinary or extended prescription. Therefore, to cumulate the possessions of the multiple possessors to acquire ownership by prescription, in the case of extended acquisitive
prescription, there is no need for all to start possessing in good faith,
i.e., with the belief that the person who transmits the possession is
the owner.
Other changes include amendments to articles 1151, 1215, and
1216 of the Civil Code.
Under the new article 1150(1), “The action to demand the partition of the inheritance expires after twenty years against the coheir
who has possessed the entirety or part of the inheritance in their own
name or as the sole owner.” It is clear that the provision, which used
to require a thirty-year term, now allows a party to ask for the partition of an inheritance (even if the provision applies to any kind of
indivision) up and until the time when the coheir who has inheritance property acquires such property by prescription. The logic underlying the reduction of the term is clear: as the terms for extended
prescription of immovables were reduced, the term to request the
partition was reduced accordingly.
Under the new article 1215, Civil Code, “Any real action prescribes after twenty years,” which significantly reduces the term, as
the term used to be thirty years. However, the provision makes an
express exception from that term with respect to servitudes, which
are extinguished by nonuse for ten years (article 643(2)) and when
acquisitive prescription has run, in which the action to recover the
possession of the thing from which the owner was deprived, ceases
after the term has run for the prescription of the thing (articles 1204,
1212, and 1214, Civil Code).
At the same time, the new wording of article 1216(1), in connection with the extinctive prescription of credit rights, establishes
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that “Any personal action for a debt due prescribes after ten years,
without prejudice to any specific provisions of special laws.” This
provision reduces by a half the twenty-year term that Uruguayan law
used to require.
D. Other Amendments to the Civil Code
Law No. 19889 introduced two changes in the law of succession.
First, article 809(9), Civil Code, was repealed. This section had provided that “persons who are not domiciled in the Department” could
serve as witnesses to a testament. As the article did not detail
whether the domicile referred to was that of the testator or the place
where the testament was executed, the choice was made to repeal
the provision.
Article 462, Law No. 19889 amends article 1075, Civil Code,
which is about the express renunciation of the inheritance. The provision stated: “An inheritance must be renounced by notarial record
executed by a civil-law notary of the domicile of the renouncing
party or of the deceased.” The new wording no longer requires that
the notarial record be executed by a civil-law notary of any of these
domiciles, so the record may be executed by any civil-law notary of
the country, regardless of their domicile.
Article 1561 was also amended by the new law—now, the article
adopts a unanimous position in the doctrine, which embraced an interpretation contrary to the provisions of the legal text. The provision on the absolute nullity established that “absolute nullity cannot
be cured by the parties’ ratification or by a lapse of less than thirty
years.” However, commentators believed that the nullity could not
be cured even by a lapse of thirty years or more, although during
that term the thing that was intended to be acquired through an absolutely null contract could still be acquired through acquisitive prescription. As a consequence of the changes made, the last part of
article 1561, Civil Code, now provides that absolute nullity “cannot
be cured.”
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The Center of Civil Law Studies (CCLS) at the Louisiana State
University Paul M. Hebert Law Center is pleased to announce the
continuation of the Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project. This
ambitious effort to make the Civil Code available in other languages
started with the translation into French, completed in 2016. 1 A translation into Spanish has been contemplated since the inception of the
project in 2009. Now, four years after the completion of the French
translation, the Spanish translation is in full swing.
I. WHY TRANSLATE THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE INTO SPANISH?
Spanish is the official or national language of twenty-one countries and it is estimated that more than 580 million people speak
Spanish as a native, second, or foreign language. 2 At the same time,
the Louisiana Civil Code is known for having been influential in

* Research Associate, Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana State University; M.A. in English-Spanish Legal Translation and LL.B. (University of Buenos Aires), LL.M. (Louisiana State University).
1. This translation is accessible for free at https://perma.cc/7AHF-N4GG.
The print version was published as CODE CIVIL DE LOUISIANE. ÉDITION BILINGUE
(Olivier Moréteau ed., Société de legislation comparée 2017). Also, see Olivier
Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: An Introduction, 5 J.
CIV. L. STUD. 97 (2012).
2. INSTITUTO CERVANTES, EL ESPAÑOL: UNA LENGUA VIVA. INFORME 2019,
available at https://perma.cc/LE8J-AD6L.
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Latin American codification. 3 The promoters of this project believe
that if the Code is available in Spanish, it will be more easily available for scholars from Latin America and Spain who cannot read
English. Therefore, the Code in Spanish will be a good resource to
inform future amendments in these countries, as well as a good
showcase for Louisiana law in the rest of the world. Last but not
least, translating the Code into Spanish also pays homage to the
Spanish legacy in Louisiana. 4
As Spanish is a language spoken in so many countries, there is
wide linguistic variation depending on the country where it is used.
These differences, which are significant but which in no way hinder
understanding among speakers of the different countries, also exist
in the realm of the law. The goal in this translation is to reduce those
differences to the minimum. While using a Spanish that satisfies
every single Spanish-speaking reader is a chimera, efforts will be
made to use what some call international or neutral Spanish, though
the translation may end up having more of a Latin American, rather
than Iberian, sound.
II. THE TRANSLATION TEAM
The Louisiana Civil Code Spanish Translation team is spearheaded by Olivier Moréteau, CCLS Director. Mariano Vitetta, an
LSU LL.M. 2020 graduate and presently CCLS Research Associate,
is the translator in charge, with the support of María Natalia Rezzonico as assistant translator and reviser.
As in the French translation, this project includes a Validation
Committee, made up by distinguished experts in the civil law, codification, and legal translation. As of the date of publication of this
note, these are the members of the Validation Committee (in alphabetical order): Jimena Andino Dorato (Montreal, Canada),
3. See, e.g., Agustín Parise, Influence of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825
in Latin-American Codification Movements: The References to Louisiana Provisions in the Argentine Civil Code of 1871, 35 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 33 (2020).
4. Louisiana was Spanish for 31 years, from 1769 until 1800.
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Francisco Alterini (Buenos Aires, Argentina), Ignacio Alterini
(Buenos Aires, Argentina), Ricardo Chiesa (Buenos Aires, Argentina), Alejandro Garro (New York, New York), Aniceto Masferrer
(Valencia, Spain), Luis Muñiz Argüelles (San Juan, Puerto Rico),
Agustín Parise (Maastricht, Netherlands), Julio César Rivera (Buenos Aires, Argentina), Andrés Sánchez Herrero (Rosario, Argentina), and Lécia Vicente (Baton Rouge, Louisiana).
These experts have the possibility of providing feedback before
publication and also help by providing assistance upon request when
the translation team stumbles upon a particular problem. The involvement of these experts also helps to give prestige to the project
and hopefully they will be instrumental in making the Spanish translation reach a larger audience.
III. THE TRANSLATION PROCESS
Publishing extracts of the translation in the Journal of Civil Law
Studies is part of the overall plan to make the Spanish translation
visible in the academic community. The natural destination of the
Spanish translation will be the dedicated website Louisiana Civil
Code Online (LCCO) curated by the CCLS: https://lcco.law.lsu
.edu/. There, the translation will remain available for free, together
with the English and French versions, for everybody, and like the
French and English versions, will be updated regularly to reflect future legislative changes. Hopefully, in the future the CCLS may publish a print English-Spanish edition of the Louisiana Civil Code and,
resources permitting, a trilingual edition.
The CCLS team hopes that by making the translation available
to the public in this publication and online, comments will be received from readers from all over the world. The team is committed
to giving serious thought to any feedback it receives, so that just like
its French predecessor, the Spanish translation may be improved
with the help of readers.

LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
CÓDIGO CIVIL DE LUISIANA
PRELIMINARY TITLE

TÍTULO PRELIMINAR

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
[Acts 1987, No. 124, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1988.]

CAPÍTULO 1. PRINCIPIOS
GENERALES
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 124 de 1987, vigente desde el 1 de enero de 1988.]

Art. 1. The sources of law are legislation and custom.

Art. 1. Las fuentes del derecho son
la ley y la costumbre.

Art. 2. Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will.

Art. 2. La ley es la expresión formal de la voluntad legislativa.

Art. 3. Custom results from practice repeated for a long time and
generally accepted as having acquired the force of law. Custom
may not abrogate legislation.

Art. 3. La costumbre surge de la
práctica reiterada durante un período prolongado y con la aceptación generalizada de que adquirió
fuerza de ley. La costumbre no
puede derogar la ley.

Art. 4. When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from
legislation or custom, the court is
bound to proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is
made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages.

Art. 4. Cuando no sea posible extraer una regla para una situación
particular a partir de la ley o la
costumbre, el juez procederá conforme a la equidad. Para decidir
conforme a la equidad, se recurrirá a la justicia, a la razón y a los
usos vigentes.

Art. 5. No one may avail himself of
ignorance of the law.

Art. 5. Nadie puede alegar la ignorancia de la ley.

Art. 6. In the absence of contrary
legislative expression, substantive
laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative
expression to the contrary.

Art. 6. A falta de expresión legislativa en contrario, las leyes de fondo solo rigen para el futuro. Las
leyes procesales e interpretativas
se aplican tanto para el futuro como retroactivamente, a menos que
medie expresión legislativa en
contrario.
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Art. 7. Persons may not by their
juridical acts derogate from laws
enacted for the protection of the
public interest. Any act in derogation of such laws is an absolute
nullity.

Art. 7. Las personas no pueden,
mediante sus actos jurídicos, contradecir lo dispuesto en las leyes
sancionadas con el objetivo de
proteger el orden público. Todo
acto contrario a tales leyes está
viciado de nulidad absoluta.

Art. 8. Laws are repealed, either
entirely or partially, by other laws.
A repeal may be express or implied. It is express when it is literally declared by a subsequent law.
It is implied when the new law
contains provisions that are contrary to, or irreconcilable with, those
of the former law.
The repeal of a repealing law does
not revive the first law.

Art. 8. Las leyes son derogadas,
total o parcialmente, por otras
leyes.
La derogación puede ser expresa o
tácita. Es expresa cuando una ley
posterior la declara literalmente.
Es tácita cuando la nueva ley contiene disposiciones que son contrarias a las de la ley anterior o
que son incompatibles con ella.
La derogación de una ley derogatoria no restablece la vigencia de
la ley derogada en primer término.

CHAPTER 2. INTERPRETATION
OF LAWS
[Acts 1987, No. 124, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1988.]

CAPÍTULO 2. DE LA INTERPRETACIÓN DE LAS LEYES
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 124 de 1987, vigente desde el 1 de enero de 1988.]

Art. 9. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does
not lead to absurd consequences,
the law shall be applied as written
and no further interpretation may
be made in search of the intent of
the legislature.

Art. 9. Cuando una ley es clara e
inequívoca y su aplicación no acarrea consecuencias absurdas, se
aplicará tal como está escrita y no
se la interpretará en busca de la
intención del legislador.

Art. 10. When the language of the
law is susceptible of different
meanings, it must be interpreted as
having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.

Art. 10. Cuando la letra de la ley
es susceptible de diferentes significados, debe interpretarse conforme al significado que mejor coincida con la finalidad de la ley.

Art. 11. The words of a law must
be given their generally prevailing
meaning.
Words of art and technical terms

Art. 11. Las palabras de la ley deben interpretarse conforme a su
significado más generalizado.
Los términos especializados y los
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must be given their technical mean- vocablos técnicos deben interpreing when the law involves a techtarse conforme a su significado
nical matter.
técnico cuando la ley se refiera a
un asunto de ese carácter.
Art. 12. When the words of a law
are ambiguous, their meaning must
be sought by examining the context
in which they occur and the text of
the law as a whole.

Art. 12. Cuando las palabras de
una ley son ambiguas, su significado debe buscarse analizando el
contexto en que se presenten y el
texto de la ley en su conjunto.

Art. 13. Laws on the same subject
matter must be interpreted in reference to each other.

Art. 13. Las leyes que versan sobre
la misma materia deben interpretarse en función de su relación
entre sí.

CHAPTER 3. CONFLICT OF
LAWS
[Acts 1991, No. 923, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1992.]

CAPÍTULO 3. DE LOS
CONFLICTOS DE LEYES
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 923 de 1991, vigente desde el 1 de enero de 1992.]

Art. 14. Unless otherwise expressly
provided by the law of this state,
cases having contacts with other
states are governed by the law selected in accordance with the provisions of Book IV of this Code.

Art. 14. A menos que la ley de este
estado disponga lo contrario expresamente, los asuntos que tengan contactos con otros estados se
regirán por la ley elegida de
acuerdo con las disposiciones del
Libro IV de este Código.

Arts. 15-23. [Blank.]

Arts. 15-23. [En blanco.]

BOOK I. OF PERSONS

LIBRO I. DE LAS PERSONAS

TITLE I. NATURAL AND JURIDICAL PERSONS
[Acts 1987, No. 125, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1988.]

TÍTULO I. DE LAS PERSONAS
FÍSICAS Y JURÍDICAS
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 125 de 1987, vigente desde el 1 de enero de 1988.]

Art. 24. There are two kinds of persons: natural persons and juridical
persons.
A natural person is a human being.
A juridical person is an entity to
which the law attributes personality, such as a corporation or a part-

Art. 24. Existen dos tipos de personas: las personas físicas y las
personas jurídicas.
Son personas físicas todos los seres humanos. Son personas jurídicas los entes a los que la ley confiere personalidad, tales como las
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nership. The personality of a juridical person is distinct from that of
its members.

sociedades de capital o las sociedades de personas. La personalidad de la persona jurídica es distinta de la de cada uno de sus
miembros.

Art. 25. Natural personality commences from the moment of live
birth and terminates at death.

Art. 25. La existencia de la persona física comienza en momento del
nacimiento con vida y finaliza con
la muerte.

Art. 26. An unborn child shall be
considered as a natural person for
whatever relates to its interests
from the moment of conception. If
the child is born dead, it shall be
considered never to have existed as
a person, except for purposes of
actions resulting from its wrongful
death.

Art. 26. El niño por nacer se considerará persona física a los efectos de la preservación de sus intereses desde el momento de la
concepción. Si el niño naciera
muerto, se considerará que nunca
existió como persona, excepto a
efectos de las acciones derivadas
de su muerte por acto ilícito.

Art. 27. All natural persons enjoy
general legal capacity to have
rights and duties.

Art. 27. Todas las personas físicas
tienen capacidad de derecho general para adquirir derechos y contraer obligaciones.

Art. 28. A natural person who has
reached majority has capacity to
make all sorts of juridical acts, unless otherwise provided by legislation.

Art. 28. La persona física que alcanza la mayoría de edad tiene
capacidad para celebrar cualquier
tipo de acto jurídico, salvo disposición legislativa en contrario.

Art. 29. Majority is attained upon
reaching the age of eighteen years.

Art. 29. La mayoría de edad se
alcanza al cumplir los dieciocho
años.

Art. 30. When a person has disappeared under circumstances such
that his death seems certain, his
death is considered to have been
established even though his body
has not been found.

Art. 30. Cuando una persona haya
desaparecido en circunstancias
que permitan presumir con certeza
su muerte, se la considerará fallecida aunque no se haya encontrado el cuerpo.

Art. 31. One claiming a right that
has accrued to another person is

Art. 31. Quien alegue para sí un
derecho de otro debe demostrar
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bound to prove that such person
existed at the time when the right
accrued.

que tal persona existía al momento
en que surgió el derecho.

Arts. 32-35. [Blank.]

Arts. 32-35. [En blanco.]

Art. 36. [Repealed by Acts 1974,
No. 134, §1.]

Art. 36. [Derogado por sec. 1, ley
n.o 134 de 1974.]

Art. 37. [Blank.]

Art. 37. [En blanco.]

TITLE II. DOMICILE
[Acts 2008, No. 801, §1; Acts
2012, No. 713, §2, eff. Aug. 1,
2012.]

TÍTULO II. DEL DOMICILIO
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 801 de 2008;
sec. 2, ley n.o 713 de 2012, vigente
desde el 1 de agosto de 2012.]

Art. 38. The domicile of a natural
person is the place of his habitual
residence. The domicile of a juridical person may be either the state
of its formation or the state of its
principal place of business, whichever is most pertinent to the particular issue, unless otherwise specifically provided by law.

Art. 38. El domicilio de una persona física es su lugar de residencia
habitual. El domicilio de una persona jurídica puede ser el estado
en que fue constituida o el estado
donde se encuentre el asiento
principal de sus negocios, según
cual sea más pertinente respecto
del asunto en cuestión, a menos
que la ley específicamente disponga otra cosa.

Art. 39. A natural person may reside in several places but may not
have more than one domicile. In
the absence of habitual residence,
any place of residence may be considered one's domicile at the option
of persons whose interests are affected.

Art. 39. La persona física puede
residir en varios lugares, pero no
puede tener más de un domicilio. A
falta de lugar de residencia habitual, cualquier lugar de residencia
podrá considerarse el domicilio de
una persona, a elección de las personas cuyos intereses se vean afectados.

Art. 40. Spouses may have either a
common domicile or separate domiciles.

Art. 40. Los cónyuges pueden tener
un domicilio común o bien domicilios diferentes.

Art. 41. The domicile of an unemancipated minor is that of the
parent or parents with whom the

Art. 41. El domicilio de un menor
no emancipado es el del progenitor o los progenitores con quienes
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minor usually resides. If the minor
has been placed by court order under the legal authority of a parent
or other person, the domicile of
that person is the domicile of the
minor, unless the court directs otherwise.
The domicile of an unemancipated
minor under tutorship is that of his
tutor. In case of joint tutorship, the
domicile of the minor is that of the
tutor with whom the minor usually
resides, unless the court directs
otherwise.

el menor resida habitualmente. Si
el menor se encuentra bajo la autoridad de uno de los progenitores
o de otra persona por orden judicial, el domicilio de esa persona es
el del menor, a menos que el juez
ordene otra cosa.
El domicilio de un menor no
emancipado bajo tutela es el de su
tutor. En caso de tutela conjunta,
el domicilio del menor es el del
tutor con quien el menor reside
habitualmente, a menos que el juez
ordene otra cosa.

Art. 42. The domicile of a full interdict is that of the curator. A limited interdict retains his domicile,
unless otherwise provided in the
judgment of interdiction.

Art. 42. El domicilio de un interdicto pleno es el del curador. El
interdicto parcial conserva su domicilio, a menos que la sentencia
de interdicción disponga de otro
modo.

Art. 43. The domicile of a person
under continued or permanent tutorship is that of his tutor.

Art. 43. El domicilio de una persona sujeta a tutela continua o permanente es el de su tutor.

Art. 44. Domicile is maintained
until acquisition of a new domicile.
A natural person changes domicile
when he moves his residence to
another location with the intent to
make that location his habitual residence.

Art. 44. El domicilio se conserva
hasta que se adquiera uno nuevo.
El domicilio de la persona física
cambia cuando la persona traslada su residencia a otro lugar con
la intención de que este se convierta en su residencia habitual.

Art. 45. Proof of one’s intent to
establish or change domicile depends on the circumstances. A
sworn declaration of intent recorded in the parishes from which and
to which he intends to move may
be considered as evidence of intent.

Art. 45. La prueba de la intención
de establecer o cambiar el domicilio depende de las circunstancias.
Podrá considerarse prueba de tal
intención una declaración jurada
registrada en las parroquias 1 desde la cual y hacia la cual la persona pretende trasladarse.

1. N. de T.: En Luisiana se denomina parish (parroquia) la demarcación
territorial que en los demás estados suele denominarse county (condado).
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Art. 46. A person holding a temporary position away from his domicile retains his domicile unless he
demonstrates a contrary intent.

Art. 46. La persona que posee un
cargo provisorio fuera de su domicilio conserva su domicilio a menos que demuestre intención en
contrario.

TITLE III. ABSENT PERSONS

TÍTULO III. DE LOS AUSENTES

CHAPTER 1. CURATORSHIP OF
THE PROPERTY OF ABSENT
PERSONS
[Acts 1990, No. 989, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1991.]

CAPÍTULO 1. DE LA CURATELA
DE LOS BIENES DE LOS
AUSENTES
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 989 de 1990, vigente desde el 1 de enero de 1991.]

Art. 47. An absent person is one
who has no representative in this
state and whose whereabouts are
not known and cannot be ascertained by diligent effort.
When an absent person owns property in this state, the court may,
upon petition of any interested party and a showing of necessity, appoint a curator to manage the property of the absent person.

Art. 47. Es ausente quien no tiene
representante en este estado y cuyo paradero es desconocido y no
puede determinarse mediante esfuerzos diligentes.
Cuando el ausente es propietario
de bienes ubicados en este estado,
el juez puede, a solicitud de parte
interesada y previa demostración
de la necesidad, designar a un curador para administrar sus bienes.

Art. 48. The curator has power of
administration and disposition over
the property of the absent person as
provided by legislation.
When the absent person is a spouse
in community, the curatorship is
limited to his separate property.

Art. 48. El curador está facultado
para administrar y disponer de los
bienes del ausente conforme a lo
dispuesto por la ley.
Cuando el ausente es un cónyuge
sujeto al régimen de la comunidad
de ganancias, la curatela solo se
extiende sobre sus bienes propios.

Art. 49. The establishment of the
curatorship does not deprive the
absent person of his capacity to
make juridical acts. Nevertheless,
his acts of disposition of immovable property are not effective towards third persons and the curator
unless filed for registry in the public records of the parish in which

Art. 49. El establecimiento de la
curatela no priva al ausente de su
capacidad para realizar actos jurídicos. Sin embargo, sus actos de
disposición de inmuebles serán
inoponibles frente a terceros y al
curador a menos que se presenten
para su inscripción en el registro
público de la parroquia en la que
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the immovable property is located.

se encuentre situado el inmueble.

Art. 50. The curatorship of the
property of the absent person terminates of right when he appoints a
person to represent him in this
state, when his whereabouts become known, or when he dies.

Art. 50. La curatela sobre los bienes del ausente cesa de pleno derecho cuando el ausente designa a
una persona para representarlo en
este estado, cuando se conoce su
paradero o cuando muere.

Art. 51. The curatorship of the
property of the absent person also
terminates when a judgment of
declaration of death is rendered.
When an absent person has no
known heirs and is presumed dead,
it shall be the duty of the curator to
initiate proceedings for a declaration of death.

Art. 51. La curatela sobre los bienes del ausente también cesa
cuando se dicta sentencia de declaración de fallecimiento.
Cuando el ausente no tenga herederos conocidos y se presuma fallecido, será deber del curador
iniciar el proceso de declaración
de fallecimiento.

Art. 52. Upon termination of the
curatorship, the curator is bound to
account for his management and to
restore the property to the formerly
absent person or to his successors.

Art. 52. Terminada la curatela, el
curador debe rendir cuentas de su
administración y restituir los bienes a la persona que estaba ausente o a sus sucesores.

Art. 53. When the curator acquires
knowledge of the termination of his
curatorship, he is bound to file a
notice in the curatorship proceeding that his authority to manage the
property of the formerly absent
person has ceased.
Acts of administration or disposition made by the curator after the
curatorship has terminated are valid toward third persons unless notice of the termination of the curatorship has been filed in the curatorship proceeding.

Art. 53. Cuando el curador tome
conocimiento de la finalización de
su curatela, estará obligado a informar en el expediente de la curatela que cesó su facultad para administrar los bienes de la persona
que estaba ausente.
Los actos de administración o disposición realizados por el curador
después de finalizada la curatela
son oponibles frente a terceros a
menos que se haya informado el
cese de la curatela en el expediente.

CHAPTER 2. DECLARATION
OF DEATH
[Acts 1990, No. 989, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1991; Acts 2006, No. 258, §1.]

CAPÍTULO 2. DE LA DECLARACIÓN DE FALLECIMIENTO
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 989 de 1990,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1991; sec. 1, ley n.o 258 de 2006.]
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Art. 54. One who has been an absent person for five years is presumed to be dead. If the absence
commenced between August 26,
2005, and September 30, 2005, and
was related to or caused by Hurricane Katrina or Rita, the absent
person who is not currently
charged with an offense that is defined as a felony under the laws of
the state of Louisiana or the United
States of America shall be presumed dead after the passage of
two years. Upon petition by an interested party, the court shall render judgment declaring the death of
the absent person and shall determine the date on which the absence
commenced and the date of death.

Art. 54. Se presume fallecida la
persona que ha estado ausente
durante cinco años. Si la ausencia
hubiera comenzado entre el 26 de
agosto de 2005 y el 30 de septiembre 2005 y estuviera relacionada
con los huracanes Katrina o Rita o
hubiera sido causada por ellos, se
presumirá fallecido después de dos
años el ausente que actualmente
no esté acusado de un delito grave
conforme a la legislación del estado de Luisiana o de los Estados
Unidos de América. A solicitud de
parte interesada, el juez dictará
sentencia en la que declare el fallecimiento del ausente y determinará la fecha en que comenzó la
ausencia y la fecha de la muerte.

Art. 55. The succession of the person declared dead shall be opened
as of the date of death fixed in the
judgment, and his estate shall devolve in accordance with the law of
successions.

Art. 55. La sucesión de la persona
declarada fallecida se abrirá a
partir de la fecha de fallecimiento
determinada en la sentencia, y el
acervo hereditario se transmitirá
conforme a las disposiciones del
derecho sucesorio.

Art. 56. If there is clear and convincing new evidence establishing
a date of death other than that determined in the judgment of declaration of death, the judgment shall
be amended accordingly.
Persons previously recognized as
successors are bound to restore the
estate to the new successors but
may keep the fruits they have gathered.

Art. 56. Si hubiera pruebas claras
y convincentes de una fecha de
fallecimiento diferente de la determinada en la sentencia de declaración de fallecimiento, se modificará la sentencia en consecuencia.
Quienes hubieran sido reconocidos previamente como sucesores
estarán obligados a restituir el
acervo hereditario a los nuevos
sucesores, pero podrán conservar
los frutos que hubieran percibido.

Art. 57. If a person who has been
declared dead reappears, he shall

Art. 57. Si reapareciera la persona
declarada fallecida, tendrá dere-
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be entitled to recover his property
that still exists in the condition in
which it is found from those who
took it as his successors or from
their transferees by gratuitous title.
He may also recover the net proceeds of things alienated and for
the diminution of the value of
things that has resulted from their
encumbrance.

cho a recuperar los bienes que aún
existan, en la condición en que se
encuentren, de aquellos que los
hubieran tomado en carácter de
sucesores o de quienes los hubieran adquirido de estos a título gratuito. También podrá recuperar el
producido neto de las cosas enajenadas y el monto correspondiente
a la disminución del valor de las
cosas que se hubiera producido a
consecuencia de su gravamen.

Art. 58. A person who is presumed
to be dead or who has been declared dead at a time a succession
would have been opened in his favor cannot be a successor. The estate of the deceased devolves as if
that person were dead at the time of
the opening of the succession.

Art. 58. No podrá ser sucesora la
persona que se presume fallecida o
cuyo fallecimiento se ha declarado
al momento en que se hubiera
abierto la sucesión a su favor. El
acervo hereditario del causante se
transmitirá como si esa persona
estuviera fallecida al momento de
la apertura de la sucesión.

Art. 59. If the person who is presumed to be dead or who has been
declared dead reappears, he shall
be entitled to recover his inheritance in the condition in which it
is found from those who succeeded
in his default and from their transferees by gratuitous title. He may
also recover the net proceeds of
things alienated and for the diminution of the value of things that has
resulted from their encumbrance.

Art. 59. Si reapareciera la persona
que se presume fallecida o cuyo
fallecimiento se ha declarado, tendrá derecho a recuperar su herencia, en la condición en que se encuentre, de quienes hubieran sucedido en su ausencia y de sus respectivos adquirentes a título gratuito. También podrá recuperar el
producido neto de las cosas enajenadas y el monto correspondiente
a la disminución del valor de las
cosas que se hubiera producido a
consecuencia de su gravamen.

Arts. 60-85. [Repealed by Acts
1990, No. 989, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
1991.]

Arts. 60-85. [Derogados por
sec. 1, ley n.o 989 de 1990, vigente
desde el 1 de enero de 1991.]
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I. BACKGROUND
Is it fair that a husband with a multi-million-dollar judgment
debt claim uses a matrimonial regime change to avoid payment? 1 As
the number of Americans pursuing the age-old tradition of marriage
continues to decline, it is important to take note of how modern laws,
such as Louisiana’s restrictions on post-matrimonial agreements,
may negatively affect the public’s view of marriage. 2 A Louisiana
husband, in a marriage with a community property regime, found
himself obligated to repay a multi-million dollar debt in Radcliffe v.
Burger. 3 In order to avoid the debt judgment, which was rendered
in his name only, Ronald Burger quickly transferred all of his assets
* J.D. candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. This case note was prepared under the tutelage of Prof. Oliver Moréteau.
1. Radcliffe 10 L.L.C. v. Burger, 2016-0768 (La. 1/25/17); 219 So. 3d 296.
2. Christopher Kirt Ulfers, Is Postmarital Agreement in Your Best Interest?
Why Louisiana Civil Code Article 2329 Should Let You Decide, 15 LA. L. REV.
1399 (2015).
3. Radcliffe, 219 So. 3d at 305.
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into his wife’s name before executing a post-matrimonial agreement
which created a separate property regime in the couple’s marriage. 4
The couple received court approval to terminate their community
property regime under Louisiana Civil Code article 2329. 5 The postmatrimonial agreement effectively made Mr. Burger insolvent; the
creditor could not seize the property because it legally belonged only
to Mrs. Burger. In response, Radcliffe 10, LLC (the creditor) filed a
revocatory action under Louisiana Civil Code article 2036 against
judgment debtor Ronald Burger and his wife. 6 Radcliffe sought to
have the couple’s post-matrimonial agreement, in which the Burgers’ community property regime was terminated, declared null.
The post-matrimonial agreement proceedings and approval of
the Burger’s community property regime did not occur until after
Radcliffe delivered a debt judgment of over 3.4 million dollars
against Mr. Burger. 7 In fact, the Burgers admitted to terminating the
community property regime with the specific intent to evade the
“multi-million dollar judgment rendered against Mr. Burger in favor
of the plaintiff.” 8 In response, Radcliffe filed a motion for summary
judgment in its revocatory action, arguing the Burgers’ separate
property regime approval was void “for failure to comply with the
form requirements of art. 2329.” 9
Radcliffe argued the action was void because the Burgers failed
to properly file the required joint action. 10 The pertinent portion of
Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 provides as follows:
Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement that modifies or terminates a matrimonial regime during marriage only
upon joint petition and a finding by the court that this serves
their best interests and they understand the governing principles and rules. They may, however, subject themselves to
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 296.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id. at 305.
Id.
Id.
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the legal regime by a matrimonial agreement at any time
without court approval. 11
This article explicitly requires a joint petition by spouses to terminate a matrimonial regime, such as community property which is
at issue in the immediate case. The trial court found the issue of the
joint petition did not warrant a motion for summary judgment even
though the Burgers’ art. 2329 proceeding erroneously named Mrs.
Burger as a defendant instead of a joint petitioner. 12
During trial, Radcliffe renewed its request for summary judgment on the basis that the separate property judgment was a “nullity
and the matrimonial agreement is void ab initio for failure to strictly
comply with the requirements of art. 2329.” 13 The trial court found
in favor of Radcliffe, revoked the agreement ab initio, and found the
separate property regime null and void, having no legal effect. The
Burgers appealed. On appeal, a panel of ten judges split “on the issue
of whether the Burgers’ failure to file a joint petition as required by
La. C.C. art. 2329 resulted in an absolutely null or relatively null
matrimonial agreement and judgment approving the matrimonial
agreement.” 14 As a result, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted writ
to determine that issue.
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Louisiana Supreme Court delivered two holdings in this
case. First, “failure by the debtor and spouse to file [a] joint petition
to terminate matrimonial agreement rendered agreement relatively
null as opposed to absolutely null.” 15 Therefore, the creditors were
unable to challenge the validity of the termination agreement. The
11. Id. at 299.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 298. Ab initio is Latin for “from the beginning.” Therefore, Radcliffe argued that the Burgers’ petition for a separate property regime was void
from the beginning for failure to comply with the form requirements of Louisiana
Civil Code art. 2329.
14. Radcliffe 10, L.L.C. v. Burger, 14-0347, p. 298 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/28/16);
191 So. 3d 79.
15. Id. at 296.
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court delivered this holding after reading Louisiana Civil Code articles 2031 and 2329 in pari materia to determine whether 2329 provided a “rule of public order” or if it was simply a “rule intended for
the protection of private parties.” 16 Here, the court reasoned that
since this is the case, the action results in a relative nullity. 17 Only
one of the Burgers, as private parties in the termination agreement,
can seek to declare it a nullity. Third parties, such as Radcliffe, cannot terminate the agreement on the basis of relative nullity. Under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2032, a relative nullity can only be invoked by a party for whose interest the nullity was found. 18
Instead, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that a revocatory
action, as governed by Louisiana Civil Code article 2036, was the
proper means to attack the validity of the Burger’s revocatory action. 19 However, Radcliffe failed to provide sufficient evidence to
support granting a revocatory action at trial. 20
III. COMMENTARY
The commentary will provide an in-depth look at how the Burgers cleverly utilized a change of matrimonial regime to evade a $3.4
million debt judgment under Louisiana Civil Code article 2329. An
understanding of the distinction between absolute and relative nullities is also essential in understanding why Radcliffe was unable to
recover in the case at issue despite a technical error in the Burgers’
paperwork. The last section of this essay discusses another means
by which Radcliffe could have secured a remedy.

16. Id. at 300.
17. Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2031, if the Burgers’ faulty joint petition was found in violation of a rule of public order, the action would result in
an absolute nullity.
18. The Court held that, in this case, the only persons who could invoke the
relative nullity would be one of the Burgers.
19. Radcliffe, 219 So. 3d at 303-304.
20. Id.
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A. Post-Matrimonial Agreements
In Louisiana, under Louisiana Civil Code article 2334, a community property regime is the default matrimonial regime. Under
article 2329, a couple may choose to modify or alter the community
property regime either before or after entering into a marriage. A
married couple may only modify their marriage arrangement after
filing a “joint petition,” which is an amicable proceeding. The court
is asked to verify that the modification requested “serves their best
interests and that they understand the governing principles and
rules.” 21 The fact that the law requires the court to verify that the
change does not sacrifice the interest of either spouse or both
spouses explains the requirement for couples to file jointly. Arguably, the husband’s erroneous suit against his wife, rather than filing
jointly de facto, served the same purpose.
Article 2329 effectively allows a court to determine what is best
for parties in an intimate relationship, which may contradict the
holding in Radcliffe, in which the court impliedly held marriage is a
legal relationship others cannot encroach on. Additionally, though
marriage is an intimate relationship between two persons, executing
a patrimonial agreement after marriage interferes with the rights of
third parties. For instance, in this case, moving from a community
to a separation regime implies a partition of the community which
may adversely affect the interests of the spouses’ creditors.
B. Absolute and Relative Nullity
Louisiana, like many other civil law jurisdictions around the
world, distinguishes between absolute and relative nullity. In Louisiana, relative nullity is defined by Civil Code article 2031, and article 2030 delineates absolute nullity. Article 2031 explains that relative nullity exists when a contract “violates the rule intended for
the protection of private parties.” Relative nullity may only be
21. Id. at 299.
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invoked by the “persons for whose interest the ground of nullity was
established”; a court may not declare a relative nullity on its own
motion or a petition by a third party. 22 In contrast, a contract is an
absolute nullity when it “violates a rule of public order.” Where a
nullity is absolute, it may be invoked by “any person or may be declared by the court on its initiative.” 23 There is a common misconception that an absolute nullity is more egregious than a relative nullity. 24 Jurisprudence even reinforces this erroneous idea. 25 But, in
reality, the effects of either type of nullity is identical in Louisiana
law. 26 The main distinction is whether a third party, such as a creditor, may or may not invoke the nullity.
Determining the permanency of the defect or problem which
created the nullity is also quintessential in classifying a nullity as
either relative or absolute. 27 Specifically, a relative nullity involves
a defect that is temporary: “once the offending element ceases, the
parties can redo the contract such that it has retroactive effect to
when the contract was first executed. In other words, the parties can
confirm it.” 28 In contrast, an absolute nullity occurs as the result of
a “defect or invalidity [that] is permanent insofar as the offending
transaction cannot be fixed in a way that gives it effect.” 29 When an
absolute nullity occurs, the contract must be redone without the offending element in order to attain validity. 30 In other words, a contract that is absolutely null cannot be confirmed.
To summarize, the Radcliffe court rightly decided that the procedural error in the Burgers’ separate regime agreement was a
22. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2031 (2019).
23. Id. art. 2031.
24. See Ulfers, supra note 2, at 12.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 13.
27. Id. at 14.
28. Id.
29. Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Rethinking the Doctrine of Nullity, 74 LA. L. REV.
663, 693 (2014).
30. It is important to note that public order nullities are only one form of defective acts that result in absolute nullity. They fit the classic definition of an absolute nullity because they are rules of public order.
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violation of a “rule intended for the protection of private parties”
and is therefore a relative nullity in accordance with Louisiana Civil
Code article 2031. The Burgers alone have the right to seek nullification or confirm the contract. The procedural requirement set by
article 2039 is not a rule of public order; it simply aims at protecting
the consent of both spouses. Therefore, Radcliffe is left without a
valid argument to combat the validity of the separate regime agreement. It is important to remember that third-party interests, particularly those concerning security and credit, are at stake when couples
change matrimonial regimes to the detriment of their creditors.
However, for them to seek absolute nullity, a rule of public order
must be violated, which does not seem to be the case. The lack of
such a rule puts the public policy in peril, opening the door for couples to simply transfer all their debts to the more responsible (or solvent) as a means of avoiding large debt settlements. The civil law
tradition, however, provides for another remedy in such circumstances, the revocatory action.
C. Revocatory Action
A revocatory action ultimately provides repayment to creditors
for the “damage they have suffered by the fraud committed against
them by the debtor.” 31 This action allows a debtor to invalidate a
fraudulent transfer of funds. 32 Historically, this action is also known
as a Paulian action. 33 In times of antiquity, a revocatory action provided a penalty equal to the harm caused within the penal system. 34
By bringing a Paulian action, creditors are allowed to regain possession of property “fraudulently alienated.” 35 Property is fraudulently
alienated when it is moved or partitioned in such a manner as to
injure the interest of a creditor. A revocatory action allows a court
31. MARCEL PLANIOL, 2 TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW § 327 (La. State Law
Inst. trans., 11th ed. 1959).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. PLANIOL, supra note 31, at 191.
35. Id.
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to find a “remedy for a judgment creditor whose debtor has transferred all of his or her assets” by invalidating the transfer which
made the debtor insolvent and therefore unable to pay his or her
debts. 36 Louisiana courts have recognized revocatory actions are an
appropriate remedy for creditors (such as Radcliffe) swindled by
married couples hoping to evade debt collection by shuffling around
assets subject to seizure. 37
In Louisiana, revocatory actions are governed by Louisiana
Civil Code articles 2036 and 2037. A revocatory action brought under this article brings restitution. The creditor who brings the action
is distinct from the other creditors pursuing the third party. In accordance with Louisiana Civil Code article 2043, bringing a revocatory action effectively nullifies the fraudulent act only “in the interest of the defrauded creditor and remains effective with all its consequences with regard to all other persons.” 38 The revocatory action
brings about a nullity that is the “most direct and simple means of
assuring the creditor the reparation to which he has a right.” 39
In the case at issue, Radcliffe brought the revocatory action
against Mr. Burger in an attempt to get hold of his assets. The fraudulent act, according to Radcliffe, is the change of matrimonial regime: by abandoning the community regime and adopting a regime
of separation, valuable community assets were shifted to Burger’s
wife, thereby defeating the enforcement of the preexisting debt judgment. In such a case, the revocatory action allows third party creditors to step in and nullify the act, provided that the fraudulent act of
failure to act “causes or increases the obligor’s insolvency.” 40
In Radcliffe v. Burger, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized
that the revocatory action was the appropriate remedy for the case
36. SUSAN KALINKA, JEFFRY W. KOONCE & PHILIP T. HACKNEY, LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE—LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND PARTNERSHIPS: A
GUIDE TO BUSINESS AND TAX PLANNING § 1:44 (4th ed., West 2019)
37. ANDREA CARROLL & RICHARD D. MORENO, 16 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE—MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 7:5 (4th ed., West 2019)
38. PLANIOL, supra note 31, at 191.
39. Id.
40. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2036 (2019).
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at issue. 41 However, the court denied the revocatory action requested
by Radcliffe because of the narrow language utilized by the creditor.
In fact, the court stated “the record is devoid of any evidence” to
prove that the new marriage agreement “caused or increased Mr.
Burger’s insolvency.” 42 The proof of insolvency is the hot-button
issue here. Proof of preexisting insolvency or of causation of insolvency is required by article 2036, and according to article 2037: “An
obligor is insolvent when the total of his liabilities exceeds the total
of his fairly appraised assets.” This holding serves as a warning: a
plaintiff to a revocatory action risks a multi-million-dollar loss by
coming to court without his opponent’s accounts and balance
sheets—prove the figures so that the court can do the math.

41. Radcliffe, 219 So. 3d at 302.
42. Id.

BOOK REVIEW
THE FUTURE OF CONTRACT LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: THE
PRINCIPLES OF LATIN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW, by Rodrigo
Momberg & Stefan Vogenauer (eds.), Bloomsbury, 2017, ISBN
978-1-50991-427-2, 352 pp, £81.
One of the most surprising facts when studying Latin American
contract law arises from its fragmented legal history and its consequent inability to speak the same language: despite having legal
codes sharing common origins, contemporary Latin American contract law has not succeeded in achieving any workable union or
cross-system harmonization. All effortsat least when compared
with the European Unionhave so far been unsuccessful: Andean
Pact, ALADI, ALBA, and UNASUR. Even MERCOSUR, since its
establishment in 1991, has failed to bring to life a related tribunal.
Without a court, the projected Southern Common Market has not
moved beyond platitudes and a few commercial agreements. Rodrigo Momberg and Stefan Vogenauer’s edited volume proposes another attempt at analysis. A group of legal academics, with the support of the French “Fondation pour le droit continental” and the
Chilean “Fundación Fernando Fueyo” (attached to the Universidad
Diego Portales), joined in a private project. They were concerned
with the Principles of Latin American Contract Law (PLACL)’s potential to provideas Momberg describes in his contribution“a
source of inspiration for the reform and modernization of contract
law in Latin America.” 1
The initial question that arises reading this book is whether such
a well-intentioned private project still has the same degree of necessity. The problem is not a theoretical oneespecially having in
1. Rodrigo Momberg, The Process of Private Law in Latin America: An
Overview, in THE FUTURE OF CONTRACT LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: THE
PRINCIPLES OF LATIN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW (Rodrigo Momberg & Stefan
Vogenauer eds., Bloomsbury 2017).
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mind the recent reforms produced with the new Civil and Commercial Codes of Argentina and the Civil Code of Brazil, two major
players in Latin America, as well as Latin American law’s broad
acceptance of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG), which has now been adopted
by 19 countries in the region, leaving aside until today only Bolivia,
Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela. Guatemala, which belonged to the same list until recently, will begin to apply for CISG
in 2021. But, more important than the wide acceptance of the CISG,
on February 22, 2019, during its regular session held at its headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, the Inter-American Juridical Committee (CJI)
approved the final version of the Guide on the Law Applicable to
International Commercial Contracts in the Americas. 2 The Guide
takes into account at all times the main existing instruments on the
subject of international contracts such as the EU’s Rome I regulation
and, in particular, the OAS’ 1994 Inter-American Convention on the
Law Applicable to International Contracts (the “Mexico Convention”) and the Hague Conference on Private International Law’s
2015 Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (the “Hague Principles”). The provisions of these instruments
and even some comments on the Hague Principles are often copied
literally in the Guide’s text. It is exciting work, but although approved in 2019, two years after the publication of this volume, the
Guide’s antecedents go back as far as 1994 with approval of the
Mexico Convention, and they were considered by the book here discussed, as a failed project. Later, Professor Vogenauer, one of the
book’s editors, was part of the project initiated in March 2019 by
the Hague Conference on Private International Law’s Council on
General Affairs and Policy to submit a consolidated draft Legal
Guide to Uniform Legal Instruments in International Commercial

2. See Organization of American States Inter-American Juridical Committee, Guide on the Law Applicable to International Commercial Contracts in the
Americas (2019), available at https://perma.cc/349J-9Z22.
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Contracts, itself a joint project of the Hague, UNCITRAL, and
UNIDROIT.
In the volume’s first chapter, Rodrigo Momberg begins by studying the process of harmonization of private law in Latin America.
One standard structure and vocabulary is in the French Code Civil
copied by five Latin American nations and quoted as a source by
several more. The Chilean Código Civil prepared by the Venezuelan
Andrés Bello was adopted by six other countries of this subcontinent
and taken into consideration by other drafters such as the Brazilian
Texeira de Freitas. Momberg finds that harmonization (unification)
happened in Latin American private law through the codification of
principles of private international law, first with the work of the
Montevideo Conference of 1888 and the 1926 Bustamante Code,
and later with the Inter-American Specialized Conferences on Private International Law (CIDIP). Beginning in 1975, seven CIDIP
conferences drafted twenty conventions, three protocols, two uniform documents, and one model law. Reviewing the PLACL, Momberg, with a clear sense of reality, recognizes that acceptance of
PLACL by private parties would require the concomitant consolidation of a relevant body of doctrine and case law.
Pizarro Wilson, another scholar who took an active part in the
project, offers a general introduction to the PLACL. He mentions
that one challenge faced by the group was determining which legal
culture represents Latin America. He understands that the group
moves forward with a text that “respects our traditions.” However,
recognizing that the law on contracts in South America varies
widely, the author admits that the project’s objective was to offer a
model for reforms in those countries that needed it or, in the remaining jurisdictions, an inspiration for better solutions for courts. Despite such good intentions, the group engaged in conflictive discussions (such as including in the Principles the concept of cause) that
will produce resistance from well-established legal points of view
throughout the region. The PLACL did not offer a complement of
existing legal instruments applied in the region like CISG, as
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happened with UNIDROIT Principles, and beyond the scholarly interest in such a project, it seems that it helps more to determine
where conflictive points exist, rather than offering a model or inspiration.
In chapter 3, Agustín Parise refers to the harmonization of private Law in Latin America and the emergence of third-generation
codes. Parise understands that Latin American participation in a
globalized economy requires new solutions and a new generation of
codes that must provide a lingua franca for juridical relations. He
explains that three generations of codes exist in Latin America: secessionistscodes adopted during the post-independence period;
differentialsnew codes that projected differentiation among regions; and globalistscodes looking to address the realities of new
global settings. In Parise’s opinion, harmonization efforts must start
in areas with common ground, and from there may proceed to specialized areas of private law. Contract law could provide the first
path to achieve the “typical” Latin American flavor, whatever that
means. Harmonization efforts such as PLACL must aim to a degree
of universality that respects particularities.
In the next chapter, Jan Peter Schmidt offers a European perspective on the PLACL against the background of Latin American
legal culture. In the beginning of his contribution, Schmidt recognizes that there is no such thing as “the” Latin American private law
culture. This comment is a breath of fresh air because, being Latin
American, I was beginning to wonder whether I have lost something
in the meantime. Schmidt subtly remarks that Latin America had
been identified with the magical realism of its literature, the skill of
its soccer players, and its history of military coups, but not its legal
contributions. Latin American codes have been produced in imitation of the codes of the French or Romanistic legal family, and the
legal order could be classified as “mixed” because of the coexistence
of French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian ideas within
one legal order. The frequent recourse to foreign legal sources does
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not follow any clear methodological criteria. It has in fact diminished the value of domestic legislation and reveals a passion in Latin
America for quoting foreign authorities. Schmidt produces an exciting and intelligent array of examples in support of these conclusions.
He accepts that the PLACL might serve as a kind of “background
law” which could also help to increase the visibility of Latin American jurists.
In chapter 4, Gerardo Caffera is concerned with the economic
conditions of contracts in South American Law from a historical
perspective. He recognizes that the PLACL’s provision on the gross
disparity between contractual parties does not match the recent
trends in South American legal systems, which have been characterized by rampant inflation.
In the final chapter of the first part, Pilar Perales Viscasillas
compares the PLACL with CISG and argues that, considering the
CISG’s direct application to the international sale of goods contracts, PLACL could be seen instead as a complementary rather than
competing instrument. She offers a fascinating series of tables comparing both instruments; first, offering a general comparison about
the origin, the scope of application and issued covered; and then a
list of principles and some duties of both instruments. Finally, she
compares their main differences concerning the essential elements
of an offer, the offer to the public, the withdrawal, revocation, the
expiration of the offer, its irrevocability, its acceptance, and a comparison between the performance and non-performance of contractual obligations. Despite the broader remedies adopted by PLACL,
Perales Viscasillas finds that the principles do not provide a solution
related to the interest rate in case of non-performance, a frequently
debated matter under the CISG.
The second part of the volume offers a comparative analysis of
the PLACL. In chapter 7, Iñigo de la Maza Gazmuri explores the
PLACL’s notion of contract and its essential elements. Interestingly,
given a project like PLACL that looks for harmonizing principles of
Latin American contract law, de la Maza Gazmuri begins pointing
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out that for PLACL, according to its article 9 consent, subject matter
and cause are the essential elements to form a contract. The latter is
especially interesting in a project of this nature. Cause as a contractual element, which originated in France but was later erased in the
French reform of the Code Civil, was nevertheless resurrected somehow in the new Argentine Civil and Commercial Code (Articles 281
to 283) on juridical acts, while Article 1013 explicitly declares under
the title “Necessity”: “The cause must exist in the formation of the
contract and its conclusion and subsist during its execution. The lack
of cause gives rise, depending on the case, to the nullity, adaptation,
or termination of the contract.” 3 It will be interesting to follow the
Argentine jurisprudence in this sense, and if cause will be interpreted as “consideration.” Inclusion of cause as an essential element
for a contract will be protested and refused mostly in the same countries where supposedly the PLACL was trying to harmonize its
rules.
Earlier, Rodrigo Momberg analyzed from a comparative perspective the rules on formation of contract contained in PLACL,
and, in his second contribution (chapter 8), he again studies the concept of cause in Latin American codes, which was not included in
the codes of Brazil, Paraguay, Ecuador, or Mexico. He remarks that
some important issues, not usually considered in Latin American
civil codes, were not considered by the PLACL. Examples include
the letter of confirmation, merger clause, and standard terms, matters that have been analyzed in a substantial body of case-law issued
by tribunals and arbiters dealing with CISG. Although Momberg
suggests that the matter deserves further attention given that these
issues commonly arise in commercial contracts, none of them is familiar in Latin America.
Next, John Cartwright analyzes the question of defects in the
formation of contracts when the parties are acting under a mistake,
or one of them has acted under fraud, pressure, or some other form
3. ARG. CIV. & COMM. C., Art. 1013 (2016).
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of misconduct. The PLACL tries to establish a balance of protections for claimant and defendant based on a compromise with the
rules contained in the different national traditions and the “soft law”
systems found in Europe.
In chapter 10, Jean-Sébastien Borghetti studies performance and
non-performance under the PLACL. He understands that, compared
to the Napoleonic tradition embedded in many Latin American civil
codes, the drafters of the PLACL chose to modernize the approach
to performance and non-performance. In his opinion, the PLACL
shows some interesting diversions from the Code Civil including,
for instance, its rules on defective performance or correction of defective performance, which were overlooked in the French text but
included in the CISG. Borghetti expresses surprise that the PLACL
did not consider some issues of importance like the fate of the contract when a change of circumstances happens.
Sabrina Lanni also deals with the provision of non-performance
in the PLACL. In chapter 11, Lanni underlines that the principle of
good faith, of the kind found in several Latin American civil codes,
dominates the legal content of the PLACL. The new Latin American
civil codes also include references to due diligence similar to the
ones incorporated into the PLACL. Lanni looks for the pattern of
comparison for measuring good faith and due diligence. The
PLACL avoids any reference to the standard conduct of a reasonable
person.
Finally, Hugh Beale offers an outsider’s response to the PLACL,
asking seven questions about the PLACL’s purposes, aims, guiding
philosophy, and intended users. He recognizes the academic work
performed by the PLACL drafters, but he also underlines that several decisions remain to be made concerning the intended purposes
of the PLACL.
The book has an appendix with the PLACL text in Spanish and
English, as well as a thematic index.
Alberto L. Zuppi

